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ART. I. — *Le Protestantisme comparé au Catholicisme dans ses Rapports avec la Civilisation Européenne.* Par M. L'ABBÉ JACQUES BALMES. Paris: Debrécourt. 1842-44. 3 tomes. 8vo.

WE briefly noticed this work by the Abbé Balmes in our Review for April, 1848; but we find it, as we continue studying it, so various in its topics, and so rich in its views and suggestions, that we cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of again directing to its eloquent and erudite pages the attention of our readers and the public generally, both Catholic and Protestant. Balmes is a Spanish priest, still comparatively a young man, we believe, but one of the best known and most influential of the contemporary political and philosophical writers of his country, enjoying a high European reputation, and deservedly ranking among the first authors of our times. He is at once learned, philosophical, profound, and popular, — a man of the nineteenth century, and a Catholic of the most Catholic days of "most Catholic" Spain, — rigidly orthodox, unaffectedly pious, and wholly free, as far as we have been able to discover, from those tendencies and seductive speculations which have ruined a La Mennais or a Ventura, and in many minds cast suspicion on a Gioberti.

We have seen few works written with a more just appreciation of our age than the one before us, or so well adapted to the present state of the controversy which we are always obliged to carry on with the enemies of the Church. Its author understands well the essential nature of Protestantism, and clearly and distinctly points out the proper method of

meeting it under the various forms it at present assumes, and of imposing silence on its arrogant and noisy pretensions. He does not confine himself to the field of theological controversy, properly so called, but he meets Protestants on their own chosen ground, on the broad field of European civilization, and shows them that, under the point of view of civilization, of liberty, order, and social well-being, Protestantism has been a total failure, and that, even in reference to this world, Catholicity has found itself as superior to it as it claims to be in regard to the world to come. He does not merely vindicate Catholicity, in relation to civilization, from the charges preferred against it by the modern advocates of Liberalism and Progressism, but, by a calm appeal to history and philosophy, he shows that the opposing system has interrupted the work of civilization which the Church was prosecuting with vigor and success, and has operated solely in the interests of barbarism. In doing this, he has done a real service to the cause of truth, and we learn with pleasure that one of our friends in England has translated his work, — which he wrote originally both in French and Spanish, — and rendered it accessible to the great body of English and American readers.

Such a work as this was much needed in our language. We have, indeed, many able controversial works, — works admirable for the learning, ability, and skill of their authors; but we have comparatively few which are adapted to the present state of the controversy with Protestants. The greater part of those accessible to the mere English reader are well adapted only to the few individuals whose hearts the grace of God has already touched, and whose faces are already set towards the Church. Truth is one and invariable, but error is variable and manifold. It is always the same truth that we must oppose to error, but it is seldom the same error for two successive moments to which we must oppose it. We must shoot error, as well as folly, “as it flies,” and we must be able to shoot it under ever varying and varied disguises. The works we have, excellent as they are in their way, and admirably fitted to guard the faithful against many of the devices of the enemy to detach them from the Church, and to aid and instruct persons in heretical communions who are virtually prepared to return to the Church, do not hit the reigning form of Protestantism; they do not reach the seat of the disease, and are apparently written on the supposition of soundness, where there is, in fact, only rottenness. The principles they assume as the basis of

their refutation of Protestantism, though nominally professed or conceded by the majority of Protestants, are not held with sufficient firmness to be used as the foundation of an argument that is to have any practical efficacy in their conversion. They all appear to assume that Protestants as a body really mean to be Christians, and err only in regard to some of the dogmas of Christianity and the method of determining the faith; that Protestantism is a specific heresy, a distinct and positive form of error, like Arianism or Pelagianism, and that its adherents would regard themselves as bound to reject it, if proved to be repugnant to Christianity, or contrary to the Holy Scriptures. This is a natural and a charitable supposition; but we are sorry to say, that, if it was ever warrantable, it is not by any means warrantable in our times, except as to the small number of individuals in the several sects who are mere exceptions to the rule. Protestantism is no specific heresy, is no distinct or positive form of error, but error in general, indifferent to forms, and receptible of any form or of all forms, as suits the convenience or the exigency of its friends. It is a veritable Proteus, and takes any and every shape judged to be proper to deceive the eyes or to elude the blows of the champions of truth. It is Lutheran, Calvinistic, Arminian, Unitarian, Pantheistic, Atheistic, Pyrrhonic, each by turns or all at once, as is necessary to its purpose. The Protestant as such has, in the ordinary sense, no principles to maintain, no character to support, no consistency to preserve; and we are aware of no authority, no law, no usage, by which he will consent to be bound. Convict him from tradition, and he appeals to the Bible; convict him from the Bible, and he appeals to reason; convict him from reason, and he appeals to private sentiment; convict him from private sentiment, and he appeals to skepticism, or flies back to reason, to Scripture, or tradition, and alternately from one to the other, — never scrupling to affirm, one moment, what he denied the moment before, nor blushing to be found maintaining, that, of contraries, both may be true. He is indifferent as to what he asserts or denies, if able for the moment to obtain an apparent covert from his pursuers.

Protestants do not study for the truth, and are never to be presumed willing to accept it, unless it chances to be where and what they wish it. They occasionally read our books and listen to our arguments, but rarely to ascertain our doctrines, or to learn what we are able to say against them or for ourselves. The thought, that we may possibly be right, seldom



occurs to them; and when it does, it is instantly suppressed as an evil thought, as a temptation from the Devil. They take it for granted, that, against us, they are right, and cannot be wrong. This is with them a "fixed fact," admitting no question. They condescend to consult our writings, or to listen to our arguments, only to ascertain what doctrines they can profess, or what modifications they can introduce into those which they have professed, that will best enable them to elude our attacks, or give them the appearance of escaping conviction by the authorities from tradition, Scripture, reason, and sentiment which we array against them. Candor or ingenuousness towards themselves even is a thing wholly foreign to their Protestant nature, and they are instinctively and habitually cavillers and sophisticators. They disdain to argue a question on its merits, and always, if they argue at all, argue it on some unimportant collateral. They never recognize—unless it is for their interest to do so—any distinction between a *transeal* and a *concedo*, and rarely fail to insist that the concession of an irrelevant point is a concession of the main issue. They have no sense of responsibility, no loyalty to truth, no mental chastity, no intellectual sincerity. What is for them is authority which nobody must question; what is against them is no authority at all. Their own word, if not in their favor, they refuse to accept; and the authority to which they professedly appeal they repudiate the moment it is seen not to sustain them. To reason with them as if they would stand by their own professions, or could or would acknowledge any authority but their own ever-varying opinions, is entirely to mistake them, and to betray our own simplicity.

Undoubtedly, many of our friends, who have not, like ourselves, been brought up Protestants, and have not to blush at the knowledge their Protestant experience has given them, may feel that in this judgment we are rash and uncharitable. Would that we were so. We take no pleasure in thinking ill of any portion of our fellow-men, and would always rather find ourselves wrong in our unfavorable judgments of them than right. But in this matter the evidence is too clear and conclusive to allow us even to hope that we are wrong. There is not a single Protestant doctrine opposed to Catholicity that even Protestants themselves have not over and over again completely refuted; there is not a single charge brought by Protestants against the Church that some of them, as well as we, have not fully exploded; and no more conclusive vindication

of the claims of Catholicity can be desired than may be — nay, than in fact has been — collected from distinguished Protestant writers themselves. This is a fact which no Protestant, certainly no Catholic, can deny. How happens it, then, that the Protestant world still subsists, and that, for the last hundred and fifty years, we have made comparatively little progress in regaining Protestants to the Church?

We may, it is true, be referred to the obstinacy in error characteristic of all heretics; but, in the present case, — unless what is meant is obstinacy in error in general, and not in error in particular, — this will not suffice as an answer; because, during this period, there has been no one particular form of error to which Protestants have uniformly adhered. No class of Protestants adheres to-day to the opinions it originally avowed. In this respect, there is a marked difference between the Protestant sects of modern times and the early Oriental sects. The Jacobite holds to-day the same specific heresy which he held a thousand years ago; and the Nestorian of the nineteenth is substantially the Nestorian of the fourth century. But nothing analogous is true of any of the modern Protestant sects. Protestants boast, indeed, their glorious Reformation, but they no longer hold the views of its authors. Luther, were he to ascend to the scenes of his earthly labors, would be utterly unable to recognize his teachings in the doctrines of the modern Lutherans; the Calvinist remains a Calvinist only in name; the Baptist disclaims his Anabaptist original; the Unitarian points out the errors he detects in his Socinian ancestors; and the Transcendentalist looks down with pity on his Unitarian parents, while he considers it a cruel persecution to be excluded from the Unitarian family. No sect retains, unmodified, unchanged, the precise form of error with which it set out. All the forms Protestants have from time to time assumed have been developed, modified, altered, almost as soon as assumed, — always as internal or external controversy made it necessary or expedient. Here is a fact nobody can deny, and it proves conclusively that the Protestant world does not subsist solely by virtue of its obstinate attachment to the views or opinions to which it has once committed itself, or in consequence of its aversion to change the doctrines it has once professed.

This fact proves even more than this. Bossuet very justly concludes from the *variations* of Protestantism its *objective* falsity, because the characteristic of truth is invariability; but we may go farther, and from the same variations conclude the

*subjective* falsity of Protestantism, or that Protestants have no real belief in, or attachment to, the particular doctrines they profess, — not only that Protestants profess a false doctrine, but that they are insincere, and destitute, as a body, of real honesty in their professions. If they believed their doctrines, they could never tolerate the changes they undergo. New sects might, indeed, arise among them, but no sect would suffer its original doctrines to be in the least altered or modified. The members of every sect, if they believed its creed, would, so long as they adhered to it, be struck with horror at the bare idea of altering or modifying it; for it would seem to them to be altering or modifying the revealed Word of God. This is a point of no slight importance in judging the Protestant world, and seems to us to deserve more attention than the great body of Catholics even are disposed to give it. These variations prove, at least, that Protestantism is something distinct from the formal teachings of Protestants, and something that can and does survive them.

That we are neither rash nor uncharitable in our judgment of Protestants, severe as it unquestionably is, may be collected from facts of daily occurrence. The great body of Protestants, it is well known, labor unceasingly to detach Catholics from the Church, and to this end use all the means the age and country will tolerate. It was to combine their forces against Catholicity, that, a few years since, under the pontificate of Gregory XVI., the Protestant ministers held their World's Convention in London; that they formed Protestant alliances in England, Germany, France, Switzerland, and this country, devised a plan in concert with the Italian refugees in these several countries for effecting a civil revolution in every Catholic state, especially in the Papal States, and called upon the Protestant people everywhere to contribute funds for carrying it out, — a plan, even to minute particulars, which the well-known ministers, Bacon, Coxe, Beecher, Kirk, and others, forewarned us of in a meeting of the Protestant Alliance in this city in 1845, and which we have seen to a great extent realized during the last two years, much to the joy of thousands of nominal Catholics, who little suspected themselves to be the dupes of miserable demagogues on the one hand, and of hypocritical Protestant ministers on the other. But while Protestants, in season and out of season, by means fair and by means foul, by means open and by means secret and tortuous, seek to detach Catholics from the Church, they appear quite indifferent as to



which of the thousand and one Protestant formulas they are led to embrace, or whether, indeed, they are led to embrace any one of them. Excepting, as we always do, here and there an individual, they are satisfied with the simple fact, that those drawn off from the Church are no longer Catholics. Whatever we lose, they count their gain, and although they are well aware that the majority of those they gain from us turn out rank apostates, infidels, and blasphemers, they nevertheless rejoice over them, and claim them as so many accessions to their ranks. If Protestants had any sincerity in their professions, if they had any sense of religion, how could they regard themselves as triumphing in proportion as they succeed in detaching miserable wretches from us, and sinking them in religion even below the ancient heathen, — especially since none of them dare pretend that we do not embrace all the essentials of the Christian religion, or that salvation is not attainable in our Church? They profess to be Christians, but they would rather make us, infidels, apostates, atheists, blasphemers, than suffer us to remain Catholics. What more conclusive proof can you ask of their insincerity, — of the fact that their professions afford no clew to the real state of their minds, and ought to count for nothing?

Doubtless, we are not to be understood to imply that Protestants are always distinctly conscious of their own want of strict honesty and sincerity. No man knoweth whether he deserveth love or hatred. Knowledge of one's self is hard to acquire; self-deception is one of the easiest things in the world, and few there are who are certain that they have a *good* conscience, or are sure of the motives which govern them. No doubt, Protestants gloss over their conduct, and have some method of justifying it in their own eyes; no doubt, they persuade themselves that they are sincere, — at least as sincere as they can afford to be, as honest in their belief as people generally are; but they know not what manner of spirit they are of, and as that spirit is inherently a lying spirit, as Catholics well know, it must needs lie unto themselves as well as unto others. Probably every heresiarch dupes himself before he dupes others, and holds the post of leader only because a greater dupe than his followers. That kind of honesty and sincerity compatible with a false spirit and gross delusion, we are not disposed to deny to Protestants; but we should remember that no really sincere and truthful mind ever is or ever can be deluded. No man ever is or ever was strictly honest and sincere

in the profession of a false doctrine, — for no false doctrine can ever, in the nature of things, be so evidenced as to exclude doubt; and he who professes to believe what he doubts professes what he knows he does not believe, and therefore professes what he knows is not true. A man may be honestly in doubt as to what is or is not the truth on certain points; but no man can honestly *profess* faith in a false doctrine, — for in a false doctrine no man can have faith.

A sort of honesty and sincerity we certainly concede to the generality of Protestants; but as to the end for which they profess their doctrines, rather than as to the doctrines themselves. The principle common to them, and the only one we can always be sure they will practically adhere to, is, that the end justifies the means. The end they propose is, neither to save their souls nor to discover and obey the truth, but to destroy or elude Catholicity. The spirit which possesses them maddens them against the Church, and gives them an inward repugnance to everything not opposed to her. To overthrow her, to blot out her existence, or to prevent her from crushing them with the weight of her truth, is to them a praiseworthy end, at least a great and most desirable end; directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, it becomes the ruling passion — after money-getting — of their lives, — a passion in which they are confirmed and strengthened by all the blandishments of the world, and all the seductions of the flesh. Any means which tend to gratify this passion, to realize this end, they hold to be lawful, and they can adopt them, however base, detestable, or shocking in themselves, with a quiet conscience and admirable self-complacency.

That the ruling motive or dominant instinct of Protestants, in their character of Protestants, is, under a negative point of view at least, to destroy or elude Catholicity, is evident from the character of the variations which their Protestantism has undergone, and is daily and hourly undergoing. Examine these variations, and you will find that they each and all tend to remove Protestantism farther and farther from the Catholic standard, and to shelter it from the blows of Catholic assailants. Each successive reformer eliminates from his sect some Catholic doctrine which it may have retained, or modifies some element of which he sees the Catholic controversialist can take advantage. The tendency of the Protestant world, collectively and in each of its divisions and subdivisions, has been steadily in the direction from the Church against which it pro-



tests, and the progress, which Protestants so loudly boast, has consisted, and still consists, in getting rid of what they originally retained in common with Catholics. The Protestant vanguard, which announces that the main body is at hand, has advanced very far, and retains less of Christian principle than was retained by the old heathen world in the times of the Apostles. Take your fully developed Transcendentalist, the last word of Protestantism, and you will find him divested of every Catholic principle, and, under the point of view of religion, reduced, not only to nudity, but to nibility. The poor man retains nothing, not even so much as a shadow. He is a Peter Schlemil, and has sold his shadow to the man in black. What can have reduced him to such straits, — driven him to such extremes? Love of truth, force of conviction? Nothing of the sort. Be not so simple as to pretend it. He assigns, and attempts to assign, no authority, no reason, for his nihilism. He even acknowledges that he has no reason to assign, and tells you that he only throws out what he thinks, without pretending to prove it. He is a seer, and utters what he sees, and you must take him at his word, or not at all. Why, then, does he rush into nihilism? Simply, because he is seer enough to see, that, if he admits that anything exists, he will be driven ultimately to acknowledge the truth of Catholicity. Rather than do that, he will sell his soul, as well as his shadow, to the man in black, and consent to deny his own existence. Almost every day, we meet intelligent Protestant gentlemen who frankly acknowledge that there is no alternative but Catholicity or no-religion, and yet who just as frankly tell us that they will not be Catholics. Not long since, a Protestant minister of respectable standing in this city assured us, in all seriousness, that he “would rather be damned than become a Catholic.” We of course informed him that he could have his choice, for Almighty God forces no one to accept the gift of eternal life. This worthy minister is, no doubt, very ready to embrace the truth that does not convict him of error, if such truth there be; but if we may take him at his word, he is prepared to resist, at all hazards, the truth that would indict him. Is it truth, or his own opinion, that he loves?

The mistake of our popular controversialists seems to arise from their supposition, that Protestantism can be learned from the symbolical books and theological writings of Protestants. Undoubtedly we can thus learn that Protestantism which is put forth to elude Catholicity, or to lure Catholics from their

Church, and therefore a Protestantism highly important, for the sake of Catholics, to be studied and refuted ; but not thus can we learn the Protestantism which lies in the Protestant mind and heart, and which it is necessary to refute for the sake of Protestants themselves. This Protestantism is not learned from symbolical books or theological writings, and but comparatively few Protestants themselves can give us a clear and distinct statement, much less a just account, of it. We can seize it only in the historical developments and manifest tendencies of the Protestant movement, and explain it only by means of a thorough knowledge of human nature on the one hand, and of Catholic faith and theology on the other.

It appears to us, that our controversialists are mistaken, also, in regarding the more reputable sects — that is, the sects which, in their symbols and professions, have departed the least from the Catholic standard — as better exponents of the Protestant mind than the less reputable, and as those whose views it is the most important to study and refute. Nearly all the controversial works we have, originally written in the English language, are directed against the Anglican and Protestant Episcopal sects. We are not aware of a single Catholic work, written expressly against the so-called Evangelical sects, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, or what we may call Pietism. And, with the exception of the profound and scientific work of Father Kollmann, against Unitarians, — too profound and scientific to be intelligible to those for whom it was written, — we have in English not a single work against Rationalism, which, in reality, has a larger number of adherents, in both England and this country, than either Anglicanism or Evangelicalism. This indicates a serious defect in our controversial literature, and seems to us to be owing to a false estimate of the relative importance of the several Protestant sects. There are, no doubt, many individuals included in the more reputable sects, who, if compelled to choose, would sooner return to the Church than follow the Protestant movement to its natural terminus ; but they are only a small minority, and would hardly be missed in the sects to which they respectively belong. All the sects are on the move, tending somewhither. Not one of them is stationary. This they make their boast ; and one of the most frequent and most effective charges they bring against the Church is, that she is not progressive, but remains immovable, insisting that we shall believe to-day the very doctrines which she taught and believed in the Dark Ages. The

dominant tendency of any given sect is the tendency which the great majority of its members obey. Ascertain, then, the dominant tendency of each sect, and you have ascertained the direction in which the great majority of its members are moving, and will continue to move, if diverted or arrested by no foreign influence. But what, in fact, is the dominant tendency of each and every Protestant sect? Is there a single one whose successive developments, modifications, and changes tend to bring it nearer and nearer to the Catholic standard, and to prepare it for communion with the Church? Nobody can pretend it. Everybody knows that every sect is moving in the opposite direction, and that the dominant tendency of the Protestant world, a few individuals excepted, is towards Rationalism, Transcendentalism, and therefore towards pantheism, atheism, nihilism. This is decisive, and proves that those sects which have departed farthest from Catholicity are the truest representatives of the Protestant spirit, and the best exponents of genuine Protestantism, as the fully developed man is a better exponent of humanity than the new-born infant. What it is most important, then, to study and refute, must be the principles of these more advanced sects, not those of the sects who remain behind, or are still rocking in their cradle, — Transcendentalism, rather than Anglicanism.

Undoubtedly we see, from time to time, a conservative, perhaps a retrograde, movement in the bosom of the several sects. But this movement is the result, in most cases, of alarm for the credit or prosperity of the sect, rather than of any deep or sincere attachment to the principles or doctrines the sect threatens to leave behind. Besides, the movement is ever but a mere eddy in the stream, or a slight ripple on its surface. It reaches never to the bottom of the sect, and arrests or diverts never its main current. This is evident from the late Oxford movement, one of the most important movements of the kind which has recently been witnessed. There was a time when timid Protestants feared, and many good Catholics hoped, that it would restore England to Catholic faith and unity; but no sooner did it become manifest to all the world that its tendency was to communion with Rome, than it was arrested. A few individuals became reconciled to the Church, but the majority of those at first favorably disposed towards it avowedly or tacitly abandoned it, lapsed into the ordinary channel of their sect, and suffered themselves to be borne onward with it towards its natural term, — no-religion, or nihil-



ism. So it is in every sect in which a similar movement takes place. As soon as it is clear that its tendency is anti-Protestant, that is, towards Rome, it is arrested, and only here and there an individual dares henceforth avow his adherence to it.

It may be thought by some, that the more reputable sects are the real bulwarks of Protestantism, and that, if we refute them, the less reputable sects will fall of themselves. Doubtless this is one reason why our English and American Catholic controversialists direct their attacks so exclusively against Anglicanism and Protestant Episcopalianism. But we are disposed to believe that the real supporters of Protestantism, if not in themselves, at least in their views and influence, are the sects which are farthest removed from Catholicity. If there was nothing below Anglicanism to which Anglicans could descend, we should have short work with it, and the Anglican and Episcopal sects would soon disappear. The more reputable sects, comparing themselves with the immense Protestant world below them, look upon themselves as substantially orthodox, and are more disposed to dwell on what they retain than others have given up, than on what they themselves lack which we have. They form, too, a sort of aristocracy, a *haute noblesse*, in the sectarian world, and are pleased with their rank, and unwilling to forego the importance it gives them in their own eyes. Moreover, the sects below them, all Protestant, and of their own race, smooth the descent for them in proportion as they are driven from their more elevated position, and enable them to descend by an easy gradation, by almost imperceptible steps, to the lowest depths of error. If the High-churchman is defeated, he can descend to Low-churchism; if the Low-churchman is defeated, he can descend to Evangelicalism; if the Evangelical is defeated, he can descend either, on the one hand, to Rationalism, or, on the other, to Transcendentalism, — for, in point of fact, Evangelicalism is nothing but a loose combination of Rationalism and Transcendentalism. It is far easier for a High-churchman to become a Low-churchman than it is for him to become a Catholic, and always is the next step in the descending scale far easier to take than the next step in the ascending scale.

“Facilis descensus Averno :

Noctes atque dies patet atri janua Ditis ;  
Sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras,  
Hoc opus, hic labor est.”

As long as there is a lower step that can be taken without

abandoning the essential element of Protestantism, the defeat of the more reputable sects, on the ground they profess to occupy, will do little for their conversion ; for they will never acknowledge, even to themselves, that they are defeated, so long as there is any conceivable Protestant ground from which they are not actually driven. It is owing to the fact that Protestants now claim as Protestant all the territory between the ground occupied by Dr. Pusey and that occupied by M. Proudhon, and thus have a larger field for advance or retreat, that we find their conversion in our times so much more difficult than it was formerly. St. Francis of Sales, Bishop of Geneva, himself alone regained seventy-two thousand Protestants to the Church ; we are aware of no bishop in the present age, however zealous, learned, able, or saintly, who has the consolation of recovering anything approaching a like number. We cannot, therefore, but regard the views and tendencies of the more advanced sects as those which it is now altogether the most important to study and refute.

Not only does Protestantism, as our divines have from the first maintained, logically lead to the denial of all religion, to atheism, and therefore to nihilism, — for to deny that God exists is to deny that anything is, — but it is now clear to all who have examined the subject, that the great body of Protestants are really prepared, as occasion may require, to follow it thus far. The majority of the Protestant world are really, if not avowedly, Transcendentalists to-day, as every one knows who is acquainted with recent Protestant literature ; and Strauss, Feuerbach, Bauer, Parker, Emerson, Michelet, Cabet, and Proudhon have more sympathizers than Hengstenberg, Pusey, Seabury, Schaf, Alexander, Beecher, and Kirk. Proudhon is nothing but a consistent Red Republican ; and where is the Protestant, in case he is not restrained by his temporal interest, who does not sympathize with Red Republicanism ? Have not Protestants very generally, in England and this country, sympathized with Mazzini and his Roman Republic ? Nay, was it not in concert with, and by aid even of, the more reputable Protestant sects, that he expelled the Sovereign Pontiff, and established his Reign of Terror ? Is not Protestant sympathy very generally enlisted in favor of the infidel and Socialistic revolutions in Europe, all of which have been stirred up and helped on by Protestants, under the lead of their ministers, in the name of liberty, but really for the purpose of overthrowing and annihilating the Church ? Evident is it, then, that they

will go, as a body, to all lengths which they find necessary to accomplish their purpose of hostility to Catholicity ; and as they never can even logically overthrow the Church, so long as the existence of anything is admitted, they must deny everything, and rush into nihilism.

It is necessary, then, if we wish to arrest the Protestant movement, and do what in us lies to save the souls of Protestants, that we reason with them, not as if it were a sufficient refutation of them to prove that they are tending to atheism, but as men who believe nothing, and build up our argument against them from the very foundation. Prove to them that their doctrines are anti-Christian, and they will only beg you to inform them wherefore that is a reason for not believing them ; prove Christianity to be true, and they will merely beg you to prove your proofs, and thus demand of you an infinite series of proofs. They are, under the point of view of religion and philosophy, wholly rotten, and from the sole of the foot to the crown of the head there is no soundness in them. Nothing will answer for them that does not descend as low as the last denial that it is possible for the human mind to conceive, and drive them from position to position, till there is no position remaining outside of the Church which they can even affect to take.

Protestantism as we now find it, and even as it was, virtually, in the sixteenth century, is not merely the denial of certain Catholic dogmas, is not merely the denial of the Christian revelation itself, but really the denial of all religion and morality, natural and revealed. It denies reason itself, as far as it is in the power of man to deny it, and is no less unsound as philosophy than it is as faith. It extinguishes the light of nature no less than the light of revelation, and is as false in relation to the natural order as to the supernatural. Even when Protestants make a profession of believing in revelation, they discredit reason. In regard to reason, they are, even when professing to believe, very generally Pyrrhonists. The Evangelical sects, for instance, do not merely deny the sufficiency of reason as our only guide, but they deny its trustworthiness altogether, and assert that we must take for our guide the Scriptures, not as interpreted by an authority accredited to reason, nor as interpreted by reason itself, but as interpreted by the private illuminations of the spirit. They thus supersede, as it were, annihilate, reason, and reduce themselves to the condition of irrational beings, virtually declare man incapable of receiving



a supernatural revelation, and then call upon him to believe the Bible, and to walk by the supernatural light of faith. As long as their enthusiasm lasts, as long as they can keep up a sort of unnatural excitement, they may half persuade themselves that they are supernaturally illuminated ; but as soon as their fever abates, and they sink to their ordinary level, they experience the most painful misgivings, the supposed supernatural light fades away, and, having no reason on which to fall back, they can believe nothing, and either openly avow themselves infidels, or, merely keeping up a show of piety, seek relief by devoting all their energies to worldly distinctions or pleasures. They begin by proposing revelation, not as the complement, but as the substitute, of reason ; and when revelation fails, as fail it must if not supported by motives of credibility addressed to reason, and satisfactory to it, nothing remains for them but universal skepticism.

The formalistic sects, as the Anglican and Episcopalian, reach the same result, though by a different process. Building on sham, taking the shadow for the substance, and denying both the substance and the light the shadow necessarily implies, — or, in other words, refusing to draw from their premises their logical consequences, afraid to make a complete proposition, to say two and two make four, and stopping short with saying two and two, lest they lose the *via media*, and roll over to Rome, or fall off into dissent, — they destroy reason by mutilating and enslaving it, and find themselves without anything by or to which a supernatural revelation can be accredited. The Rationalistic sects, seeing the errors of Evangelicals and formalists, think to save reason by resolving the supernatural into the natural ; but in doing this they lose revelation, and therefore reason, — because no man can deny revelation without denying reason, and because reason without revelation is insufficient for herself, inadequate to the solution of the great problems of life which she herself raises. Beginning by asking of reason more than she can give, they end by discarding her and falling into universal skepticism, the ultimate term of all Protestantism.

Protestants, it is well known, are able to keep up the self-delusion that they are believers only by obstinately refusing to push their principles to their legitimate consequences, and by shutting their eyes to the objections which may be suggested or urged against them. The condition of a Protestant wishing to retain his Protestantism, and yet keep up the appear-

ance of being a believer, is most pitiable. The poor man has no mental freedom, no intellectual courage, but is a cowardly slave, with all the weakness and meanness characteristic of slaves in general. He never dares trust himself to his principles, and follow them out to their remotest logical consequences, and is doomed, turn which way he will, to be inconsequent, and to submit to a most tyrannical and capricious master ; for otherwise he would find himself, on the one hand, approaching too near Catholicity to remain a Protestant, or, on the other, too near to nihilism to even pretend to be a believer. Alas for the poor man ! He hugs his chains, and, by the strangest infatuation imaginable, fancies his slavery is freedom. All who have studied the subject know well that Protestants are Protestants, not by virtue of reason, but in spite of reason, — not because they reason, but solely because they do not, will not, and dare not reason. The rejection of reason is their fundamental vice. Reason is our natural light, and, though of no value out of its sphere, in its sphere is ineradicable. It does not suffice of itself for all the wants of the human soul, but its annihilation reduces us below the condition of men, and renders us incapable of receiving even a supernatural revelation. Revelation does not abrogate or supersede reason ; it restores it and supplies its deficiencies. Grace supposes nature. Christianity is a system of pure grace, — is, in fact, a supernatural creation, but a supernatural creation *for* the natural, designed to repair the damage nature has incurred by guilt, and to enable man to attain the end to which his Creator originally appointed him. Man is not for the Sacraments, but the Sacraments are for man. The first office of grace is to restore nature, or to heal its wounds ; having restored it to health, it elevates it, indeed, but always retains it, and uses it. Here is the grand fact that Protestant theologians always overlook. They, in reality, always present nature and grace as two antagonistic powers, and suppose the presence of the one must be the physical destruction of the other. Luther and Calvin, weary of the good works, and shrinking from the efforts to acquire the personal virtues enjoined by Catholicity, began their so-called reform by asserting the total depravity of human nature, and maintaining that original sin involved the loss of reason and free-will, reducing man physically to the condition of irrational animals, and superadding the penalty of guilt. Here, in the very outset, they denied natural reason, all natural religion, and all natural

morality, and consequently asserted for man in the natural order, left to his natural powers and faculties, universal skepticism and moral indifference ; for without reason there can be no belief, and without free-will no moral obligation, no moral difference of actions.

The Arminians, indeed, saw this, and sought to remedy it by reasserting the natural law ; but as they still held to total depravity, the reassertion amounted to nothing ; or, if they sometimes abandoned total depravity, they rushed to the opposite extreme, and reasserted Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism, and restricted the office of grace to enabling us to do more easily what, nevertheless, we are able to do without it. If they succeeded in escaping the peculiar error of Luther and Calvin, they fell into Rationalism. As Luther and Calvin annihilated reason and free-will, the whole spiritual nature of man, and made man purely passive in the work of regeneration and Christian perfection, the Arminians, become Rationalists, disregarding the necessity of grace, made the natural law sufficient, and asserted only a natural morality. But experience proving the inadequacy of the natural law, when taken without its revealed complement and sanction, — of natural morality, when not elevated by supernatural Christian virtue, — they, like the others, lapsed, of necessity, into the same skepticism.

The error of each class is avoidable only by understanding that grace always supposes nature, and that grace without nature would be as a telescope to a man without eyes. Revelation supposes reason, and we as effectually deny Christianity when we deny reason as when we deny revelation ; both must be asserted with equal firmness and emphasis, each in its own sphere, in relation to its appropriate office, or nothing is asserted. To deny reason is, *a fortiori*, to deny revelation, and to deny revelation is virtually to deny reason ; because the evidences of the fact of revelation are amply sufficient to satisfy reason, and because reason, without revelation, being undeniably insufficient to solve the problems which torture the mind without faith, and to satisfy the craving of our nature for something above itself, cannot maintain itself practically in credit, and necessarily loses its authority. Philosophy, undoubtedly, rests for its basis on natural reason, otherwise we should be unable to distinguish it from Catholic theology, or to draw any intelligible distinction between the natural and supernatural ; but without the aid of revelation as an instrument in its construction, we shall never be able, in our fallen condition, to



construct a sound and adequate philosophy. So, on the other hand, without a sound and adequate philosophy, we can never possess a true and adequate theology; for as revelation is necessary as an instrument in the construction of philosophy, so is philosophy necessary as an instrument in the construction of theology, — that is, theology as a science, and as distinguishable from faith. Hence, in all courses of Catholic instruction, the student makes his philosophy before he proceeds to his theology.

It is clear enough, from what we have said, that the most pressing want of Protestants, under the intellectual point of view, is a sound philosophy, which, so to speak, shall rehabilitate reason, and restore them to natural religion and morality. They have lost reason, and have fallen below the religion or morality which lies in the natural order, and which all revealed religion and morality presuppose. The philosophy needed is nowhere to be found in the Protestant world, and cannot possibly be created by Protestants, for the reason that the revelation which must serve as its instrument they have not, or at best only some detached fragments of it. The only respectable school of philosophy to be found amongst Protestants is the Scottish School of Reid and Stewart; but this school dogmatizes rather than philosophizes. It very justly assumes that all philosophy must proceed from certain indemonstrable principles, and it does not err essentially in its inventory of these principles; but it fails to establish them, or to show us that they have scientific validity. It calls them the constituent principles of human belief, and says, very truly, that they must be admitted, or all science, all philosophy, is out of the question. But this is no more than Hume, whom it aims to refute, himself said. Is science or philosophy possible? is the precise question to be answered. Without the conditions you assert, we grant it is not possible; but what then? Therefore your alleged principles are sound? Why not? Therefore all science, all philosophy, is impossible? No doubt, the Scottish School has protested vehemently against the skepticism of Hume, but its refutation of that skepticism is a mere paralogism, a simple begging of the question, and therefore, scientifically considered, worthless.

But, after all, we cannot place our chief reliance on philosophy as an instrument in the conversion of Protestants. Philosophy is too indirect and too slow in its operations to meet their wants. They are too far gone, too restless, too impa-

tient, too averse to calm reflection and continuous thought, to listen to us while we set the true philosophy before them, or to submit to the labor absolutely requisite to comprehend and appreciate profound philosophical science. An age of balloons, steam-cars, and lightning telegraphs is not exactly the age for philosophers. Moreover, Protestant perversity would find in the necessity of the long and patient thought, and close and subtle reasoning, demanded by philosophy, an objection to our religion itself. Your religion, they would say, if true, is intended for all mankind, and therefore should be within the reach of every capacity. The thought and reasoning necessary to create or understand the philosophy you insist upon transcend the capacity of all but the gifted few, and therefore, if necessary to establish your religion, prove that your religion is not true. We might, indeed, reply, that the thought and reasoning objected to are necessary to refute the errors of Protestants, not simply to establish our religion; but that would amount to nothing in practice. The nature of the Protestant is to devise the most subtle errors in his power, and to find an objection to our religion in the very labor he makes necessary for their refutation. When he objects, he may be as subtle and as abstruse as he pleases; but when we reply, he insists that we shall be popular, and never go beyond the depth of the most ordinary capacity, — that we shall answer the objection not only to the mind that raises it, but to the minds of all men. Only the candid among Protestants would acknowledge the justness of our reply, and these would fail to comprehend it; for if you find a candid Protestant, you may safely conclude that he lacks intelligence, as when you find an intelligent Protestant you may be sure that he lacks candor. There must, then, be some briefer and more expeditious way of dealing with Protestants than that of philosophy, if we wish to affect them favorably.

We have defined Protestantism to be hostility to the Church, and virtually nihilism, because Protestants in general, sooner than return to the Church, will push their hostility to its last consequence, which is the denial of God, therefore of all existence and existences. But this is not all that we have to say of the matter. No man loves error for its own sake, or wills what does not appear to him to be good. The natural heart of every man recoils instinctively from atheism; and it is seldom, if ever, that one without a fearful and even a protracted struggle abandons all faith and piety, resigns all

hope of an hereafter, and consents to place himself in the category of the beasts that perish. Hatred, no doubt, will carry a man to great lengths ; but even hatred must have its cause, real or imaginary. Hatred is love reversed, and intense hatred of one thing is the reverse action of intense love of something else. Protestants hate the Church. Wherefore ? Because they love truth ? Nonsense. Because they believe her false, and destructive to the souls of men ? Nonsense again. We hope there is no Catholic so stupid as to believe it. Hatred of the Church has nothing to do with concern for truth or for salvation. A large portion of Protestants believe in no truth, in no salvation ; a larger portion still are of opinion that all men will be saved, and that truth is whatever seems to a man to be true ; and the remainder hold that the Church is substantially orthodox, and that salvation is attainable in her communion, as well as in their own. Whatever, then, the cause of their hatred of the Church, it is a cause unconnected with considerations of another world, or with truth as such.

We need not look far for this something which Protestants love and the Church condemns, and for condemning which they are full of wrath against her. It is nothing very recondite, or very difficult to seize. We make quite too much of Protestantism, which is, in reality, a very vulgar thing, and lies altogether on the surface of life. Protestantism is nothing more or less than that spirit of lawlessness which leads every one to wish to have his own way, — very common in women and children, and perhaps not less common in men, only they have, generally, a better faculty of concealing it. Objectively defined, it is expressed in the common saying, "Forbidden fruit is sweetest"; and subjectively, it is a craving for what is prohibited, because prohibited. It imagines that the sovereign good is in what the law forbids, and opposes the Church because she upholds the law, — hates the law because the law restrains it, duty because duty obliges it ; and since, as long as it admits the existence of God, it must admit duty, it denies God ; and since, as long as it admits the existence of anything, it must admit the existence of God, it denies everything, and lapses into nihilism. Here is the whole mystery of the matter, — Protestantism in a nutshell.

The source of this impatience of restraint, and this desire to have one's own way, is the pride natural to the human heart, the root of every vice and of every sin. "Your eyes shall



be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," said the serpent to Eve ; and she reached forth her hand, plucked the forbidden fruit, ate, and sin and death were in the world. Pride is, on the one hand, a denial of our dependence, and, on the other, the assertion of our own sufficiency. Here you may see the origin and the essential characteristic of Protestantism, which is as old as the first motion of pride or of resistance to the will of God. Protestantism, after all, is more ancient than we commonly concede. Dr. Johnson, in his Dictionary, would have been no less correct in saying the Devil was the first Protestant, than he was in saying that he was "the first Whig." It offends pride to be compelled to acknowledge our own insufficiency, to admit that we cannot be trusted to follow our own inclinations, that we must be subjected to metes and bounds, and placed under tutors and masters, who say, Do this, Do that ; and we are galled, and we resolve we will not endure it ; we will break the withes that bind us ; we will stand up on our own two feet, and assert our freedom in face of heaven, earth, and hell. Hence we see Protestants, in every age, mounting the tallest pair of stilts they can find or construct, and with more or less vehemence, with more or less eclat, according to the circumstances of time and place, magniloquently asserting the "inborn" rights of man, proudly swearing to be free, to stand up in their native dignity, in the full and resplendent majesty of their own manhood, and making such appeals and forming such alliances as they fancy will best secure their independence, relieve them from all restraints, and give them the opportunity to live as they list.

Such is the general and essential characteristic of Protestantism ; its particular character or form is determined by, and varies with, the circumstances of time and place. In itself, as Balmes well shows, it is a phenomenon peculiar to no period of history, but whatever it has that is peculiar it borrows from the character of the epoch in which it appears. It is always essentially the spirit that works in the children of disobedience, but the form under which the disobedience manifests itself depends on exterior and accidental causes. What it resists is what it finds offensive to human pride, to pure, unmitigated egotism, and what it asserts is always asserted as the means of securing free scope to its independent action. In the sixteenth century, pride found itself galled by submission to the Church, for the Church could not tolerate its wild speculations and its theological errors. It then denied the authority of the

Church ; and in order to make a show of justifying its denial, it asserted the supremacy of the Scriptures, interpreted by private reason, or by the private Spirit. Soon it found that the assertion of the supremacy of the Scriptures, so interpreted, limited its sovereignty, and that it was as galling to its sense of independence to submit to a dead book as to a living Church, and then it denied the Scriptures, and, to justify its denial, asserted the supremacy of reason. But reason, again, galled it, reminded it of its dependence, and would not suffer it to live as it listed. Then it cried out, Down with reason, and up with sentiment ! — a Transcendental element paramount to reason,—and thus reached the jumping-off place. In order to resist effectually the Pope, it at one time, as in England, proclaims the divine right of kings ; and then, in order to get rid of the divine right of kings, it proclaims the divine right of the people, or, to speak more accurately, of the mob ; and finally, in order to get rid of the authority of the mob, it proclaims the divine right of each and every individual, and declares that each and every individual is God, the only God, — thus resolving God into men, and all men into one man, which implies the right of every man to take the entire universe to himself, and possess it as his own property. You laugh at its absurdity ? Upon our conscience, we invent nothing, we exaggerate nothing, and say nothing more than is asserted, in sober earnest, by men whom the Protestant world delights to honor.

Turn Protestantism over as you will, analyze it to your heart's content, you can make nothing more or less of it than mere vulgar pride, and the various efforts pride makes from time to time and place to place to secure its own gratification, to realize the assertion of the serpent, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," — that is, ye shall know good and evil of yourselves, as God knows them of himself, and shall be independent, and act as seemeth to you good, even as God is independent and doth according to his will, not as subject to a power above himself, and in obedience to another will than his own. Just see the proof of this, in the sympathy now universally given to every revolt against established authority. All your modern literature is Satanic, and approves, and teaches us to approve, every rebel, whether against parental, popular, royal, or Divine authority. The Protestant readers of *Paradise Lost* sympathize with Lucifer, in his war against the Almighty, and if they had been in heaven, as one of our friends suggests, would have sided with him. Our friend, J. D. Nourse, defending

himself against the strictures, in this Review for last April, on his book, boldly asserts that God is a despot, and his government a despotism, — nay, that all authority is despotic.

Finding the essence of Protestantism to be mere vulgar pride, that it is a moral disease rather than an intellectual aberration, it is evident that we are to treat it as a vice rather than as an error, and Protestants as sinners rather than as simply unbelievers or misbelievers. This may not be very flattering to their pride; nevertheless, it is the only way they deserve to be treated, and the only way in which they can be treated for their good. We honor them quite too much when we treat them as men whose heads are wrong, but whose hearts are sound. The wrongness of the head is the consequence of the rottenness of the heart. The remedy must be applied to the seat of the disease, or it will be wholly ineffectual; and as the disease is in the will rather than in the intellect, we must, as we do with sinners in general, avail ourselves of motives that tend to persuade the will, rather than of those which tend primarily to convince the understanding. Get the heart right, and the intellect will soon rectify itself.

Now it is certain, that, so far as the great body of Protestants are concerned, it is of no use to appeal to any love of truth or regard for salvation they may be supposed to have. They are very generally prepared, with Macbeth, “to jump the world to come,” and think only how they shall manage matters for this world. They are worldly, and their wisdom is earthly, sensual, devilish; even their virtues, their honesty, their uprightness of conduct, have reference, not to God, but to their justification, either in the eyes of the world, or in the eyes of their own pride. They are too proud or too vain to do this or that act which is contrary to good manners. We must therefore approach them as men who are wedded to this world, who are Protestants for the sake of living for this world alone, and refuse to be Catholics because Catholicity enjoins humility, detachment from the world, and a life of self-denial and mortification, lived for God alone. As long as it is conceded, or as long as they believe it true, that their Protestantism is more favorable to man, regarded solely as an inhabitant of this world, than Catholicity, we cannot get them to listen to what we have to say for our religion. If they hear, it will be as if they heard not.

But it is a fact, as clearly demonstrable, in its way, as any mathematical problem, that Catholicity enjoins the only normal



life for man, even in this world, letting alone what it secures us in another. Human pride just now takes the form of Socialism, and Socialism is *the* Protestantism of our times. It is human pride under this form that we must address, and show to the Socialists, not—as some silly and misguided creatures calling themselves Catholics, and sometimes occupying editorial chairs, are accustomed to do—that Catholicity favors them by accepting their Socialism, but that it favors the object they profess to have at heart,—that it is the true and only genuine Socialism, the basis of all veritable society, and the only known instrument of well-being, either for the individual or for the race. We must show, that, under the social point of view, under the various relations of civilization, Protestantism is an egregious blunder, and precipitates its adherents into the precise evils they really wish to avoid. That it does so is evident enough to all who have eyes to see, and is proved by the very complaints Protestants make of their own movements. Their own complaints of themselves show, to use a vulgar proverb, that they always “jump from the frying-pan into the fire,” in attempting to better their condition. They could not endure the authority of the Church; they resisted it, and fell under the tyranny of the sect, even in their own view of the case a thousand times less tolerable. They rebelled, in the name of liberty, against the Pope, and fell under the iron rule of the civil despot; in England, they could not endure the Lord’s bishops, and they fell under the Lord’s presbyters, and from Lord’s presbyters under the Lord’s brethren, and from Lord’s brethren under the capricious tyranny of their own fancies and passions. In political and social reforms it has fared no better with them. In France, the *Constituante* were more oppressive than the old monarchy, the *Gironde* than the *Constituante*, the *Mountain* than the *Gironde*; and the present French government, in order to save society from complete destruction, is obliged to adopt measures more stringent than ever Charles the Tenth or Louis Philippe dared venture upon. The overthrow of one tyranny leads to another of necessity more heartless and oppressive, because weaker and possessing a less firm hold on the affections of the people. A strong government can afford to be lenient. A weak government must be stringent. Yet the wise men of the age rush on in their wild-goose chase after worldly felicity, while it flies ever the faster before them. Like the gambler, who has played away his patrimony, his wife’s jewels, and pawned his hat and coat, but

keeps playing on, they insist on another throw,— though losing all, fancy they are just agoing to recover all, and make a fortune equal to their boundless wishes. If they could but see themselves as the unexcited bystanders see them, they would throw away the dice, and rush with self-loathing from the *hell* in which they find only their own ruin.

The principle on which Protestants seek even worldly felicity is false, and we can say nothing better of them, than that they prove themselves fools, — yes, pure, unmitigated fools, — in following it. When was it ever known that pride, following itself, did not meet mortification, or that any worldly distinction or good, sought for its own sake, did not either baffle pursuit, or prove a canker to the heart? Did you ever see a man running after fame that ever overtook it, or a man always nursing his health that was ever other than sickly? Have you no eyes, no ears, no understanding? Fame comes, if at all, unsought, greatness follows in the train of humility, and happiness, coy to the importunate wooer, throws herself into the arms of him who treats her with indifference. All experience proves the truth of the principle, “Seek first the kingdom of God, and his justice, and all these things shall be superadded unto you.” Take it as inspiration, as the word of God, or as a maxim of human prudence, it is equally true, and he who runs against it only proves his own folly. “Live while you live,” says the Protestant Epicurean. Be it so; live while you live, but live you cannot, unless you live to God, according to the principles of the Catholic religion. Live now you do not, and you know you do not; you are only *just agoing*, and not a few of you fear that you are never even agoing to live, as all your poetry, with its deep pathos and melodious wail, too amply proves.

Here comes in to our aid the excellent work before us. It exactly meets the present state of the Protestant world, and makes the only kind of appeal to which, in their present mood, they will listen. Its author makes no apology for Catholicity, he offers no direct argument for its truth; he simply comes forward and compares the respective influences of Protestantism and Catholicity on European civilization, and shows, that, while Catholicity tends unceasingly to advance civilization, Protestantism as unceasingly tends to savagism, and that it is to its hostile influences we owe the slow progress of European civilization during the last three centuries. He shows that Protestantism is hostile to liberty, to philosophy, to the higher

mental culture, to art, to equality, to political and social well-being. He shows it, we say ; not merely asserts, but proves it, by unanswerable arguments and undeniable facts. If any one doubts our judgment, we refer him to the work itself, and beg him to gainsay its facts, or answer its reasoning, if he can. The Protestant who reads it will hardly boast of his Protestantism again.

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ART. II. — *The Christian Church and Social Reform. A Discourse delivered before the Religious Union of Associationists.* By WM. H. CHANNING. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1848. 8vo. pp. 31.

WE perhaps said all that is really necessary for the refutation of the principles of this Discourse in our Review for last April ; but as we set out with the intention of giving them a somewhat thorough examination, we shall resume our comments, although in continuing them we may be obliged to repeat many things which, in substance, we have already said.

Our readers, we trust, will recollect that Mr. Channing supposes man to be composed of three elements, — love, intellect, power, — which give birth, respectively, in their outward expression, to the Church, the University, and the State ; and that his aim is to harmonize these three institutions in society, so as through them to harmonize in the interior of man the three elements from which they spring. He assumes that there has been a development of Christendom, that is, of the nations professing the Christian religion, and that, by ascertaining the law of this development, we can arrive at the principles and methods of effecting the harmony proposed. We let him now speak for himself.

“Now the development of Christendom may be best understood by tracing the formation, union, division, of its Church, University, State, — or its Religious, Scientific, and Political organizations, — in successive eras. Let us pass in review Four of these, already gone, which will lead us to a Fifth, in the unfolding of which our lot is cast.

“1. In the *first* era, the constituent elements of Christendom existed in a condition of relative *Independence*. Amidst the breaking up of once stately institutions and the incursions of fresh barbaric



tribes, amidst desolating wars and corrupting courts, — amidst societies dissolving from decrepitude, or dying by suicide, — the life of love, the law of brotherhood, the hope of heaven, which from the divine benignity of Jesus had passed into the hearts of his followers, lay hid, like a vital germ in the decaying seed. Oriental philosophy, Greek and Roman mythology, the guesses of Alexandrian or Gnostic mysticism, the lawlessness and rude traditions of savage minds, offered no reconciling bond between small persecuted congregations united by the fluent power of charity, and distracted nations jostled together in violent destruction. Who, in that feeble embryo, foresaw a Godlike Humanity slowly maturing? Yet, formless as were then the Church, the University, the State, and at first glance seemingly hostile, convergent tendencies gradually appear; till at length the faith of a Galilean sect becomes the religion of the Roman empire, — and sages, summoned to council from distant regions, announce a Creed.

“2. And so we enter the *second* era of Christendom. This era is characterized by its pervading spirit of *Authority*, its aspiration after order, its determination at any cost and by any means to establish relations of intercommunion and of hierarchy among the yet incongruous elements. A vast confederacy of archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy, ranked in grades around a common head, constitutes the aristocracy of the Church. Nobles, surrounded by loyal vassals, stand grouped in haughty circles about their kings, who strive by craft or war to establish one central monarchy which may hold the balance of power among the allied though rival nations; and thus is organized the aristocracy of the State. Meantime, theology formed into a system, and ancient philosophy recast in modern moulds, and subtle metaphysics and stern logic, establish the dynasty of the Schoolmen, the aristocracy of the University; while the spiritual power threatening excommunication upon heretics, and the temporal power punishing as magic the discoveries and inventions of genius, uphold dictatorship in the realm of thought. The unity of *Force* fulfils its end, when Pope and Emperor and Council conspire to cramp elastic Europe with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism.

“3. But crosier and sceptre wielded by tyrants lose their claim to reverence; and a creed that makes believe is mentally abjured, while the lips profess it. The Church, claiming to use the purse and sword, the prison and fagot, becomes a corrupt politician; the State, arrogating to itself control over conscience belonging to God alone, and turning religion into a prop of power, convicts itself of blasphemous usurpation; while youthful thought, under the mentorship of classic antiquity, and cheered to adventure in the wide world which science discloses, laughs the censorship of the University to scorn. The time for protest has come. This is the *third*

era of Christendom; its characteristic is *Individual Freedom*. The reform is at first incomplete, its progress slow; its very authors establish petty popedoms of their own, hold tenaciously to the shattered fragments of feudalism, and strive to fence in the new soil wherewith the freshet has overspread old landmarks. But it is all in vain. The thought of the inviolability of the individual has taken form in men's consciousness. In simple yet saintly souls, spiritualism abides like an angel of the Lord, suggesting the freest flights of piety; to thousands of earnest seekers, truth comes, and, putting aside the masks of tradition, smiles out in original beauty; and the instincts of multitudes feel afar the gathering earthquake, which is to swallow up caste, privilege, and unjust distinctions. The variety, latent in the formal unity, buds forth and branches and blooms. The Church and University and State divide again for freer, fuller growth. Sect rises from sect, and system from system, and party from party; restless aspiration, controversy, enterprise, stimulate the nations to gigantic exertions; there is a prophetic yearning for a good not yet accomplished, a reaching forward to a new world.

"4. Liberty of conscience, of thought, and of action, acknowledged in principle and partially exercised, cannot but thoroughly embody themselves in deeds. Asserting the direct communion of every spirit with God, through his appointed mediations, the reformer must carry out his doctrine of personal sacredness through all departments, intellectual and physical. An unconscious logic pervades nations and ages, and rigidly determines their conduct. And thus opens upon us the *fourth* era of Christendom, whose characteristic is *Practical Equality*. The unity of the Church is broken, and with the loss of its prestige has gone much of its sanctifying power; by unavoidable reaction, the senses, long curbed or constrained to deceptive indulgence, demand the rights which asceticism has denied; priests, proved guilty of outside morality, sink into objects of contempt; and goodness, manifested in kindly acts, becomes the only tolerable worship. Thus all are equals before God. Again, the authority of the University once shaken off, minds follow impetuously the lead of wild speculation; seated on the temporary judgment-bench of common sense, they call up for trial every time-hallowed rite, dogma, law, and custom; or, driven on by the mob-spirit of iconoclasts, blacken with flaring torches of skepticism the temples of faith, and deface with careless ridicule the shrines of once-honored sages. It is the sans-culottism of free inquiry, where learned and ignorant are 'hail, fellow, well met'; and every one, in his claim to hold and declare opinions, ranks as his neighbour's peer. Above all, as specially marking this epoch, is the desire for a practical test of principles manifested in the sphere of the State. The form of political institutions which it naturally

seeks to organize is democracy, the establishment of equal rights. But — whether hindered from realizing this ultimate manifestation, or successful, as it has been in this nation, and will soon be elsewhere — it bursts on all sides resistlessly forth in Utilitarianism ; and, seizing control of industry, finance, commerce, social usages, the press, the pulpit, — under pretence of equal protection to property, — and in the name and authority of Political Economy, makes money the ruler alike over priests and scholars, over nobles and people. Intense individual selfishness, *laissez-faire*, competition, exaggerated estimate of outward good, expediency as the habitual rule, wealth as chief title to honor and power, are the final consummation of this fourth era of Christendom, — which is passing, — has passed.

“ 5. When this last-described era is thus spoken of — like those which have preceded it — as already gone, let the assertion be understood to mean, that a *new principle* is working to-day throughout Christendom. Slowly, very slowly indeed, to one whose span is threescore years, sweeps by the procession of the ages, — each under its special banner, clothed with its own insignia, and bearing the emblems of its appropriate work. In the marching and countermarching of the mighty host, principles and tendencies may seem to approximate, and even to walk in parallel columns, which really are separated by the lapse of centuries ; and laggards there are, too, behind their times, who, limping after their own divisions, block up the path which of right belongs to the new-comers. Still, ever onwards moves mankind ; and the Tricolor banner of this generation is greeted with cheer on cheer of ‘ Fraternity ’ from the hearts of millions, while hands long sundered by selfish jealousies are clasped in pledge of mutual service. We have entered a *fifth* era of Christendom, whose watchword is *Coöperation*. As, in the first era, he was the truest Christian who bore his glimmering light into the forests of barbarism, and translated from parchment manuscript the Gospel of peace to armed hordes camped around their watch-fires ; as, in the second era, he was the truest Christian who, in loyal consciousness of the unity of Christendom, took his station, high or low, with the magnanimous intent to sacrifice life, wealth, affections, conscience, all, for the collective good of the Kingdom of God, — now immersing himself in the cells of monasteries, now with dying breath upon the battle-field praying his fellow-crusader to bear his heart to the holy sepulchre ; as, in the third era, he was the truest Christian who confronted prelate bigotry, corruption in high places, and vulgar prejudices, — who bore unmoved the ridicule of the courtier at his puritan primness, grew prematurely gray with study, or led out bands of stern and godly pilgrims to plant colonies in savage lands ; as, in the last age, he was the truest Christian who, firmly centred in a pure conscience, trusted reason



boldly in every field of investigation, followed out principles fearlessly to their extreme consequences in action, demanded the widest diffusion of learning, the freest exercise of speech, the most active charity, the strictest justice, and who unscrupulously brought his battery of reform to bear against every bastille of oppression and palace of exclusiveness;—so, in *this* generation, he is the truest Christian who most unreservedly yields up mind, heart, and energy to the grand impulse of RECONCILIATION.

“What Humanity commands to-day is not destruction, but construction; not revolution, but reform; not dissolution, but resurrection. It would keep all it has gained in past eras of divergence, and multiply each partial good by prolific interchange. It wishes Independence for the Church and University and State, not as unrelated, but as correlated in concentric spheres,—the THREE ESTATES, whose functions are diverse, though complementary to each other; whose boundaries should be mutually inviolate, while their forces are allied. It wishes Unity throughout the Divine,—the Spiritual,—the Natural departments of life, collective and individual, not by constraint or sacrifice, but by fulness of development and harmonious counterpoise. It sanctions Individual Freedom without bounds, in religion, science, and politics; but it teaches that the only liberty in the universe is love,—that finite creatures live in and for one another, and that their common destiny is compassed by an Infinite original and end. Finally, it demands Practical Equality,—the only equality, that is to say, which, in a universe of graduated relations, whereon as a ladder the angels of God’s mercy are for ever descending and ascending, is *practical*,—unchecked opportunity for every being to develop its powers symmetrically, and to use them for the common good. The privileges and responsibilities, the temptations and encouragements, the trials and the joys, of such an age are as many as the results which it aims to realize are magnificent. And the devotedness, the reverence, the heroism, the energy, of earlier times, like silver-headed ancestors, are gathered round the baptismal font of this New Era, to anoint it with their benedictions.”—pp. 8–15.

It strikes us, with our very limited knowledge of history, that these five eras or epochs are purely arbitrary, and, if modern history is really divisible into distinct periods, Mr. Channing has failed to characterize them. We must complain, moreover, of the absence of chronology. We can guess at the date of the commencement of the series, but where the author ends his first era, and begins and ends his second, his third, or his fourth, it is impossible to determine with any tolerable degree of certainty. This is a serious defect, and gives him a chance to evade, if he chooses, many of the criticisms we

might be disposed to offer, by replying that they are applicable only to an earlier or later period of time than is included in the given era. This is not fair. A man who writes to instruct, to communicate truth, and not merely to confuse the reader, to support a theory, or to escape conviction, should study to be definite and exact. In reasoning on history, facts and dates are of considerable importance.

Mr. Channing assumes that there has been a development of Christendom, and supposes it capable of a scientific exposition. He aims at what is called philosophy of history, and, in creating it, attends only to what are called principles. Facts and dates, as nations and individuals, he counts for nothing. All he looks for is the ideas which the race is engaged in realizing, and he determines the idea of a given era *a priori*, — deduces it from the psychological or ontological principles recognized by his theory, not from the actual facts and events in space and time which history records. It is necessary to his purpose, or the purposes of his theory, that history should have been so and so, therefore it was so and so, and may be written without any reference to the chronicles or annals of nations. This is convenient for the system-monger, or the philosopher who fancies that he can spin the world, spider-like, from his own bowels; but it can hardly satisfy the man who seeks truth, and would build his castle on solid ground, not in the air. It presupposes, also, a system of fatalism, which is unsupported by any authority, and is contradicted by all the laws, usages, and common sense of mankind. History can be written *a priori*, reduced to a science, or logically deduced from either psychological or ontological principles, as Hegel and Cousin would have us believe, only on condition that there is nothing contingent in the universe, that there is nothing in history but these principles themselves, and that they are developed by a law of stern and invincible necessity. But this is not true; for in human affairs we must always recognize the freedom of God on the one hand, and the free agency of man on the other, which no philosophy can measure, and the influence of which on the events of history no science can determine, either beforehand or afterwards. History is simply a record of facts, and can be ascertained, without special Divine inspiration, only in the study of the facts themselves. Hence your philosophies of history are and must be all arbitrary, illusory, chimerical, unworthy of the least confidence. You must measure the infinite freedom of the infinite and eternal God,

and calculate the free agency of man, as elements in the production of historical events, before you can reasonably aspire to the creation of a philosophy of history, in the sense of modern philosophers.

Assuming a regular development of Christendom, the author supposes that this development has been in four successive eras, which have passed, and is now entering the fifth era ; — yet not because he finds this number of eras distinctly marked in history, but because his theory of development requires that there should be that number to give an era to each of the principles he wishes to find successively developed. The principle on which he writes is not the old one of bending theory to facts, but the modern one of bending facts to theory. Why should not facts bend to theory ? Theory is deduced from principles intuitively apprehended by reason ; facts rest on the authority of ignorant chroniclers, stupid annalists, and uncertain tradition. Is not theory, then, superior to facts, and ought it not to govern facts ? If the facts were as they ought to have been, will they not harmonize with theory ? And, if they do not, is it not a proof that they were not what they ought to have been, and therefore wicked or rebellious facts, with which the less we have to do the better ? Well, having determined that there ought to be the number of successive eras mentioned, the author concludes that there has been. Having determined, again, what, according to his theory, should have been their several characteristics, he concludes what they actually were, and proceeds to state his conclusion. The first epoch was characterized by the “relative independence” of the Church, University, State, or the religious, scientific, and political organizations of Christendom ; the second, by the “pervading spirit of authority” ; the third, by the predominance of “individual freedom” ; the fourth, by “practical equality” ; and the fifth is to be characterized by the principle of “coöperation,” or association, *à la* Fourier, or *à la* somebody else. Let us examine the question for the moment, and see if history really bears out the author in his statements.

1. The limits of the first era are not given, but we shall assume it to extend from the time of our Lord and his Apostles to the accession of Constantine the Great. We are not certain but the author means to extend it even from the birth of our Saviour to the downfall of Rome, say from the beginning of the first to the close of the fifth century ; but we take the shorter period as the more favorable to his view. But during



this period there was no Christendom in the sense in which the author uses the term ; for the State was pagan, and Christians had no political organization, except the Church herself. How, then, can he say that the three institutions were relatively independent ? If he object, and insist on including the pagan state as one of the elements of Christendom, he can with still less propriety, if possible, say the three elements were relatively independent ; for the pagan state claimed supreme authority in spirituals over the religion of all its subjects, and promulgated its edicts against Christians, and sought by the most cruel persecutions to suppress the Church. The political order occasionally tolerated the Church, we grant, but in no respect acknowledged her independence. Nor was the University, that is, education, independent of both Church and State. The Church claimed authority over the education of her own children, and required it to be Christian and orthodox. The State maintained a system of public schools, had the supreme control of them, could open or close them at its pleasure, and determine what should or should not be taught in them. We cannot understand, then, in what sense the University, that is, education, was independent, or how scientific institutions were independent of both civil and ecclesiastical control. It seems to us somewhat singular that the author should have selected the period known in history as the martyr age — which is specially characterized by its fierce and unrelenting persecution, when the political authority exerted its whole power to suppress, to exterminate, the Christian religion, and also many of the forms of Oriental paganism — as the era of freedom of thought and conscience, the only meaning of the independence of Church and University. Does the author find the characteristic of an era in what it has, or in what it has not ?

The author, it will be seen, still further asserts, that, during his first era, the Church, the University, and the State were “formless,” — that is, were unconstituted, and therefore no institutions at all. These institutions, according to the author, are the constituent elements of Christendom, and therefore without them there can be no Christendom. But in the first era they were “formless,” that is, had no actual existence. The author must therefore suppose that there passed an entire era of Christendom before there was a Christendom ! Again, nothing exists without form ; how, then, during the era when Church, University, State, were formless, that is, non-

existent, can the author say that they "*existed* in a condition of relative independence"? Would the author teach us that there is no difference between existence and non-existence?

Then, on what authority does the author assert, that, during his first period, Church, University, and State *were* "formless"? Surely, the State was formed, was constituted, under Augustus, Tiberius, Trajan, the Antonines, and Diocletian, — thoroughly formed, whether well formed or not, — as it was under Constantine, Theodósius the Great, and Justinian, if the author chooses to bring his first era down to a later date than we have supposed. Of the particular constitution of what the author calls the University, that is, of public education, we are only imperfectly informed; but we know that public provision was made for education, and that celebrated schools flourished in most, if not in all, of the great cities of the empire. As to the Church, she certainly was not "formless" in the third century, but was constituted with a hierarchy, as at present. We know, also, that she was not "formless" in the first century; for St. Paul, at least good historical authority, writing to the Corinthians, tells them, that "God hath set some in the Church, first, apostles, secondly, prophets, thirdly, teachers," &c.,\* which implies that the Church then had a constitution, and, if it had a constitution, it was not "formless." That she had a constitution in the *second* century, we may learn from Irenæus and Tertullian, and various other sources. During the first three centuries, then, the Church had a constitution, though what constitution she had is foreign to our present purpose to inquire. Since the third century, nobody pretends that the Church has been formless, for we see her constitution as complete at the Council of Nice as at the Council of Trent. The author, then, drew upon his imagination or his theory, instead of history, when he asserted, that, during the first era, Church, University, and State were "formless."

2. The second era, according to the author, was characterized by the "pervading spirit of authority." Of the extent of this era we are not informed; but we judge, from the author's incidental remarks, that he extends it from the downfall of Rome to the rise of Protestantism, and intends to include the whole period commonly called the Middle Ages. Now, according to our historical reading, this period is characterized,

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\* 1 Cor. xii. 28.

so far as in its endless variety it can be characterized by any one element, by the spirit of lawlessness, barbarity, tyranny, and contempt of authority. It opens, for all Western, Central, and Northern Europe, with the destruction of the political order, and long ages passed away in the effort to restore it ; and at no period do we find authority as all-pervading, as well established, and as peacefully discharging its functions, as it was under imperial Rome, pagan or Christian. The University, during the first half of the period, hardly existed ; and when it was reëstablished in the twelfth century, it was with a freedom and independence it never before enjoyed. The academic bodies were almost independent polities, wellnigh able to resist both the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. The Church claimed, as always, her spiritual supremacy ; but she was restricted in its exercise by the civil powers and the barbarity and turbulence of the times. The lay society were perpetually questioning her authority, and were less submissive to it than they had been in the first era, or than they were in the third. It strikes us that an age marked by the struggle to preserve the wrecks of civilization, and to establish order, to check despotism, and to vindicate the freedom of religion and conscience, the independence of the spiritual society, can hardly be said to be characterized by a "pervading spirit of authority," which is, as every one knows, or ought to know, the basis of all order and all real freedom.

"A vast confederacy of archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy, ranked in grades around a common head, constitutes the aristocracy of the Church." But this confederacy, if the author chooses so to call it, — although "a confederacy ranked around a common head" is rather unintelligible to us, — whether good or bad, is no peculiarity of the author's second era. In the only sense in which it exists in one of his eras, it exists in them all ; nay, it had, apparently, more the character of a confederacy in the first era than in the second, for the power of the patriarchs, primates, and archbishops was then greater than in subsequent times ; that is, while the great patriarchates of the East remained steadfast in the apostolic communion, fewer cases were carried to Rome for decision, and the monarchical or papal element of the Church was less apparent. Yet, a confederacy there never was, for a confederacy supposes a union by the will of the parts, whereas, in all the eras enumerated, the union of the parts of the hierarchy has been held to derive from the head, the centre of

unity, which makes the hierarchy not merely a union or confederacy of independent bodies, but one body, dependent for its unity on the head, the Pope, who is, so to speak, the personality of the Church. For this reason, the author makes a gross mistake when he states that the archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy constitute an aristocracy. In an aristocracy, as in a confederacy, the unity derives from the parts, and therefore is never, properly speaking, unity, but merely a union; whereas in the hierarchy it derives from the common centre, from the head, which is one, and not from the members, which are many.

“Meantime, theology formed into a system, and ancient philosophy recast in modern moulds, and subtle metaphysics and stern logic, establish the dynasty of the Schoolmen, the aristocracy of the University.” We are at a loss to understand what the author means. His thesis is, that the Church, the University, and the State, during his second era, were subjected to authority, that is, were not free. But in what does he place their freedom? The Church is free when she is not controlled by any power foreign to herself, and can teach, govern, discipline, worship, according to her own constitution and laws. The State is free when no foreign or extraneous element interferes with its discharge of its legitimate functions. So, also, must be the University. How, then, the University is pervaded by a spirit of authority, is controlled in the discharge of its functions, when it is free to govern itself, and is subject only to its own laws, we do not and cannot understand. Perhaps the author means less by the Church, University, and State than we suppose. He uses these words to designate both the interior elements, love, intellect, power, and the outward institutions which spring from them; or rather, he confounds the interior elements and the outward institutions, and means one or the other, both together, or not exactly one or the other, as he finds it most convenient. The interior element, love, is the Church, in its principle; and when he complains of authority exercised over the Church, perhaps he means merely that the interior element, which sounds the outward Church, is not free to push itself out at will, to overthrow existing, and to found new church organizations at pleasure. The grand defect, then, of the Middle Ages would be, under the point of view of Church, that they attempted to preserve the Church they received, and to maintain ecclesiastical order, or, in other words, that they labored to main-



tain for the inward element its outward organization. Under the point of view of State, the defect would be, that they labored to restore political order, and preserve society from dissolution or anarchy, and thus interfered with the liberty of revolutions. So the defect of the University would be, that it sought to give to the inward conception an outward expression, and to satisfy the intellect by clear, distinct, and well-established truths. The doctrine of the author would seem to be, since he is severe upon all revolutionists and destructives, that nothing should be fixed or established in Church, State, or University, and that every organization, every institution, every law, every formal statement, is repugnant to the interior freedom of man, and contrary to the true liberty. He would cure all the vices, crimes, and errors of society, as Lycurgus cured adultery, by abolishing the law which enjoined conjugal fidelity. But be this as it may, the dynasty of the Schoolmen, in so far as dynasty it could be called, and as distinguished from the political authority, on the one hand, and from the ecclesiastical, on the other, was the result of the free intellectual development the author contends for, and proves, not the presence, but the absence of the authority to which he objects.

“While the spiritual power threatening excommunication upon heretics, and the temporal power punishing as magic the discoveries and inventions of genius, uphold dictatorship in the realm of thought.” That the spiritual power not only threatened excommunication upon heretics, but actually excommunicated them, during the Middle Ages, is no doubt true; but so it did in the primitive age, and so does it even now; it therefore is nothing peculiar to the author’s second era, and cannot be adduced to prove its peculiar character. That the temporal power punished magic in the Middle Ages is possible; it did so under the pagan emperors, and has done so almost within our own day; but we shall be obliged to Mr. Channing to name to us one well-authenticated discovery of genius, or scientific discovery, that was punished as magic in the Middle Ages, or in any other age. We are aware of no instance of the sort. The dictatorship in the realm of thought was no greater in the author’s second than in his first or his third era. “The unity of *Force* fulfils its end, when Pope and Emperor and Council conspire to cramp elastic Europe with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism.” The author here uses *force* as the synonyme of *authority*, or he changes, without notice, his subject, neither of which is allowable. If force fulfils its end, it

does what is legitimate ; what, then, is there to complain of ? But when and where did "Pope and Emperor and Council conspire to cramp elastic Europe *with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism*" ? Popes and councils have not seldom labored to check despotism, and to secure the freedom of conscience and worship ; but we recollect no instance in which they conspired to establish a despotism. If the author does, we wish he would name it, — the place where, and the time when. It is easy to make loose assertions if one is unscrupulous, but an honest man is cautious how he makes assertions for which he has no authority, to the prejudice of his neighbour. That there was despotism in the Middle Ages we do not dispute, for there is always despotism where there is barbarism ; but that there was in them a *monotonous* despotism we have yet to learn. So far as we have studied those ages, monotony was by no means one of their characteristics. The only monotony we have detected in them is the monotony of the ocean in a storm, — the monotony of the mountain torrent, swollen by recent floods, — the monotony of movement, change, and variety. But this may be owing to the fact that we have not read them, lately, through the spectacles of a world-reformer, by which one sees much that is not to be seen.

3. The third era is characterized by "Individual Freedom," and therefore, negatively, we suppose, by the absence of authority in Church, State, and University. This era, like the others, is left indefinite ; but we shall assume that the author means to extend it from the breaking out of Protestantism to the peace of Utrecht, in 1713. We cannot commence it earlier without running back into his second, nor extend it later without running forward into what is obviously his fourth era. This period of two hundred years is, we had supposed, remarkable for the absence of individual freedom. It is the period of the rise, progress, and decline of Protestantism, the destruction in favor of monarchy of the old feudal nobility throughout the principal states of Europe, the suppression of the Estates in Sweden and Denmark, of the States General in France, the Comuneros in Spain, and, virtually, the Parliament in England under the Tudors and the Stuarts, the centralization of government, and the consolidation of the power of the monarch. It is the golden age of absolute monarchy, as we see in the Austrian House of Hapsburg and the Prussian House of Hohenzollern ; in Henry the Eighth, Elizabeth, and James the First and his son Charles, in England ;

Richelieu and Louis the Fourteenth in France ; and Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second in Spain. Indeed, the principal outward effect of Protestantism for these two hundred years, aside from the destructive and protracted wars to which it gave rise, and which threatened to replunge Europe into barbarism, from which the Church, by a thousand years of unremitting labor, had in a measure rescued it, was the establishment of absolute monarchy in nearly all Protestant, and, indirectly, in nearly all Catholic Europe. It did this by its resistance to the Papal authority, and by the centralization of the powers and administration of government it rendered necessary on both sides to carry on the wars it engendered.

In the University, there was very little of what Mr. Channing calls individual freedom. Indeed, in Protestant countries, during the whole period, very little is done for education ; the great mass of the people are suffered to grow up in utter ignorance, and the Universities that flourish are entirely under the control either of the sect or of the state. As to Catholic countries, it is enough to say that it is the glorious era of the Jesuits, who are the masters, under the Church, of education, and the principal educators ; and Mr. Channing will hardly contend that the most striking feature of Jesuitism is individual freedom in his sense of the term, although, we grant, it may be in ours ; for no man is or can be more free than he who has no will but that of his legitimate superior.

The Protestant nations, we grant, threw off the authority of the Pope, but they fell under the civil despot ; they discarded the authority of the Church, but only to become slaves of the sect, — to say the least, as hostile to individual freedom as the authority discarded, Mr. Channing himself being judge. Under a religious point of view, in the Protestant world, there may have been a struggle for individual freedom, but there was no individual freedom obtained. It was, we must remember, the period when Protestants not only persecuted Catholics, fined, imprisoned, massacred them without mercy, — which we do not expect a Protestant to regard otherwise than as praiseworthy, — but when they persecuted one another, — Calvinists, Socinians ; Gomerites, Arminians ; Lutherans, Anabaptists and Sacramentarians ; Anglicans, Puritans ; and Puritans, Anglicans ; and both Puritans and Anglicans, Quakers and Unitarians. It is the period, we must also remember, of Cavaliers and Roundheads in England, of Irish and English penal laws, of Episcopalian intolerance in Virginia and Maryland, and of Con-

gregational exclusiveness in New England, where the law even forbade, as it is said, the making of minced pies or plum-puddings on Christmas, lest some countenance might be shown to prelacy and Papacy. Surely, in the Protestant world, there was, in Church, State, University, anything but individual freedom.

In Catholic countries, the Church relaxed nothing of her claims, and perhaps in no previous period of her history was the Papal authority more resplendent, or more fully recognized, or more cheerfully submitted to, by the great body of the faithful, than in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In no previous period had the Church been more vigilant in detecting and condemning heresy, or more rigid in her control over the doctrines held by the faithful. It was in this period that was celebrated the great Council of Trent, in which the Christian doctrine was defined to a far greater extent than it had ever been in any previous Council. If the Church lost the Northern nations of Europe, which became Protestant, she was compensated by her conquests in the East, and in the newly discovered continent of America; and perhaps the number of her children had never been, for any previous two hundred years, greater, or more worthy of her name of Catholic. Indeed, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so calamitous to Protestants, may almost be called, for Catholics, the Age of Saints. Whatever else the author may say of this period of history, he cannot with the least truth represent it as characterized by the presence of individualism and the absence of authority, ecclesiastical or civil. Indeed, if he had reversed his statement, and represented his second era, the Middle Ages, as characterized by individual freedom, and his third by the "per-vading spirit of authority," he would have been, though still incorrect, less far from the truth.

4. The author's *fourth* era is characterized by "*Practical Equality*," by which we understand him to mean equality in the material order, the material interests of life. This period, like the others, is left undefined; we presume, however, that we shall meet the author's views, as far as he has any, if we consider it as extending from the peace of Utrecht, the commencement of the modern industrial system, of which Great Britain may be considered as the chief, to the publication of Fourier's *Theory of Unity*, in 1822, — what, in a loose way, is termed the eighteenth century. In some respects, the author's outlines of this epoch are just, though his tone and coloring are false; and he proves that he has at least glanced at its history, or



rather, that the masters he follows, for the most part educated in the eighteenth century, were better acquainted with its facts than they were with the preceding centuries. Nevertheless, to name it the age of *practical equality* is wholly inaccurate. Of all known ages, it was the least practical. It was carried away in pursuit of Utopias, even more than the present. The wildest, the maddest schemes were imagined, and pursued as realities. Was it not the age of Law's Mississippi Scheme, — of Mesmer, Cagliostro, and the Republic of all the Virtues, — of atheism, *L'Homme-plant*, *L'Homme-machine*, Voltaire, Condorcet, Hume, Hartley, Price, Thomas Paine, Jacobinism, the perfectibility of human nature, and dreams of man's immortality on earth? It should be called the age of impracticable dreams, and mad fancies, — and yet not wholly, for it was also the age of Vico, Reid, William Pitt, Edmund Burke, Napoleon Bonaparte, and George Washington. As to equality, never was there less approach to it, nor was there ever set in operation a series of causes more hostile to it. Political equality was established here, but it operates chiefly in favor of material inequality, in covering the land over with industrial corporations which defy individual competition. Labor-saving machinery has been invented and introduced to an incalculable extent, but it results in throwing out of employment millions of laborers, in concentrating the business of production in the hands of capitalists or soulless corporations, in destroying the class of small manufacturers, and compelling the operatives to toil for the mere minimum of human subsistence. It is to get rid of the effects produced by it and other kindred causes, the hopeless inequalities and the terrible physical degradation of the laboring classes resulting, that Socialism is preaching up reform, and effecting its anarchical revolutions in Europe, if we may believe Mr. Channing and his friends. The only sense in which the author can say the last century was marked by practical equality is in the sense that it had it not, and made wholly ineffectual efforts to gain it.

The author says the unity of the Church was broken, and its prestige lost. But this is a mistake. The unity of the Church has never been broken, and never can be broken as long as there is a successor of St. Peter, the centre of unity; for where Peter is, there is the Church, — *Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia*. Individuals and nations may lose the unity of the Church by breaking from her communion, and thus losing the Church herself; but, if they do, it is they, not she, that lose

unity. The unity of the Church was never more perfect than during the last century, when all the powers of earth and hell seemed to be let loose against her, and when Jansenism, Protestantism, infidelism, and Jacobinism, strengthened by gross impurity and unbounded license, made their combined assaults upon her, and in their madness shouted a triumph which proved to be illusory. And it was in the very moment of their intoxication and frantic excesses, when the Holy Father was stripped of his temporal dominions, and was dying in exile or languishing in prison, that the reaction in favor of Catholicity began in the heart of Protestant Europe; a reaction which still continues throughout the world,—nay, which Mr. Channing himself has felt more than once, and to which, had he followed the promptings of Divine grace, and not struggled against tendencies which he was conscious of, he would long ere this have yielded.

5. The fifth era is the present, and is characterized by the principle of "Coöperation," or rather, is to be so characterized. Of this era we have not much to say, for we do not, like Mr. Channing, claim to be a prophet. The principle of coöperation, however, is no new principle, as Mr. Channing asserts; it is as old as society, that is, as old as the human race itself. The "Fraternity" the author preaches was known from the beginning, and ceased to be a fact only with the confusion of languages and the dispersion of the human race. In the Christian sense, fraternity by election and grace, as distinguished from that by natural generation, has always been proclaimed and realized in the Church. Coöperation must be either by force of nature or by virtue of grace, either compelled or voluntary. What it is or can be by force of nature, the author may learn from the history of gentilism, which, we imagine, is not precisely what he wishes for. It cannot be compelled without a despotic authority, against which he declaims. If voluntary and by grace, it can be realized only in the Christian Church, which reëstablishes unity in the elected human race, or chosen people of God, and will make the elected commensurate with the natural human race, in proportion as men voluntarily submit to her authority.

We pass over what the author says of "Revolutionary Tendencies," or "the Position of Judge," and also what he says of "Unitary Tendencies," or "the Position of Prophet," the fourth and fifth general divisions of his Discourse; for we do not know who has installed him as judge, and because he appears

to us to be one of those prophets whom the Lord commands us not to hear, — prophets of their own hearts, of whom the Lord says, “I did not send these prophets, yet they ran.” “The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word with truth; what hath the chaff to do with the wheat? saith the Lord.”\* He who asks us to listen to him as a prophet must show us the seal of his commission from the Almighty. We pass over, therefore, these two divisions of his Discourse, and come at once to his official statement of what he terms the “fundamental principles of Social Science.”

“1. The One God, Infinite and Eternal, lives in three modes; of which Love is the Principle, — Beautiful Joy the End, — and Wisdom the harmonizing Medium; and throughout creation every existence, as made in the likeness of the Being of beings, is triune also, — having an impulse of good for its motive power, a coöperative use for its ultimate destiny, and a form of order as the law of its development.

“2. The Divine Idea of Man is of Many men made One, or, in other words, of a race unfolding, through ages, around the globe, from simple, original unity into every possible variety, and thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity. The centre of this race is God in Man; its destined end, a Heaven of Humanity; and the mode of its growth, the formation of Societies, whose members may be trained to wise beneficence, and in whose confederacies, peaceful and prosperous, may be brightly imaged the Divine Blessedness.

“3. The Life of Man is Love, inspired continually by God, who, from everlasting to everlasting, attracts the members of every race to Unity, and to Himself, by rational freedom, — thus governing his children by the law of liberty, while rewarding them by the liberty of law; and the method of holy and humane existence is so to harmonize Collective and Individual good, that societies and nations may be reconciled in all interests, and become fit temples for the indwelling Divine Spirit.

“4. The Form of this Unitary Life is the Law of Series, by which, throughout creation, Divine Justice graduates, — intermingles, — combines the varieties latent in every unity, and out of seeming discord evolves sublimest concord. This plan of perfect order so distributes the functions of society, that each primitive affection finds the freest play, and persons the most diverse in character and power are bound in one by mutual service, as are the organs of a living body.

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\* *Vide* Jer. xxiii. 21 – 34.

"5. As Divine Goodness is manifested in the impulses which animate all creatures, — and Divine Wisdom in the law which, regulating all movement, finds expression in intelligent spirits, — so Divine Power reflects itself in the beauty of the universe, whose every particle and coacting whole symbolize the perfect peace of God; and as Nature, thus fashioned in image of the Almighty, is designed as the mould for finite energy, the indispensable condition of human refinement is Organized Industry, and Work exalted into Art.

"6. The aim of a Community should be to form a Collective Man, wherein the inspiring principle of Love, the distributing method of Law, and the refining conditions of Beauty, may be severally developed and mutually completed, and thus, by interaction, their common end fulfilled. Property should be held in joint-stock ownership; — Labor made coöperative in groups and series of groups; — economy, refinement, and pure influences secured by families united in a Combined Dwelling; — profits equitably distributed to partners, in proportion to Labor, Skill, and Capital; — anxiety and sorrow lightened by a system of Mutual Guaranties, extending to all the risks and responsibilities of life; — honors and trusts assigned by election according to approved Usefulness in special functions, or in general direction; — physical, mental, moral growth insured by an Integral Education, at once spiritual, scientific, and practical, and embracing the whole of life; — and chiefly the Divine rule of All for Each, and Each for All, embodied and actualized in Unity of Interests.

"7. In such Organized Societies alone can Individual Men be formed to Integrity; — for only *there* can infants be worthily welcomed at birth, — children purely and symmetrically developed, — young men and women guided to vocations appropriate to their peculiar powers, — the mature upheld in magnanimous efficiency by a consciousness, that, in laboring for the commonwealth, they are insuring the welfare of their families, and their own highest good, — the aged revered, solaced, cheered, — and every person taught by *life* to know the worth of a human being, and the loyalty due to a united race; and, finally, only from Societies thus constituted can States, Nations, Humanity, become One in that fraternity of freemen, which, in spirit, truth, and deed, will be the Kingdom of God." — pp. 22 — 24.

This statement has evidently been drawn up with great care, and that it is satisfactory to the author we may infer from the fact, that he has recently republished it, as an official statement of principles, in *The Spirit of the Age*, a paper of which he is the editor, and which takes the place of *The Harbinger*, whilome the organ of the Fourierists, or American Associationists. But



however carefully it may have been drawn up, and however well satisfied the author may be with it, it is to us exceedingly obscure, confused, vague, and uncertain; and without referring to the author's antecedents and concomitants, and drawing upon our own knowledge of the authors he has studied, and from whom he has borrowed most of his doctrines, we should be utterly unable to extract the least intelligible meaning from it. To analyze the seven paragraphs cited, or articles of the author's creed, to ascertain the precise number of propositions they contain, and to determine the precise sense and value of each, would far transcend our ability, or, if not our ability, at least our limits, and our patience, as well as — what is more to the purpose — the patience of our readers. We must therefore confine ourselves to some three or four of the more general and more fundamental propositions.

1. "The one God, Infinite and Eternal, *lives* in three modes." What does the author mean by saying that God *lives*? Does he mean to distinguish between the Divine *esse*, or living, and the Divine *existere*, or existence? We presume so. He, then, holds that our primary conception of God is that of pure essence, the *reine Seyn* of the Hegelians, and supposes that the conception of God as existence — *das Wesen* — is secondary. Hence God does not live or exist in himself, but in his evolutions, his works, or the universe, which express him. This is the doctrine of the school to which the author appears to us to belong, and is in accordance with what, in our former article, we found to be his own doctrine. Hence God is not conceivable as living or actually existing God without the universe, and the universe is as necessary to him as the medium of his life, as he is to the universe as the fountain of its being. God, regarded in himself, is the ideal of the universe, and the universe is his realization, — to him, as Mr. Channing once said to us in conversation, what the picture is to the ideal or design of the artist. But as God is the infinite Ideal, and tends to the infinite revelation of himself, he must run through an infinite variety of being in order to actualize his infinite potentiality. This tendency to infinite realization of himself implies his infinite progress in his life, and the infinite progress in the universe, from the lowest and least perfect forms of existence, to the highest and most perfect. Here is the foundation of the modern or pantheistic theory of progress, which we find in Hegel, Cousin, and Pierre Leroux, and the law of which Fourier professes to have determined.

But this doctrine implies, as ordinarily taken, that the ideal can realize itself, that pure essence can clothe itself with existence, and that the cause is completed, fulfilled, perfected, in the effect, — that is, what does not exist can act, and imperfection can, of and by itself, perfect itself. As we actualize our potentiality by our efforts, and may be said to grow and to consolidate and enlarge our powers by acting, and to live only by *doing*, so it is thought that the same may be predicated of God himself, — as if the reason why this is true of us, namely, that we live, move, and have our being in God, could apply in his case as well as in ours ! Under another point of view, the progression of life supposed is merely a progression in order, irrespective of space or time, — that is to say, God and the universe form one eternal and indissoluble whole, embracing in itself every conceivable variety or form of existence. This seems to us to have been the view of Hegel himself, and is the only consistent pantheistic view conceivable. This, so far from proving the common theory of progress, denies it, and reduces all to eternal immobility, and real silence and death, — teaching that life and motion are only sense-illusions, arising from the contracted sphere of our vision, without anything to respond to them in the world of reality. But take the doctrine in either sense, it is incompatible with the ends Mr. Channing contemplates. If the first view is taken, progress is impossible, because pure essence without existence is nothing but mere potentiality or possibility, and the possible cannot reduce itself to act, — that is, mere possible existence cannot make itself actual existence ; for it must be actual before it can act, or perform anything. If the second view be taken, progress is equally impossible ; for all is complete as it is, can be neither more nor less, nor other, than it is, either in whole or in part. Yet Mr. Channing and all the Associationists are great believers in progress, and will tolerate no immobility, — no, not even in God.

Theologically considered, the distinction between the Divine *esse*, or being, and the Divine *existere*, or living, is inadmissible. Being, abstracted from existence, is merely possible being, not actual being ; and therefore the distinction, if asserted, implies that God, considered in himself, in our ultimate conception of him, is merely potential or possible God, and must be reduced to act, before we can assert that he exists, or *actually* is. But the possible cannot reduce itself to act, for to reduce is to act, and only the actual can act. How, then, from merely possible God obtain actual, living God ? The author must either say

there is no God, or else suppose something more ultimate than God, which reduces the pure essence to existence. If he says the former, he concedes that his distinction is tantamount to the denial of God ; if he says the latter, he supposes an exterior cause of God, and therefore a cause prior to the first cause, and a cause of the cause of all causes, which, we need not add, is absurd. He cannot say this ; he is not at liberty to deny God, for he begins with the assertion of the existence of the one, infinite, and eternal God ; nothing, then, remains for him, but to agree with the Schoolmen, that God is most pure act, *actus purissimus*, excluding from his being all potentiality, and all conceivable distinction between his essence and his existence, his being and his life. His essence is existence, and his existence is essence. He is infinitely and essentially living, — living from, by, and in himself.

A little philosophy, of which Mr. Channing and his school claim to have so much, would suffice, we should suppose, to teach him that pure essence, or being, without existence, is absolutely inconceivable. God, non-existent, but as the dark background of existence, as some profess to conceive him, is absolutely unintelligible, and really indistinguishable, as Hegel himself says, from nothing. In God we live, move, and are ; and therefore it is only in him we can see, know, or conceive at all, as Malebranche has shown in his theory of *Vision in God*, whatever we may think of the theory itself. Every conception of which we are capable, whether of the actual or the possible, conceals at bottom, connotes, or implies the conception of God as actually existing, living God. The idea of God logically precedes all our other ideas, and in fact chronologically, although not distinctly, or as distinguished from our other conceptions ; for to distinguish implies reflection, — what the Italians very finely term *ripensare*, — which belongs to a later period of life. This idea, the idea of God, — not of pure abstract being, as Rosmini, if correctly reported to us, maintains, — is the *forma*, or formative principle, of the intellect, or faculty of intelligence. It is the light by which the faculty is constituted intelligent faculty, and by virtue of which we see all that we do see. Take away from the mind this idea, you take away the very power of intellection, and leave to man nothing intelligible. To take away this idea is to deny God, and if you deny God, you deny, not only all actual existence, but all *possible* existence ; for the possible is conceivable as possible even only by virtue of the conception of God

as actually existing being, whose actual power can reduce it to act, make it actual, if he pleases. Hence, we must either say that we can conceive nothing at all, and assert nothing, — which is impossible, for we cannot, if we would, deny our own existence without at the same time asserting it, — or else we must concede that our primitive conception is the conception of God as living God, in whom no distinction between essence and existence is admissible or conceivable, as the Church has defined, as all Catholic theologians teach, as every sane philosopher maintains, and the common sense of mankind asserts.

But “the One God, Infinite and Eternal, lives in *three modes*.” Since we can admit no distinction between Deity and God, between the Divine essence and the Divine existence, whatever be the distinction of modes here intended, they must be understood as distinctions in the Divine being or nature. To suppose them to be in the Divine being or nature is to suppose that nature to be composite, essentially composed of substance and mode, or of subject and accident. But this is not admissible. The composite is subsequent to the components, and God, if composite, can be revolved into something more ultimate than himself. The substance is potential in relation to the mode, the subject in relation to the accident; but God, we have seen, is most pure act, and therefore excludes from his being all potentiality. If we suppose God to be composed of substance and mode, we must suppose a power anterior to him that composes him, or unites the substance and mode so as to form from their union the living God; which, as we have seen, is to suppose a cause prior to the first cause, and a cause of the cause of all causes. Our readers may be inclined to believe, that Mr. Channing predicates the three modes of God operating out of himself, not of his being, but of his operations. This, however, is not the case; for he is evidently speaking of God, regarded in his own life, not as operating in space and time, but as infinite and eternal, therefore above and prior to his external operations in time. He must, therefore, predicate the modes of his being, and not of his operations.

“The One God, Infinite and Eternal, lives in three modes; of which Love is the Principle, Beautiful Joy the End, and Wisdom the harmonizing Medium.” But what is the antecedent of which? *Three modes*? Then what are the modes themselves? Love will be the principle of all three, beautiful joy the end, and wisdom the medium; but of all three what? This does not appear. *Lives*? It is not, we believe, accord-



ing to Lindley Murray to make a verb not used as subject, or as subjective member of a sentence, the antecedent of a relative pronoun ; but world-reformers may, no doubt, reform grammar as well as other things, and we suppose the author really means to tell us, that, of the Divine life or living, love is the principle, beautiful joy the end, and wisdom the harmonizing medium. As God lives from, in, and by himself, and no distinction between his essence and his existence is conceivable, we must predicate the love, joy, and wisdom of the Divine *being*, and they are themselves the three modes of its existence ; which, after what we have said, must mean, if anything, that God, in our highest conception of him, is essentially composed of principle, means, and end, which are love, wisdom, joy. What all this means is more than we know. It is a doctrine of the author, that all existences mirror or image God, and he has told us that every man is constituted of three elements, namely, love, truth, power, related to each other as inmost, mediate, outmost, or as motive, means, end (p. 7). It is, therefore, only fair to presume that he holds that God is constituted, in like manner, of three elements, which are in him, as in man, related as motive, means, and end, as inmost, mediate, and outmost. God, then, is to be regarded as a whole, composed of beginning, middle, and end, like a good oration ; but what this really means is not very intelligible to us. That God, in operating out of himself, that is, in creating the universe, acts by means, from a motive, or for an end, may be said ; and that the motive is his own infinite love or goodness, wisdom the means, and, as to his creatures, beautiful joy the end, may also be said ; but this has nothing to do with Mr. Channing's doctrine. He asserts that God lives in three modes, and that he lives from love to joy, by or through wisdom. But what, since these three elements constitute God, is he who lives thus ? He cannot be the love, for that is his motive ; he cannot be the joy, for that is the end he seeks ; and he cannot be the wisdom, for that is the means he uses. To say he is no one nor all of these taken singly, but is all of them taken together, in their union or composition, is — besides the absurdity of supposing a being seeking an end which he essentially is — to suppose the Divine nature to be complex, and therefore subject to analysis and dissolution. It denies the unity and substantiality of God, by making him a mere union or totality, and is open to all the objections already urged.

In republishing this first article of his creed in *The Spirit of*  
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*the Age*, Mr. Channing has made a slight addition, which may help us to understand him. "The Absolute Being, infinite, eternal, though *in Himself* utterly unapproachable, is presented to our highest conceptions as Triune, — the one, the one in many, and the many in one. To us he appears to live," &c. The doctrine of the author, we think we cannot be mistaken in saying, is, that God is for us human beings only in his manifestations, — that to our highest conceptions he is presented only as, so to speak, the manifested or actualized God, inseparable and indistinguishable from the principle, means, and end of the manifestation, or actually evolved universe. Whether back and independent of the actual universe he exists, we know not ; for out of the universe — that is, as living in and of himself, independent of the universe — he is inconceivable, "utterly unapproachable," even in conception. Thus Cousin says : — "Le Dieu de la conscience n'est pas un Dieu abstrait, un roi solitaire relégué par-delà la création sur le trône désert d'une éternité silencieuse et d'une existence absolue qui ressemble au néant même de l'existence ; c'est un Dieu à la fois vrai et réel, à la fois substance et cause, toujours substance et toujours cause, n'étant substance qu'en tant que cause, et cause qu'en tant que substance, c'est-à-dire étant cause absolue, un et plusieurs, éternité et temps, espace et nombre, essence et vie, indivisibilité et totalité, principe, fin et milieu, au sommet de l'être et à son plus humble degré, infini et fini tout ensemble, triple en fin, c'est-à-dire à la fois Dieu, nature, et humanité. En effet, si Dieu n'est pas tout, il n'est rien ; s'il est absolument indivisible en soi, il est inaccessible et par conséquent il est incompréhensible, et son incompréhensibilité est pour nous sa destruction. Incompréhensible comme formule et dans l'école, Dieu est clair dans le monde qui le manifeste, et pour l'âme qui le possède et le sent."\* The identity, on this point, of Cousin's doctrine and Mr. Channing's cannot be reasonably doubted.

God, according to Cousin and our author, is at once one and many, — is one in many, and many in one. But this is not conceivable. Unity necessarily excludes multiplicity, and multiplicity unity. If God is one, he cannot be many ; if many, he is not one. Nothing in the world is more certain. Mr. Channing is in pursuit of unity ; but if he supposes plurality in God the first cause, or the first link in his series of evolutions, he can never obtain unity ; for unity can no more

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\* *Fragments Philosophiques*, 3e éd., Paris, 1838, Tom. I. p. 76.

be obtained from plurality, than perfection from imperfection. Plurality proceeds from unity, not unity from plurality. In God is the cause of multiplicity or plurality ; but not, therefore, is he himself multiple or manifold. It is false to say that God is many in one, or even that he is one in many. God does not lose his unity in creating variety, any more than an artist loses his, in producing a variety of pictures. Is the artist a man in designing a man, a horse in designing a horse, a flower in designing a flower, a fly in designing a fly ? And does he become many in designing many, and they become one and identical in him ? If he loses his oneness in the variety of his designs, where is the unity in which they become one ? If God, in creating many, is himself many, he retains no unity in which the many can be one. The absurdity of Cousin's and Channing's doctrine results from the assumption, that God does not and cannot create, but simply evolves, and, in order to produce man, becomes himself man ; a horse, becomes himself horse ; a cabbage, becomes himself cabbage ; that is to say, what we call creatures are but forms or modes of the manifested God, — pure pantheism.

The author misapprehends the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and is mistaken in supposing that he represents God as triune. His God is not triune, but threefold ; for, by introducing divisibility, plurality, variety, diversity, into the one primary conception of God, he denies the unity of the Divine Being. His God is complex, not simple ; a totality, not a unity ; for a divisible unity is inconceivable, — a contradiction in terms. His love, wisdom, joy, are not the three hypostases of the Christian Mystery, and in no sense respond to them, or can by any possibility be the real sense of the Christian symbol, — what Christians would mean by it, if they understood themselves, as Mr. Channing would say ; because they are all three essential to the Divine nature. In neither one nor another of them is God without the other two. They are distinctions in the Divine essence. Love is not God, if distinguished from wisdom, nor wisdom, if distinguished from love. But the sacred Mystery asserts that God is absolutely one in his substance, being, nature, or existence ; indivisible, indistinguishable, and most simple. The triune God is not God existing in a threefold being or nature, but one nature, one essence, one substance, one being, one existence in three persons. Personality is the last complement of rational nature. The Divine nature, which is rational nature, if we may

so speak, is one and indivisible, in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the plurality is only in the last complement, or personality ; so that "the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, yet are there not three Gods, but one God." Mr. Channing cannot say, Love is God, Wisdom is God, and Beautiful Joy is God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God ; for, according to him, God is only the union, or totality, of the three ; and, since they are distinct by nature, if he should call each separately God, he would assert three Gods, not one Divine Being in three persons. He therefore neither asserts the substance of the Christian Trinity, nor a triune God, as he supposes.

So far as the three elements Mr. Channing names are to be regarded as attributes of the Divine Being, they are undoubtedly distinguishable from one another, in our apprehension of them, or manner of conceiving them ; but not in God, nor from his Divine *esse* or being. This distinction of attributes, which we concede, does in no sense respond to that of three persons ; because all the Divine attributes are common to each of the Divine Persons. Moreover, it is only virtually real, and exists in our minds with merely a foundation in reality. Regarded in himself, since God is most simple, — *simplicissimus*, — as he must be if, as we have proved, he is most pure act, — *actus purissimus*, — there can be no distinction between him and his attributes, nor between one attribute and another. His attributes are himself, and in himself all his attributes are identical. He is goodness, wisdom, justice, power, &c. ; and goodness, wisdom, justice, power, &c., are in him one and the same. But he being infinite, and we finite, we cannot conceive him adequately, and are obliged to conceive his attributes separately, and, in our conceptions, distinguish them both from his Divine *esse* and from one another. This is allowable, because he *eminently* contains the distinctions we make, or contains himself that which equals, and more than equals, all that we conceive in our separate conceptions.

But we must quicken our pace, or we shall never reach the end of our journey. "And throughout creation every existence, as made in the likeness of the Being of beings, is triune also, — having an impulse of good for its motive power, a co-operative use for its ultimate destiny, and a form of order as the law of its development." This throws some light on what has preceded, and proves that God, as well as his creatures,



has, in Mr. Channing's view, an ultimate destiny, that is, Beautiful Joy. Who appointed to God his destiny? Does God work to realize or perfect his own beautiful joy? Do you suppose him, in the beginning, destitute of complete blessedness, and that he creates out of his own emptiness to fill up his joy, not out of his own fulness, and that his blessedness is completed or perfected in his creatures? This is what we have all along seen to be Mr. Channing's doctrine. He does not appear to be able to conceive a God perfect in himself, and creating from pure disinterestedness, for the sake, not of increasing his own joy, but of communicating his goodness and blessedness to creatures. He condemns selfishness, and yet, with an inconsistency not uncommon in system-mongers and world-reformers, makes God himself intensely, infinitely selfish, laboring only to perfect his own existence, and to fill up the measure of his own joy. He would seem, then, not to wish us to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect, but more perfect, to have an altogether higher perfection, so as, by our noble and disinterested conduct, to help perfect God, and complete his "Beautiful Joy."

If every creature is made in the likeness of God, as Mr. Channing represents him, it by no means follows that every creature is triune; for according to him, as we have seen, God is not triune, since he is a totality, not a unity, a mere union or complexity of different elements. Theologians find in man, who is made to the image and likeness of God, some faint analogy to the most Holy Trinity; but that every creature's existence reproduces in itself the image of the three Persons of the Godhead, is a proposition the author may find it not a little difficult to prove. But letting this pass, we are unable to conceive — perhaps owing to our native and acquired dullness — how a being can be essentially constituted of an impulse, a coöperative use, and a law of development. An impulse implies some one who imparts and some one who receives it, and from both of which it is distinguishable. But who or what gives the impulse? It cannot be man himself, because the impulse is a constituent element of his nature. Who or what receives the impulse, or is moved by it? Not man, again, for he is indistinguishable from it. A coöperative use implies a thing used, distinguishable from the user, and an end to which it is used. What is the thing that is used? Not man, because he is the use, — the use being one of his constituent elements. Who is the user, or coöperator? Not

man, for the same reason. What is the end to which the co-operative use is directed? Beautiful Joy? But that also is a constituent element of man, without which man is not constituted, and therefore identical with the use and user. Cannot the author see, that, if he makes the three elements constitutive of the creature, he must write — nonsense? No being, conceived to contain its motive, means, and end in itself, as constitutive of its nature, can be conceived as active. The actor must be one, simple, indivisible, and the whole being must be on the side of the actor, and distinguishable from the end for which it acts. If man is divided into motive, means, and end, there is no entire man to be placed on the side of the actor, or to seek, by the means, the end. One third is detached, and set before the other two as the end; and the other two, again, are separated, and one third takes the other third as its means of gaining the first. Is this really conceivable? Can the third part of man, distinguished from the other two thirds, be a simple, complete, active being? Or suppose Mr. Channing does not mean to separate them, — suppose he considers them united; then he must consider the whole man essentially and entirely in each of the three terms, — that he is all motive, all means, all end, simultaneously and together, and therefore that man uses himself as the means to obtain himself! We have seen a young dog amuse himself running round after his own tail; but that is nothing in comparison with a man running round after himself, like one of the characters in Jean Paul Richter's *Titan*, who is everywhere seeking his *Ich*, his *Ego*, which he fancies he has lost.

2. "The Divine Idea of Man is of Many men made One, or, in other words, of a race unfolding, through ages, around the globe, from simple, original unity into every possible variety, and thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity." This means, we suppose, that man, properly viewed, is many men made one, or unity unfolded, in space and time, into every possible variety, and through that variety becoming completed or actualized unity. But this, if it mean anything, must mean something which is not admissible. Mr. Channing recognizes in his system no simple, original unity, from which the race can unfold into variety; for he makes man essentially the mere union of three distinguishable elements, related to each other as motive, means, and end; and he also represents God, the fountain of all being and existence, essentially composite, composed, as man, of three distinct elements, which

are in like manner related to each other in him. He supposes plurality, multiplicity, in God, or first link in his series of evolutions, which is reproduced in each and every evolution or existence, and therefore denies all simple, original unity as his point of departure, whether for God or for creatures. Besides, unity cannot unfold. *Simple*, original unity *unfolding*, is a contradiction in terms. Only complexity, multiplicity, plurality, can unfold, all of which are excluded by simple unity, and, in turn, exclude it. Even if the author could, without contradicting himself, assert simple, original unity, he could not assert that the idea of man is of a race unfolding from unity. There is no difference between a unity that unfolds into variety, and no unity at all.

“And thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity.” Here is queer philosophy. The race unfolds from simple unity into every possible variety, and from variety into fulfilled, composite unity. Unity is fulfilled in variety; that is to say, unity, considered in itself, is not actual unity, is only potential unity, and becomes actual unity only in multiplicity and composition! Unity, then, must cease to be unity in order to be unity. Our modern philosophers have made strange discoveries. “Thence by combination into fulfilled, *composite* unity.” Composite unity! What sort of an animal is that? Why not talk of a round triangle, or a square circle? A *composite* unity is no unity at all, but a sheer contradiction in terms. Composition denies unity, and unity denies composition. By no conceivable combination of particulars can you obtain unity; for combination gives only a union, a whole, an aggregation, all terms which are excluded by unity, and which exclude it in turn. Mr. Channing can hardly be ignorant of this, for he has once, unless our recollection fails us, been able to distinguish between union and unity.

The contradictions and absurdities which meet us at every turn in the author, and which we grow weary of pointing out, result, we suppose, from his eclecticism, or rather syncretism, in which he includes and attempts to harmonize systems essentially incongruous and irreconcilable. He has some reminiscences of Christian theism, which he would retain and reconcile with the pantheistic conceptions he has, consciously or unconsciously, adopted; and these last he wishes to harmonize with the doctrine of progress furnished him by the dominant sentiment of the age, or modern *Welt-geist*, and which is his favorite doctrine, to which all in his system is subordinate.

Some whom he respects advocate Christianity ; others whom he respects equally as much, perhaps more, advocate pantheism ; and both these classes advocate progress. He concludes, therefore, that Christian Theism, German Pantheism, and French Socialism or Progressism are, at bottom, identical, or, at least, mutually reconcilable. He throws them all into the same category, and reasons from them as if there was no fundamental difference between them, and hence the confusion and contradictory character of his thought and speech.

Christian theism asserts one God, infinitely perfect, self-existing, eternal, independent, absolutely one and most simple, excluding from his being all potentiality, all complexity, composition, multiplicity, variety, distinction, and therefore asserts other existences, or the universe, visible or invisible, only as created by his omnipotent power out of nothing, or, what is the same thing, out of his own infinite fulness ; — fulness, we say, not *stuff*, as Cousin maintains, which would imply the eternity of matter, or that God is the *materia prima* of the universe. Pantheism denies the creative Deity, and asserts that God is all, or the whole, and that nothing but God exists. Man and nature, as distinguished from him, are, in its view, no real existences, are nothing but the infinite fulness of his own being. The world of space and time is a mere illusion, for there are and can be no separate existences coexisting, and no succession of events. All is eternal, immovable, silent. But now comes the great difficulty. To reconcile the idea of a creative Deity, *Deus Creator*, with the idea of an uncreative Deity, — a God who creates the heavens and the earth, and all things visible and invisible, with a God who creates, does, nothing, and is all that is or exists, — is hard enough ; but to reconcile this latter idea, which denies the world of space and time, and therefore all progressibles, with the idea of universal and unlimited progress, is for Mr. Channing a still harder, as well as a more pressing, problem.

To solve these problems, the author, while he asserts the creative God, as he must in order to assert the world of space and time, quietly assumes that creative and uncreative are the same, or that creation and evolution have one and the same meaning, and that to assert a God unfolding himself in variety is the same thing as to assert a God creating the universe. This disposes of the first difficulty. He then, in order to be able to conceive of God unfolding, and to reconcile the idea of the uncreative Deity with the idea of progress,



imagines multiplicity and variety in God himself; that is, in the first cause, or the first link of his series. All now is simple and easy. God contains infinite variety, which he is infinitely developing. Each evolution, since it is an evolution of God, is an image of God, — or, so to speak, God himself in miniature, God in its own sphere, — and therefore contains a variety in itself, which, in its turn, it must evolve. Its evolutions, again, each in its degree, contain a variety, which also must be evolved, that is, actualized. These successive or serial evolutions are what is meant by progress. When God, as the first evolver, has evolved all his variety, actualized his entire potentiality, and each evolved existence has evolved all its variety, actualized its entire potentiality, according to the law of the series ascertained and determined by Fourier, all potentiality is actualized, and the universe is the actualized God, — God in his completeness and integrity. Then nothing more remains to be evolved; the work is done; and God, from whom and for whom are all things, is completed. Plurality and variety are commensurate with unity, and God and the universe may go to sleep, or, as Fourier seems to hold, may die altogether, and universal night and silence close the scene.

But as simple, as beautiful, and as *scientific* as all this may seem to our modern philosophers, it by no means reconciles the different ideas which are forced into juxtaposition. By resolving creation into evolution, the author loses Christian theism, and falls into pantheism; and by placing multiplicity and variety in God in order to be able to assert evolution and progress, he dissolves his pantheism, and falls into pure atheism; for atheism consists precisely in the denial of unity, and the assertion of multiplicity, plurality, variety, in the first cause. Atheism, again, is irreconcilable with progress; for multiplicity, plurality, variety, &c., are subsequent to unity, and inconceivable without it. Hence, if placed in the first cause, represented as essential in the first link of the series, by excluding unity, they deny themselves, and therefore all existences, and then all progressibles. Thus every effort the author makes only removes him the farther from the goal he seeks, which we have found to be uniformly the case with every one who engages, outside of the City of God, in schemes of world-reform, however great their abilities, or praiseworthy, in itself considered, the general or particular end they propose.

A little sound philosophy and common sense, we should

think, might enable the author to perceive, that, if he takes multiplicity and variety for his starting-point, though he must arrive at nihility, he can never arrive at unity ; and that unless he asserts Christian theism, he can never assert progress, for it is only inasmuch as he admits a *creative* God that he can conceive of progressibles. He must assert the God of the Christian and common sense, or the dead unity or uncreative God of old Xenophanes and the Eleatics ; or, in fine, he must deny unity and assert plurality in the origin of things, with the atheist, and therefore nihilism, since we have already shown, that, without the conception of God, no conception is possible. If he asserts the second, he loses the universe, and can talk no more of progress ; for unity has no progression, and, however multiplied into itself, gives and can give only unity for its product. If he says the third, still he can talk no more of progress, for nihility has as little progress as unity. But if he takes the first, he escapes every difficulty, and can assert the universe with all its variety ; for then he supposes for it an adequate cause. He can also, since he has a world of space and time, talk of progress, not indeed in attaining to a perfection never actual, and by means of imperfection, but in recovering a perfection lost, and approaching a perfection eternally actual in God. Progress is conceivable only in space and time, and to be able to assert its possibility we must be able to assert the reality of the world of space and time, which we cannot do either as pantheists or as atheists. Progress also implies motion, but motion is inconceivable without a prime mover, who is himself immovable, at rest. This is as true in the moral as in the physical world. Pantheism denies the prime mover, by asserting a dead, uncreative unity, which, if immovable, nevertheless imparts no motion ; or, if you take Mr. Channing's view, God, as anterior to creation, is not actual, but merely potential ; and the potential cannot move, for it cannot act, since only the actual can act. Atheism, of course, denies the prime mover ; for, rendered consequent, it denies all things, is universal negation. Christian theism asserts a prime mover, the eternal and immovable God, who causes motion, but does not himself enter into motion. Under any and every point of view, then, our modern advocates of progress could never have committed a more serious blunder than in denying the creative God, — *Deus Creator*, — and in seeking a foundation for their doctrine in pantheism and atheism.

But " the Divine Idea of Man is of Many men made One."

In what are they *made* one ? The unity of the human race, that is, of what is for Mr. Channing the human race, does not now exist, and he admits it does not by the very fact that he is seeking its unity, and proposes it as the end to be gained. If made one, then, they must be so made in something which they are not and have not. What is this something ? Variety ? So Mr. Channing appears to teach ; but this is a mistake. Never will you arrive at unity through variety ; for the farther you travel in variety the farther do you recede from unity. Mankind, in themselves considered, are many, as Mr. Channing himself concedes, otherwise he could not speak of “ Many men made One.” If many, if a multitude, as they certainly are, they have not, and cannot have, the principle of unity in themselves, and can be made one only by virtue of some principle of unity above themselves, existing out of them and independent of them. What or where is this principle, of which men may participate, and by participation become one in it. It is not in nature, for nature is multiple, diverse ; it is not in man, for the very idea of man, Mr. Channing says, is of many men *made* one, and therefore the many must participate of it before *man* is conceivable ; it is not in grace, for the author recognizes no order of grace distinguishable from the order of nature. If not in one or another of these, it can be nowhere, cannot be at all. Mr. Channing, then, really recognizes no principle of unity, nothing in which the many are or can be made one. And yet he calls his doctrine the *unitary* doctrine, — professes to be seeking *unity*, in obedience to *unitary* tendencies !

“ The centre of this race is God in Man.” Thus, according to Mr. Channing, God lives in man, and not man in God, as religion teaches. This confirms what we have presented as his doctrine, that God lives in his evolutions, and is completed, actualized, or perfected in them ; that is, the cause is completed, fulfilled, in the effect, and therefore the cause depends on the effect for its perfection ! “ The centre of this race is God in Man.” This proves conclusively that Mr. Channing recognizes no unity, or principle of unity. He cannot say the human race attain to unity by participating of God, and becoming one in him ; for he is in them, not they in him ; and although he is in them, they are, nevertheless, without unity. God cannot, then, impart unity to them, or by their union with himself make them one. Let the author talk no more of unity. But if God lives in man, what more do

you complain of? "Its destined end, a Heaven of Humanity." The end of the race can, whatever it be, be actualized only in individuals. If the end is humanity, it can be nothing else than the production of individuals, that is, the fulfilment of the command, if command rather than permission it is, *Crescite et multiplicamini super eam* (sc. *terram*). But what is the destined end of individuals? Do they count for nothing in your world-scheme? It is remarkable how little account our modern reformers make of individuals, and of individual rights. They are genuine philanthropists, — love all men in general, and no one in particular; seek to make all happy in general, and render every one miserable in particular. "Its destined end, a Heaven of Humanity." A *heaven* of humanity! What is that? We are sure we do not know.

But we are transcending our limits, and are weary of the subject. We have, either in what we have heretofore advanced or in what we have now said, anticipated all we wish to say on the remaining propositions we have cited. We have aimed throughout to preserve our gravity, and to treat Mr. Channing with the kindness and affection due to the sweetness of his disposition and the gentleness of his manners. Whether we have in all instances succeeded, or not, our readers must judge. Mr. Channing sees, as all men see, and not more clearly nor more vividly, perhaps, than thousands of others not of his school, that there are innumerable evils in the world; and he holds that every man should do all in his power to remedy them. He believes men might and should live as brothers, and that, if they would, wrongs and outrages would cease, there would be no more war, no more oppression, no more injustice, and the whole earth would be filled with love and joy, — and so do we. If every man did right, nobody would do wrong; if every one lived as he ought, nobody would live as he ought not to live. Nothing in the world more true, my brother. We agree with you exactly. But how do you purpose to make all men live as brothers? Here is, for you, the question of questions. This, the only question that it was necessary to answer, Mr. Channing answers not; and none of our modern world-reformers or system-mongers answer in a very satisfactory manner. We have listened to most, perhaps to all the more notable, of their answers, but not with much edification. The only direct and practical answer we recollect to have heard is the world-famous answer of the Jacobin, "Be my brother, or I will kill you." This



is plain and direct, and has, at least, the merit of expressing truly the spirit of those who deafen us with their everlasting declamations about "brotherhood," "universal fraternity."

Mr. Channing, we cheerfully admit, does not precisely hold to killing ; but he has a great affection for the Jacobin, and takes him under his protection. Moreover, in his unwearied efforts to stir up discontent, to make people sensible of their sufferings, to tear open the wounds of society, to uncover its running sores, and exhibit them to everybody, — in dwelling upon the evils we suffer, forgetful of the good we receive, so much more than we deserve, and exciting hopes that can never be peacefully realized, nay, never realized at all, — he, whatever his intention, effectually prepares the millions, as far as his influence extends, for the Jacobin movement, and the adoption of the Jacobin answer. The Associationists, we deny not, profess to be opposed to the resort to physical force, and to advocate only peaceful modes of reform ; but, if we recollect aright, Robespierre made his first appearance before the public as the author of an essay against capital punishment. The Associationists, whatever their intentions or professions, are but panders to the physical-force party, or, if they like the figure better, recruiting-sergeants to the destructive army of revolutionists. Let them not imagine that we can be taken with their professions, even when we do not question their sincerity. They cannot promulgate their principles, and continue their declamations against civilization and society, without loosening all social bonds in their adherents, and rousing up the wild and ferocious passions of our nature, — passions which no theory, no reasoning, no smooth-toned rebuke or mild entreaty, can restrain, and which, when once broken loose, will precipitate the populations moved by them into war, bloodshed, and plunder. Hope not, madmen, ye can apply the lighted torch to flax without having it burn, or to a magazine of powder and not have it explode. You cannot go on, year after year, denouncing social order, denouncing society itself, denouncing every restraint of law, all faith, piety, conscience, everything the race has hitherto held sacred, and hope that the multitude, if they heed you, will remain quiet, charmed to peace by the dulcet persuasions you, at rare intervals, let fall from your sweet lips, or that they will not take up arms to realize the visions of Mahomet's paradise on earth, with which you have maddened their brains and inflamed their lusts. We should shudder at the bare thought of doing you injustice.

We would not willingly offend your pride or wound your sensibility ; but we tell you, pretended peaceful reformers, that the basest and most horror-inspiring criminals, on whom our society inflicts the supreme vengeance of the law, are harmless in comparison with you, pure-minded, moral, and heroic as ye fancy yourselves, and kind-hearted as ye really may be ; for you kill reason, you murder the soul, you assassinate conscience, you sap society, render order impossible, take from law its moral force, from our homes all sanctity, from our lives all security, and leave us a prey to all the low, base, beastly, cruel, violent, wild, and destructive propensities and passions of fallen nature. O, mock us not with the words Brotherhood, Fraternal Love, Universal Peace ! We have heard those words from profane lips too often ; and never have we heard the multitude echoing them from their leaders but we have seen society shaken, order overthrown, virtue treated as a crime, the prisons crowded to suffocation with the loyal and the true, the scaffolds groaning beneath their burden of innocent victims, the guillotine growing weary with its unremitting toil, and the earth drenched with the blood of her fairest and her noblest children. Repeat those words outside of the City of God, in what gentle tones and peaceful accents you will, you, at least your followers, will come at last to the answer, " Love me as your brother, or I will cut your throat."

Yet suppose not that we war against the words themselves. Rightly applied, they are good, noble, and spirit-stirring words. Brotherhood, fraternity, the unity of the race, and the union of all men in one grand and true association, are great ideas, and, in their only practical sense, no discovery and no possession of yours. The human race began in unity, and their unity was preserved in the race, as perpetuated by natural generation, till the confusion of tongues at Babel, and the consequent dispersion of mankind, as recorded in Genesis. Since then, in that race, unity, brotherhood, fraternity, have not existed, nor been attainable. They have since been attainable only by election and grace in the chosen people, in the " seed of Abraham " ; for there only has the ideal truth, in which alone man finds his unity, been preserved in its integrity. But there they have been, and are, and will continue to be, realized. You cannot have these without the principle from which they are derived ; and since that principle is lost in the natural human race, you can have it only as God supplies it by a new creative act, an act not included in nature, there-

fore supernatural, — and then only through the medium and on the conditions it pleases him to appoint. We know this is distasteful to you ; but, instead of rejecting it, you would do well to correct your taste, or put yourselves in the way of having it corrected.

Since the calling of Abraham, the father of the faithful, the true integral human race has been found only in his posterity by election, the chosen people of God, — that is, the Catholic Church. It is there only that the race, broken by the Fall, and deprived by guilt of the unity in which alone is true intellectual and true spiritual life, can be reintegrated, restored to pristine unity, and enabled to live a normal life. Out of this society you may vegetate, you may intellectually conceive of unity, nay, even intellectually apprehend many fragments of the truth which is whole and entire in it ; but to come into immediate relation with it, to participate of it and become one in its unity, you cannot. Concoct as many theories of unity, of association, as you please, they will be only theories of unity, they will not be it ; contrive all the machinery you can invent for realizing it, and you will find yourselves with a well-spread table of — empty platters and glasses ; for if you have it not as the integral principle of your life, you must be born again or you cannot have it, cannot partake of it otherwise than as a hungry man eats rich viands in his dreams, and awakes and finds it was only in his dreams.

The history of gentilism, from the dispersion of mankind in the days of Phaleg, should have taught the Associationists all this ; and they might, one would think, have inferred as much from the failure of every attempt to recover unity, or to reform individuals or nations, outside of the integral elected race, or Catholic society. Out of that society, out of the Church, you have only the shadow or echo of truth, never truth itself ; you have only far-off glimpses of life, which you mostly misinterpret, — only plurality, diversity, division, mutual repugnance, as you yourselves not only concede, but prove ; and what sane man, with these for his starting-point or his means, can hope to attain to unity, concord, peace ? Did not old Archimedes even demand a whereon to stand, a *ποῦ στᾶν*, in order to move the world ? Are ye so silly, then, as to fancy that you can move it with your fulcrum resting on nothing ?

ART. III. — *Naomi: or Boston Two Hundred Years ago.*

By ELIZA BUCKMINSTER LEE. Second Edition. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1848. 12mo. pp. 324.

It is not easy for a descendant of the Puritans, who has had the mercy to be received into the Catholic Church, to speak of his ancestors, or of Boston two hundred years ago, in those terms of filial respect and patriotic affection which they who count religious faith and association for nothing suppose they have a right to demand, or at least may reasonably expect. But we confess that we are of the number who regard the spiritual relationship as superior to the natural, and Mother Church as above father-land. Our Lord said, "Whosoever shall do the will of God, he is my mother, my sister, and my brother,"\* and also, "He that loveth father or mother, . . . . son or daughter, more than me, is not worthy of me."†

The Church is the Christian's father-land, and the Catholic society, which derives through election and grace from Abraham, whom God chose to be the father of the faithful, is the Christian's human race. In this society, the society of the chosen people of God, since the coming of Christ, all national distinctions are obliterated, all divisions of caste, clan, tribe, or family are abolished, and all are made one in the unity of the spirit, — of the spiritual life they live in Christ their head, and of whom they are members. This society and its relations, affections, and duties take precedence of all others, and no others are to be cherished, save as subordinate and subservient to these. Our Puritan ancestors were outside of this society, outside of the chosen people of God, outside of the mankind reintegrated by grace and election in unity, destitute of both true spiritual and true intellectual life; — branches severed from the vine, wilting and drying for the end they had chosen for themselves. However we may regret their delusions, however much we may weep that they were not wise in time, and did not become incorporated as integral members of the living human race, we cannot, as Catholics, claim kindred with them, or feel that we are bound to respect or defend their memories. To us, as Catholics, they were publicans and Gentiles, aliens to the Christian commonwealth, or Gospel kingdom.

Nevertheless, there are aspects under which their characters

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\* St. Mark iii. 35.

† St. Matt. x. 37.



become to us matters of interest, and under which we may have, not only things to say against them, but also things to say in their favor. In one sense, all outside the Catholic society, or the Church, are alike ; — they are alike in the want of unity, of truth in its integrity, of true human life even, and of the means, where they are, of fulfilling the law of charity, that is, supreme and exclusive love to God, and the love of our neighbour as ourselves in God. Yet are there degrees in their fall, and differences of character among them, which are appreciable, and which, when the question is between one class of them and another, may well afford just grounds of preference. When the question is between Catholics and non-Catholics, the lowest and most unworthy Catholic, who retains his faith, is far above the highest and most exemplary in the ranks of even the least deformed among the sects, on the principle that “ a living dog is better than a dead lion,” — not because faith alone profiteth a man, but because as long as one retains the faith he retains the principle of life, and may at last repent, and elicit acceptable works. But when the comparison is between sect and sect, between Puritans and Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, Unitarians, Quakers, or Universalists, or, in our own country, between non-Catholics of the Northern and non-Catholics of the Southern, Middle, or Western States, we may not only have our preferences, but sometimes find it, as American citizens, expedient to express them.

It is only when the comparison is between sect and sect, and between section and section, that we have ever spoken favorably of our Puritan ancestors according to the flesh, and ventured to vindicate the New England character. We have not done this so much because we revere the memory of the one, or sympathize with the other, as because we have found them made answerable, if not for more than they were guilty of, yet for what they were not guilty of. In itself considered, or compared with the Catholic, we do not like the New England character, and could say as severe things against it as do our friends farther south, though, if wishing to censure it, we should not bring against it the precise charges which they do. There was little in the stern old Puritan to our taste, — little with which we do or ever did sympathize ; and yet we dislike him less than we do any of the other sectaries that had a share in colonizing this country. His faults were those of Protestants in general, but he had virtues which were peculiarly his own, and which have left their mark on the country. He was English,

Anglo-Saxon, it is true, and that is no recommendation ; but he had his full share of the better, and not more than his share of the worse, qualities of his race. He was a bigot, but neither alone nor peculiarly fierce in his bigotry. He was a persecutor, and resorted to violence against those who differed from him, whether Catholics or Protestants ; but in that he was not at all distinguished from Protestants in general. The right to burn heretics was defended by Calvin in a pamphlet approved by Melancthon ; and, with the exception of the Quakers, and some later sects deriving from Lord Herbert and Voltaire rather than directly from Luther and Calvin, we are aware of no Protestant sect that holds the punishment of heresy by the civil power to be wrong. And, if the several sects — Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Baptists, Methodists — do not now fine, imprison, scourge, or burn those they regard as heretics, the reason, most likely, is, not the lack of the disposition, or of belief in their right, but their lack of power, to do so. Let the Presbyterians of the Middle States but once get the civil power into their hands, for which they have been striving ever since the formation of the Federal government, — and it would have been with success, if their language had not been confounded, — and they would soon prove themselves not unworthy sons of Farel, Calvin, and Knox. Their spirit is willing, but their power to perform is wanting. Protestantism, till it degenerates into indifference, is essentially bigoted, and every bigot is at heart a persecutor. The several sects, no longer in authority, no longer able to maintain and propagate themselves by the strong arm of the law, by pains and penalties, by fire and sword, as in former times, now turn demagogues, and seek to do it by flattery, wheedling, trickery, craft, and management, in which they are great adepts.

It is the common opinion that the Puritans of New England were, in their day, remarkable among Protestant sects for their bigotry and intolerance ; but such was not the fact, and we are inclined to believe that the opinion has arisen from the fact, that a large body of New-Englanders, for the last sixty or seventy years, have fallen into religious indifferentism, and have made the country echo with their exaggerated accounts and condemnation of the bigotry and intolerance of their ancestors ; whereas, in the rest of the old States of the Union, if there has been an equal lapse into indifferentism, those who have fallen have been too filial or too indolent to parade the errors and crimes of their early settlers. Few of the sons of Virginia have ex-

posed to the gaze of the world the intolerance of her Episcopalians ; and when the liberal Marylander exposes the Protestant intolerance and persecution so conspicuous in his own State, and which he cannot deny, he charges it upon the poor Puritans, forgetful that the Protestants of whom he complains were Episcopalians, — that the Puritans hated prelacy hardly less than papacy, and would as quick have established Catholicity by law as the Protestant Episcopal Church, which, if we recollect aright, is what the Protestants of Maryland did establish, when they abolished the toleration introduced by the Catholic Lord Baltimore. No portion of the descendants of the early Presbyterian colonists in the Middle States have, to our knowledge, exposed the intolerance of their ancestors, and, indeed, few of them, comparatively, are known in the republic of letters. The simple fact is, we suppose, that New-Englanders, who have taken the lead in the literature of the country, have published the full history of all the sins committed against both religious liberty and religious indifference by their ancestors, and made them known to the whole world, whereas the sins of a like nature committed in other parts of our common country have been suffered to sleep in forgetfulness, or, instead of being exaggerated, have been glossed over and made as little revolting as possible.

Mrs. Lee's *Naomi*, now before us, tends to confirm this conclusion. Mrs. Lee is a highly intellectual lady of this city, sister to the well-known Joseph Stevens Buckminster, one of the earliest and most promising of the Unitarian ministers of New England. What she herself is, it would be difficult for us, and still more difficult for her, to decide. She was the daughter of a Puritan minister, brought up in the rigid doctrine and discipline of the Puritans ; and, like so many thousands of the generation now passing off brought up in the same way, she became, as did her distinguished brother, a Unitarian, and, we believe, is still reckoned in the Unitarian ranks ; but she has never been able to satisfy herself with Unitarianism, which hardly rises to the level of natural religion, and she has been for years searching, with throbbing heart and aching head, for something more positive, more substantial, more able to meet the wants of the human soul. As yet, her search has resulted only in disappointment ; and, with a masculine intellect, a woman's heart, and a nature remarkable for its religiosity, she finds nothing to believe, nothing to love, nothing to worship. She has sought everywhere but in the right place, and by all means

but the right ones. Alas ! she is not alone in this, but merely one of a large class of both men and women among us, commonly reckoned as Unitarians, who have outgrown the revolting Calvinistic system in which they were reared, who understand well the shallowness and falseness of every form of Protestantism, and who, though deeply impressed with the necessity of religion, and hardly doubting that somewhere there is and must be true religion, yet feel that they have not found it, know not where to look for it, and must despair of finding it, — taking it for granted, in the outset, that it cannot be with us. Their children are in a state perhaps even more deplorable. Some of them continue going to the Unitarian meetings, — Dr. Gannett's, Dr. Frothingham's, Mr. Lothrop's, Mr. Huntington's, — from habit and a regard to decorum, rather than from conviction ; some return to the ranks of the Puritans, and try to find relief in fanaticism ; a few pass over to Anglicanism ; but the greater part grow up in indifferentism, and in real ignorance of all religion, plunge into business or dissipation, soothe their consciences now and then by a little fashionable philanthropy, declaim on abolition and against capital punishment, patronize Socialism, and talk, and sometimes write, about pauperism and the elevation of the laboring classes, — trying to appease their hunger with the east wind, and finding that they do but sow the wind and reap the whirlwind. Alas for them !

But the state of mind in which most of these are necessarily renders them hostile to the old Puritanical exclusiveness, and disposed to exhibit and condemn the bigotry and persecution of their ancestors. Thus Mrs. Lee, in *Naomi*, lays her scene in Boston, in the time of the troubles with the Quakers, and evidently writes her story mainly for the purpose of exposing the errors of the old Puritans, and of advocating religious liberty, or rather religious indifference. Not that she fails to sketch with much freedom and truth the characteristic traits of Bostonians two hundred years ago, but she brings out in bold relief only the bigoted and the persecuting features, and leaves the impression upon her readers that intolerance and persecution were what chiefly distinguished them. She enlists all our sympathies for Naomi, a concealed Quakeress, who exposed herself to persecution, not so much for her Quakerism as by her attempts to interfere with the regular course of Puritanic justice, and excites our indignation against her proud, gloomy, heartless, and sanctimonious judges. No book could be better devised to confirm the common notion entertained of the old New England



Puritans, or to make a Bostonian of the liberal school either blush for his ancestors, or applaud himself for his own indifference and unexclusiveness.

We cannot give anything like an analysis of *Naomi*, and we have space for only a few brief extracts; the book deserves a notice, and some extracts we must make, as specimens of the style of the gifted authoress, if not for their own truthfulness and beauty. The following is in a kindly spirit, and is the best that can be said of the motives of the early settlers of New England.

"Puritanism was, as those who embraced it believed, a protest of right against wrong, of good against evil, of heaven against hell; in many it was a true heroism, inspired by holy motives, pursued with devoted energy, purified from all selfish ends, and rewarded with the joys of conscience.

"The views and motives that led the Pilgrims and planters to these New England shores were as various and as widely different as the characters of the persons who composed the successive companies. Winthrop and his companions were as true, as pure, as heroic a company as ever set foot upon our sterile and severe coast. They were inspired by deep, conscientious, but yet narrow and mistaken conceptions of religious liberty. They wished to escape persecution in England, but no sooner did the occasion present itself than they became persecutors in their turn; tolerance for their own opinions was the only tolerance admitted. That tolerance itself implies intolerance was an idea which had never dawned upon the religious mind of the period.

"Many came merely to enjoy an untrammelled worship, — to be rid of surplices, and what were to them the idle ceremonies of formalism and the ritual. A very large number came to this country upon commercial speculations, with the hope of making or bettering their fortunes, and yet a larger number with a union of purposes, of which, although none perhaps were of an entirely elevated or disinterested character, yet were none censurable or unworthy.

"Included among the latter class was the merchant who was most largely interested in the ship that had just arrived, and whose carriage had been waiting upon the wharf to receive a passenger from the vessel. The reader must not suppose that a carriage was at this time a frequent appendage to a rich man's establishment. There were perhaps half a dozen in the whole country, and the merchant of whom we speak was as able as any one to maintain this luxury.

"Mr. Aldersey, to whose house *Naomi* had been borne, was one of the most wealthy merchants of Boston, although not one of the

company who came with Winthrop. At the time of Winthrop's embarkation, he was living in London, and reaping a fortune from one of the extensive monopolies common at that period ; but he was a Puritan, and belonged to the patriot party that opposed all monopolies. He would have gladly remained in the enjoyment of his own, by a connivance in which he should not be known. It was, however, discovered and withdrawn, and he came to hide his mortification in the New World. He returned, however, at the end of a few years, and married. His wife, whom he now brought with him, a lovely and excellent woman, had large connections in England of her own family, and of her first husband's (she had been a widow), which made the rending of the ties to the mother country most difficult. Naomi, the little daughter of the first husband, was the darling of many old relatives, who set their hearts and their faces against the proposal of bringing the little girl to the New World. Like Mrs. Wilson, the partner of the reverend gentleman of that name, their imaginations exaggerated the dangers of the sea, the terrors of the savages and monsters that infested the land. Mrs. Aldersey accompanied her husband, therefore, with a divided and bleeding heart ; for the little Naomi, a child of nine years old, must be left behind." — pp. 18 – 20.

As to the purity of the motives, devotion, and heroism of the Pilgrims, if taken in a religious or Catholic sense, the less we say the better ; although, in a merely human sense, we can subscribe to the greater part of Mrs. Lee's account. But it is a great mistake to suppose that they *professed* to come here to establish what is called religious liberty. Religious liberty, in its modern popular acceptation, was not an idea which they did not comprehend, as Mrs. Lee intimates, but an idea they expressly rejected. Their complaint before leaving England was, not that all sects or all forms of religion were not free in their native country, as many believe, but that the true religion, to wit, their own, was bound, and they were not at liberty to profess it. They scouted from the first the idea that there may be many forms of religion, all true and salutary, or that men have or can have the permission of their Maker, freedom before God, to embrace any other than the true religion. They came here, not to found a commonwealth which should hold all religions, all sects, all opinions, all fancies, alike sacred, and maintain their equal freedom, but to found, in their estimation, a Christian commonwealth, based on the Gospel, subject to the law of God as promulgated in his word, and professing and maintaining, as its religion, the one only true religion. Their exclusiveness was no inconsistency, but a rigid deduction from the prin-

ciples they avowed. The error was not in seeking to establish a Christian commonwealth, was not in their exclusiveness, but in assuming that their sect was the Church of God, and in supposing that they, fallible men, with no Divine commission, with no infallible authority to judge, and no authority at all in religious matters but a self-constituted authority, had a right to erect their own doctrines into a creed, and to condemn all who did not choose to conform to them; thus arrogating to themselves the authority of the Church of God, and making conscience amenable to a merely human tribunal, — conscience, which is accountable to God alone.

The following sketch of Mr. Aldersey is very well done, and may be taken as an accurate sketch of the genuine Puritan in both Old England and New England, as he was, as he is, and as he must be, or cease to be a Puritan.

“I have said that Mr. Aldersey did not exile himself to get rid of the hierarchy, the surplice, or the bishops; he came because he could no longer enjoy the revenues of a monopoly which his party had long condemned, and his principles had barely suffered him to connive at. He was already rich, and the commercial prosperity of the colony under the favorable regard of Cromwell had enabled him to double his fortune since he came to the country.

“In this religious community, men lived apparently above the world. Religion was lord of their life. To attain any degree of consideration, it was as requisite to be religious as it is now to be honest. Mr. Aldersey had joined the Boston church the first Sabbath after his arrival; he was a zealous church-member, an Assistant of the General Court, a magistrate, a keen detector of heresy in opinion and of latitudinarianism in practice; liberality of judgment in one or the other, with respect to others, was a thing that had never dawned upon his mind, yet he exempted himself from any particular strictness of principle or practice. His great Bible lay open before him on Sunday, and upon its very leaves he wrote his commercial letters. He had obtained secretly, this very Saturday night, news and information of the state of the market in England, which would be imparted to others only on Monday morning, and which enabled him to add some thousands to his property. Yet his family devotions had never been apparently more fervent than upon this very evening, when his thoughts were far away, busied with commercial speculations. He was not, however, an unmitigated hypocrite. He had always been prosperous, and deceived himself into the conviction, that it was the special blessing of God that crowned all his inferior speculations and his fraudulent gains. Such persons are not wholly without excuse. The homage that even the most upright pay to success, to wordly prosperity;

the kind of acquiescence that even the best accord to prosperous selfishness ; the flattering anticipated epitaph, written upon the countenances of all those who approach the man known to have the most avaricious appetites, but attended with ostentatious charities, — all these deceive him. They know he is the toad, ugly and venomous, but they are dazzled by the jewel borne on his front. All this makes the true heart, the discerning spirit, weep, and fear that the great day of justice is yet afar off.

“ The principles of Christian love, the beatitudes, can never influence society while those mean and grovelling propensities are honored and flattered because wealth and luxury attend them. While the man whose heart is moulded from the downtrodden mire, where serpents have hissed, and swine have rooted, — whose intellect, of coarse flint, is only capable of being struck into light by the hope of gain, — gilded with the trappings of wealth, is placed on high to receive the homage of the world, while the worshipper of truth, the man of pure, unsullied conscience, is thrust aside, or bears the obloquy of public opinion, such society, whether it be Puritan or orthodox, can never be Christian.

“ Mr. Aldersey was not ostentatious in his house or his furniture ; he lived, indeed, rather beneath than above his means ; his income constantly accumulated. Ostentation was not then shown in the pride of luxurious living. Boston has retained the stamp that was given it in the first century. Its munificence is displayed at this very day, as it was thirty years after the arrival of the *Arbella*, in its patriotic and religious charities, rather than in luxurious living.” — pp. 22 — 24.

We add the following sketch of Naomi as a fair specimen of the author's manner in her more ambitious passages.

“ Beauty is spiritual ; the most perfect features are unmeaning until irradiated by the light of the soul, — like those vases which are opaque and indistinct till the light shines from within, when they reveal forms of exquisite beauty. Naomi, when sleeping, possessed that species of beauty that had long informed her features. They were now calm and motionless, like the marble statue that will never awake to life. A noble breadth of forehead, smooth and pale, like the leaf of the camellia, was surrounded by soft brown hair, that had never been festooned or curled, but lay in wavy folds upon the pure marble. Her eyes, now veiled by their lids, were of a deep gray, or blue, or even hazel, according as the light was reflected from them ; they were not brilliant and sparkling, but serious, thoughtful, sometimes sad, and, when fixed earnestly upon one, a mild light seemed burning within them. Her complexion was pale, but not unhealthy ; and the soft but serious mouth disclosed perfect teeth. No one, on first looking at Naomi,



would have thought of her beauty. The regularity of her features was lost in something more precious ; —

‘ A sweet, attractive kind of grace,  
A full assurance given by looks ;  
Continual comfort in her face,  
The lineaments of Gospel books.’

“ Yes, it was the full assurance of perfect truth beneath those transparent features that made the charm of her presence. It is a common expression ‘ as true as the Gospel ’ ; in that sense the word is used above, and we may add that in Naomi it was a true gospel of love, that comforted all who looked upon her.

“ There had been few incidents in the life of Naomi. Her character had not been formed by external circumstances. Hers was one of those pure poetical souls, that had as yet found no manifestation. They seem made for an age of perfection that does not yet exist. Painting has succeeded in representing characters of this kind, in the early Madonnas of the Catholic Church ; — pure types of nature in humble life, exalted, because they have been *chosen*. Poetry has spoilt, by endeavouring to idealize them, forgetting that their essence consists in being simply what they are, — divine.\*

“ The fact of Naomi’s early orphanhood, the solitude of the heart in which she had been left at the most important period of her growth, was perhaps the cause that spiritual consciousness instead of external interests pervaded her whole character. She had never known her father, but to her mother’s love and influence her young heart had been completely open. The early separation from her mother had been the misfortune of her life ; for although left with the kindest relatives, the tendrils of the young heart, thus torn away from their early support, could not entwine themselves again, but floated loose upon the air. Solitude and want of companionship, of the interchange of thought upon the most interesting subjects, had formed in the little Naomi habits of reserve and of secret musings in her solitary hours, when her pillow would be wetted with the tears wrung from the lonely heart that longed to love. Not that she had not objects of love. She lived with indulgent friends, and in the truest domestic harmony ; but hers was a heart that could only surrender to tenderness, and to the most intimate sympathy. To her absent mother she poured out in her letters the riches of an affluent, of an exquisitely beautiful nature, already overflowing with love and enthusiasm. But the too fearful mother, imagining in those divine gifts an exaggerated sensibility, and fearing the evils and sorrows involved in unrestrained, unguarded affections, did not respond to the ardent, heart-warm expressions of her daughter. Her letters in return inculcated the cold and guarded

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\* This thought is derived from a foreign writer.

precepts of a more mature, even a more worldly experience, throwing over the exuberant blossoms of this young spring of feeling the wet blanket of an April snow, blighting for one season the expanding flower, but strengthening and enriching the plant whose deep roots centred in the rich soil of the heart.

"The solitude in which Naomi lived might have made her a superstitious devotee, or a dreaming enthusiast; but fortunately nature had endowed her with a vigorous reason, a strong good-sense, that prevented her from becoming either the one or the other. But her young heart thirsted for excellence; she yearned for an unknown, but a possible, goodness, which she found not around her, — neither in nature nor in the world, neither in the church nor in society, neither in sermons nor in books. The conception of this ideal goodness was ever before her; but she found it not in herself, and wept that she was never nearer to it than to the rainbow in the horizon. Dwelling as Naomi did upon the things of her own consciousness, she was in danger of sinking into melancholy, had she not been arrested by a circumstance which we shall soon mention." — pp. 28 – 31.

The circumstance which saved Naomi was being taken by her nurse to hear the fanatic George Fox, before her arrival in Boston. She listened to George, and became, in principle and in heart, a Quaker, but without deeming it necessary to make an open profession of Quakerism. She holds it sufficient to "believe in the heart," without "confessing with the mouth," and so remains outwardly attached to the Puritan body, and passes, even with her friends and relatives, as still a Puritan; — nay, on arriving in Boston, she makes an open profession of Puritanism, by joining Mr. Wilson's church or meeting. Here is a specimen of what may be called Unitarian morality. Naomi is the author's favorite, and appears to be intended as a model character, at least as a character free from all that is morally or religiously censurable. Yet she can join a church in which she does not believe, and openly profess a creed her heart abhors. Thus it is with our New England Unitarians generally. They accuse Trinitarians of idolatry, and call all who offer supreme religious homage to our crucified Lord idolaters; and yet they are perfectly willing to commune *in sacris* with these same idolaters, and one of their chief complaints against their so-called "Orthodox" brethren is, that they refuse to commune with Unitarians. What is the difference between an idolater and one who communes with him in his idolatry? Young Buckminster, the author's brother, a Unitarian in his belief, accepted the call to be the pastor of

Brattle Street Church, a professedly Trinitarian congregation at the time, without even hinting to them that he rejected the Trinity, and believed it idolatry to honor the Son as the Father. This laxity of moral principle, this readiness to conceal one's own faith or want of faith, when duty requires its distinct avowal, and this willingness to commune *in sacris* with those who, if they themselves have the Gospel, have "another Gospel" and are under anathema, — so common and made so light of on the part of Unitarians, — was a great scandal to us while we were a minister of that sect, and led us then, as it leads us now, to distrust the sincerity of its members, or to look upon them as regarding all forms of faith and worship as alike indifferent, — a point to which we could never for a moment really bring our own mind or heart.

Margaret, the nurse that led Naomi to hear George Fox, has come over to New England, a raving, fanatic Quakeress, and is concealed for several months by Naomi, aided by Faith, Mr. Aldersey's housekeeper. We extract a characteristic passage from the conversation which Naomi and Faith had with Margaret in her place of concealment.

"Naomi and Faith did not leave Margaret to the solitude of her garret; although the state of exaltation in which she was, like the delirium of a person slightly insane, made her totally indifferent to the place in which she dwelt, yet they did not leave her alone. As soon as Ruth had retired for the night, they resorted to her little room. At such times, Naomi's pale complexion and the pure outline of her features were defined by the light of the fire, for they dared not take a candle, and this uncertain and varying play of light gave her the form and expression of an angel visitant; and as she sat between the two women, the one burning with heretical zeal, the other shuddering with all the horror and detestation of the times against the heresy, tolerating the heretic only from feelings of humanity, Naomi was indeed what she seemed, a mediating and reconciling spirit.

"The conversation often reverted to the mother country, and to circumstances that occurred there. I have said above, that Faith never suspected Naomi's Quaker principles, as there was nothing peculiar in the exterior to betray the secret fountain that fed and refreshed the roots from which sprang the fresh and lovely flowers of her every-day life. One evening, Margaret, led on by reminiscences of home, mentioned the meeting when they had been so much moved by the preaching of George Fox.

"Naomi looked at Faith while she answered, — 'Ah, yes! I never can forget what has changed the whole complexion of my character, and given peace to my soul.'

"Faith did not start, nor express any surprise; but she turned very pale, and, looking again at Naomi, she rose to leave the room.

"*'Stay, Faith,'* said Naomi; and taking her gently around the waist, she drew her again into her chair. *'You must know it sooner or later,'* she added; *'I, too, am a Quaker, — a Quaker in heart and principle; but I do not feel compelled, as others do, to proclaim my faith to the world. I am but a babe and a humble learner in this pure belief, and do not yet feel it my privilege to encounter martyrdom.'*

"Faith looked at Naomi, as though possessing herself completely of the meaning of her words, and repeated very slowly the words Naomi had used, pausing between every syllable: — *'You are a Quaker in heart and principle, — you are a Quaker — Ah, well! that cannot be an evil faith, — that cannot lead to evil that produces such fruits as I see in you.'*

"Faith's plain good-sense and candid disposition had come exactly to the truth; she had struck the nail upon the head; illiterate, but true and simple-minded, she had discerned the truth, — that could not be bad in itself that cherished and fed with its secret springs the beautiful riches, the lovely graces, of such a character as Naomi's. It was the abuse, the extravagance, the perversion of these pure principles, she thought, that did so much mischief.

"*'Well,'* said Margaret, her zeal beginning to kindle; *'you see what are the fruits of pure Quakerism; you see them in Miss Naomi; will you not also inquire and be convinced, and join the company of the faithful?'*

"*'No,'* said Faith, and she shook her head; *'I am content with my own church. It is good enough for me. I must be permitted to go to heaven in the old way. I believe it has done very well for everybody since the days of the Apostle Paul. I think it quite unnecessary, to say the least, to give new names to old things; and, as far as I can see, Miss Naomi's faith produces as good works as Mr. Wilson's, or even our old minister's, whom I remember well, Mr. Cotton; there never was a holier saint; but I dare say he has met in heaven many that he never expected to welcome there.'*

"*'Yes,'* said Naomi, *'the paths diverge, but they meet at the gate; and O, how many shall we there find with their beautiful robes, — the white robes of seraphs, — who have here sat in the dust and ashes of contempt; who have been turned from the gates of the church; whom the Pharisees have passed by, shaking their robes as they passed them, lest they should have contracted the taint of heresy!'*" — pp. 118 – 120.

We like Faith's answer very well, that she must be permitted to go to heaven in "the old way"; but, poor soul! she never thought that her "old way" was quite a new way, and only a score or two of years older than Margaret's way. Yet



Mrs. Lee has made no blunder in putting the answer into her mouth. We remember, that, when a boy of some ten or twelve years old, we felt that we ought to "join the church." In our neighbourhood we had Methodists, *Chryst-yans*, as they called themselves, Universalists, and here and there a Congregationalist, or member, as the phrase then went, of "the standing order." Which of these was the true church, and the one we ought to join, was the puzzle for our young brains. The Methodist minister certainly spoke the loudest, and the fastest; but the *Chryst-yan* had the sweetest voice, and was decidedly the best singer; while the Universalist appeared to have the most wit, and made us laugh as often as the others made us cry; — so they seemed to us pretty nearly balanced. In our perplexity, we went to a good old Congregational lady, and stated the case to her, with the reasons *pro* and *con*, as fairly as we could. She listened patiently till we had finished. "My child," she replied, "don't join any one of them. They are all new-comers; they have come off from the Church, and cannot be it. The Church is one; it was founded by Christ and his Apostles; it has existed ever since, and all that have sprung up since are too young to be the true Church. They are a new way, and all new ways are false. You must walk in the old way. So, my child, you should join the 'standing order.'" "Yes; but has 'the standing order' stood ever since the time of Christ and his Apostles?" "You must join it, or you will not join the true Church." Poor old lady! She had, if we may so speak, a good major, but a very bad minor; yet her conversation made an impression on our young mind which has never been wholly effaced. "They are new-comers, and not the Church." We never forgot that, and for more than twenty years we kept ourselves out of the Church by persuading ourselves that our Lord and his Apostles founded no church, and that it was never intended that Christians should form a peculiar people, a distinct society; for we had no sooner glanced at history, than we saw clearly enough, that, if our Lord and his Apostles did found a church, the Roman Catholic Church must be the one.

Faith exclaims to Naomi, "That cannot lead to evil that produces such fruits as I see in you." Now, we do not recollect any remarkable fruits Mrs. Lee represents Naomi as having produced. She is a sensible, kind-hearted girl, serious, thoughtful, and free from a large share of the vanities and frivolities of her age and sex, with the good sense to despise Puritanism, and the weakness to conform to it. This is about

the sum of her excellences, and they are nothing more than may result from ordinary sense, moderate education, good breeding, and an amiable disposition. As to roads which diverge, meeting at last at the gate of heaven, we are not quite clear. According to our philosophy, divergents do not meet. *Convergents* may ultimately come together; *divergents*, we should suppose, never. If old John Cotton, the first minister of Boston, ever got to heaven, we make no doubt that he met unexpected company; but is it certain that he ever got there? Protestants make a great ado about the canonization of saints by the Church; but it seems that they can canonize as many as they please, and without any examination into character. Let any old Protestant sinner die, and it shall rarely happen that the sleek gentleman in white cravat and black coat who preaches his funeral sermon will not pronounce him at rest in heaven.

In the progress of the story, the Quakers pour into Boston, and are punished by the magistrates, the ministers urging or consenting. Among others who are taken up and sentenced is poor Margaret, Naomi's old nurse. She is sentenced "to receive thirty lashes, and to be whipped from town to town at the cart's tail, and then to have her tongue bored with a red-hot iron." Naomi, with a young collegian, a free-thinker, plans a rescue, and succeeds in saving her from the principal part of the punishment; but is, in consequence, herself after a while accused, tried, condemned, and finally sent out of the country as a heretic, which she certainly was, though no more so than her Puritan judges. We may add, for the satisfaction of one class of our readers, that the young collegian, Herbert Walton, who had assisted in the rescue of Margaret, becomes a Quaker without the garb of the sect, and, after years of separation and trial, meets Naomi once more; and the kind-hearted authoress concludes her narrative by leaving her "young readers to imagine the bliss that attended his reunion with Naomi."

Let not our readers imagine that they can form any tolerable notion of *Naomi* from the partial glimpses we have afforded them. We do not claim for Mrs. Lee a rank along with the great modern masters of fiction, — of the domestic, historical, philosophical, or romantic novel, — but she is no every-day woman. She possesses rare talents in her way, a rich imagination, — rather too Transcendental, perhaps, — she has read much, and reflected more, and has here given us, not, indeed, a perfect work of art, but a very pleasant histori-

cal tale, very readable, which, while it amuses the fancy and rarely offends good taste, gives one a very passable notion of our Puritan ancestors of Boston, and, indeed, of New England, "two hundred years ago." *Naomi* compares favorably with *Hope Leslie*, and, in its kind, is not at all inferior to the *Wept of Wish-ton-wish*. The author is sometimes a little careless in her expression; but, in general, her style and language are to be commended. Her story is full of incidents, many of them of deep interest; it is well managed, naturally and gracefully told; and if we were, like the author, without faith, without worship, suspended between Transcendentalism and Catholicity, we could cheerfully commend it to our readers.

The question as to the proper manner of treating the Quakers — who, with their wild fanaticism, came among the Puritans, disturbed their meetings, scorned their magistracy, and ridiculed or denounced their "godly" ministers, very much resembling Silas Lamson, Abby Folsom, Stephen Foster, and Lloyd Garrison of our own day — was a troublesome question for Bostonians two hundred years ago. Indeed, the proper method of treating dissenters from their doctrine or worship, and disorderly persons who defend their conduct under the plea of conscience, is and always must be a perplexing question for Protestants, no matter of what sect. Protestants, in order to justify their own separation from the Church, are obliged to appeal from authority to the Scriptures interpreted by individual reason, to sentiment, ignorance, or caprice; and this appeal cannot but be as available for all who choose to dissent from them as for themselves. They cannot assume the authority to punish dissenters, heretics, or fanatics, without condemning themselves, and asserting, as it were, Lynch law. They have, and can have, no spiritual authority; for they are Protestants only by virtue of protesting against all spiritual authority, and therefore they have no right to take cognizance of any spiritual offence whatever. Moreover, they are fallible, are unable to decide between truth and falsehood with infallible certainty, and are as liable to condemn orthodoxy, under the name of heterodoxy, as heterodoxy itself, and, in fact, even more so; for error is with them the rule, truth the exception. Hence, they may, under pretence of suppressing heresy, persecute the truth, and convert the victims of *their* justice into martyrs. Indeed, they must either run the hazard of being persecutors, that is, of punishing as crime the profession of the true religion, or else recognize the equal right

of all opinions, and their duty to protect every man in the free profession of any and every set of religious or moral opinions he takes it into his head to embrace. Here is the difficulty. We are far from regarding the Quakers as innocent, — far from feeling that they received, in general, more than their deserts ; but we can conceive of no principle on which the Puritans were or could be justified in punishing them. The murderer should, undoubtedly, be hung, but not by Lynch law, — not save after sentence by the proper tribunal, and then only by the officers legally commissioned to carry the sentence into execution. What we mean is, that, however much the Quakers deserved punishment, the Puritans were, as to themselves, persecutors in punishing them, because they had no right to punish them. It is this fact that gives to their conduct its peculiarly odious character.

But while we deny to Puritans the right to punish for heresy, — while we hold in utter detestation their treatment of Quakers, Baptists, Antinomians, &c., — we cannot go with the amiable authoress so far as to hold that all opinions are harmless, and that every one who suffers for conscience' sake or opinion's sake is a martyr. As to those who suffer it, — we say not as to the spirit from which it proceeds, — persecution is never persecution, unless directed against those who profess, and for professing, the true religion ; and no man ever is or can be a martyr in the cause of error. Only true religion can have martyrs, false religion can have none ; and before you can call a sufferer for opinion's sake a martyr or a confessor, you must establish the fact, that he suffers, not for error, but for the truth. Not every man who suffers for his opinions, or for what he calls his conscience, deserves for his own sake our sympathy. An atheist, an infidel, for instance, has no conscience ; and a heretic, or a fanatic, has only a false conscience, which, in itself considered, deserves no respect. Opinions, when false, are never sacred, and nothing in the world is less free from blame or more mischievous than false opinions as to religion and morals. While, then, we condemn bigotry, intolerance, persecution, in any and every shape or degree, by whomsoever exhibited, it becomes us to take care how we lavish our sympathies upon errorists, and represent all opinions as harmless, nay, as respectable, as sacred. The sentimentalism which weeps so bitterly, or whimpers so pathetically, over every sufferer for opinion's sake, so characteristic of our times, like most modern sentimentalisms, may, in general, be regarded as indicative of a weak head and a perverse heart.



There is prevalent on this subject a great mistake, which it is very important to correct. The dominant spirit of the age takes it for granted, that whoever, in the political, intellectual, moral, or religious world, resists authority, departs from the old paths, and declares himself the champion of innovation, is necessarily on the right side, and that to oppose him is to oppose God, and to war against truth, morals, faith, and the legitimate interests of mankind. It is assumed, that whatever is fixed is wrong, whatever has been generally received is false, and that whoever would uphold and defend an existing order is necessarily a tyrant, — instigated by the Devil. And yet they who so assume hold to the divinity of humanity, to the infallibility of human instincts, the divine right of the multitude, and propose to decide all questions by a majority of voices !

Our modern philanthropists, in all their reasoning, assume, that, if not positively praiseworthy, all opinions which are opposed to moral, religious, and social order are at least innocent. Nothing is more horrible to a mind rightly constructed, than the punishment of the innocent as guilty. Assume that all who take up and seek to propagate opinions repugnant to those in authority are innocent, and it is easy to conclude that to punish them is an outrage upon justice and humanity, against which every lover of truth or of mankind should protest with all his energy. But our philanthropists, before drawing their conclusion, would do well to inquire into their right to make their assumption. Opinions which tend to bring all legitimate authority into contempt, to pervert conscience, to weaken moral restraints, to loosen the bonds of society, to render property and person insecure, and to introduce disorder, anarchy, despotism, — like those of the Red Republicans, Communists, Socialists, revolutionists, whether of one country or another, — and whose punishment by authority is gravely termed “martyrdom,” so far from being innocent, are criminal; and they who hold and propagate them are criminals of the deepest die. However men may suffer for holding and propagating such opinions, they can suffer no more than they deserve. To magnify them into patriots, heroes, martyrs, is an insult to the common sense of mankind, and would itself be a crime deserving a halter, were it not rather an insanity in need of a strait-jacket. Instead of sympathizing with these men, calling them sincere, pure-minded, moved by noble and holy impulses, and palliating or excusing their licentious and blas-

phemous words and deeds, as if mere innocent mistakes, we should look on the other side of the picture, to the rights and interests of the peaceable, orderly, and virtuous portion of society, who are made their victims, and who have at least some claims upon our sympathies. Woe to the society that lavishes its sympathy upon scoundrels, upon criminals, and weeps over the just punishment which outraged law inflicts upon them, and never thinks of the thousands, the millions, of honest and virtuous persons who are ruined by their scoundrelism, their licentiousness, their iniquity, and their blasphemy! Woe to society when it is afflicted only because the murderer is doomed to a halter, and never thinks of the sufferings of the innocent family whose father, mother, son or daughter, sister or brother, he has murdered, whose stay and support, whose all, he may have taken away! Alas! our modern society is falling into a wretched state; and its greatest curse is the miserable men and women whose profession is philanthropy, — who would convert the prison into a palace, and prepare the delicate repast and the luxurious couch for the thief, the robber, and the murderer, — *philanthropists*, with their tear-stricken visage, whimpering speech, and hearts, where the defence of scoundrelism is not the question, harder than the nether millstone. They are the plague-spot on modern society, and deserve the utter detestation of every right-minded and sound-hearted man. Of all modern cants, the cant of philanthropy is the most detestable and the most mischievous. It is the Devil disguising himself as an angel of light.

Men are not necessarily doomed to error, so far as any of the great and essential principles of religion and morals are concerned. Almighty God has revealed the truth and declared his will, and all men have ample means of knowing it; and if they remain ignorant of it, it is their own fault, for which they are responsible, and will, one day, be called to an account. Sincerity in error that is persisted in is all moonshine. Error, on any question of moral, religious, or social magnitude, is never inevitable, and, when indulged or persisted in, is itself evidence of moral perversity, and should be treated as such. Wicked deeds are but the embodiment of wicked thoughts. The understanding is corrupted through the will, as the will itself is perverted through concupiscence, base propensities, vicious appetites, and vile lusts. When you see a man advocating falsehood, promulgating licentious doctrines, and spouting blasphemies, set him down — whatever his exterior deport-

ment in other respects, whatever his professions of sincerity, purity, honesty, benevolence, disinterestedness — as a servant of the Devil, as corrupt in heart, as rolling sin as a sweet morsel under his tongue ; whose mouth is an open sepulchre, and who labors but to ensnare the soul, and people hell with his victims. Weep over his delusion ; weep over his awful depravity ; pray for his conversion ; do all in your power to rescue him from destruction, to save him from the impending wrath of God ; but never think of him as innocent, or feel that, however severely society may punish him, he gets more than his due.

While, then, we condemn all persecution, while we censure, in the strongest terms we can use, the conduct of Protestants in general, and our Puritan ancestors in particular, in presuming to practise violence against individuals for their opinions, we must be careful not to let our detestation of bigotry and intolerance become religious indifference, and lead us to assert that men are not responsible for their opinions, and may innocently hold and propagate the most licentious, blasphemous, and anarchical doctrines, without moral blame. Opinions are deeds, and the parents of deeds ; and let no man entertain the folly uttered by Milton, and Jefferson after him, that error is harmless when truth is free to combat her. No such thing. Error assumes a thousand disguises, and does her mischief before truth can strip them off, and expose her in her nakedness ; and for her mischief men are as responsible as they are for any other mischief they do.

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- ART. IV. — *God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover. With a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford : Brown & Parsons. 1849. 12mo. pp. 356.
2. *Ten Discourses on Orthodoxy.* By JOSEPH H. ALLEN, Pastor of the Unitarian Church, Washington. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1849. 12mo. pp. 227.

WE have brought these two works together, because we must take some notice of them, and we would do it with as great economy of space as possible. Their authors belong to different sects, and resemble one another very little in their manner of presenting their respective views ; but they advocate

pretty much the same doctrines at bottom, and with very nearly equal ability, and equal—ignorance. Both prove that they have as yet found no form of religion that satisfies them, and both come forward as reformers, each endeavouring to improve upon the formal teachings of his sect. Dr. Bushnell is the older man of the two, and has naturally the more comprehensive and energetic mind; but Mr. Allen is the more clear, logical, and acute. The former falls into the more ridiculous mistakes, the latter is more systematic in his errors, and keeps more uniformly at a distance from truth.

Dr. Bushnell is the pastor of a Congregational parish in Hartford, Connecticut, and professes what are called in New England "Orthodox" doctrines; Mr. Allen is the pastor of a Congregational society in Washington, D. C., and professes what is termed Unitarian or Liberal Christianity. The "Orthodox" doctor labors to prove that orthodoxy is liberal, and excludes no heresy; the Unitarian pastor labors to prove that orthodoxy is heresy, and heresy orthodoxy, or that, to be truly orthodox, one must be heretical. The Liberal Christian seeks to demolish orthodoxy; the Orthodox minister seeks to accommodate orthodoxy to every heresy; both agree in this, that all heresies are to be kindly welcomed and warmly embraced. So, at bottom, as we say, there is not much difference between them, and we may with propriety include both in the same category.

Dr. Bushnell, for the last five or six years, has produced considerable excitement in New England, and is just now one of our principal "lions." He is certainly not without influence, and we are assured that he carries with him a large portion of his own denomination, and is followed, it is said, by the larger part of the younger Congregational ministers. *The New Englander*, the organ of the New Haven school, fully indorses his views, and Andover, we are told, adopts them as explicitly as it can, without forfeiting its funds. The indications now are, that the Bushnellites will either divide the Congregational body into two sects of nearly equal strength, or that they will leaven the whole lump with their peculiar views, change essentially the character of New England theology, and virtually obliterate the last traces of New England Calvinism. Such are the indications; but what the result will actually prove to be, we by no means venture to predict,—though the latter alternative seems to us the more probable.

We have discovered little that is new in Dr. Bushnell's



views, — little with which we were not in former years perfectly familiar, or which has not had for a long time a large number of adherents both at home and abroad. He is evidently dissatisfied with all the recognized forms of Protestantism, and desirous of hitting upon something which shall dissolve and recombine them all in a new and far more comprehensive form, or rather no-form, in which all men shall unite, however divided and mutually hostile they may be in their mere doctrinal statements. Mr. Allen has the same aim, and, to realize it, he comes out boldly and denounces as false and mischievous all the doctrinal statements about which men are divided, and insists that nothing should be held essential, or even important, except such points as nobody disputes. But Dr. Bushnell thinks the end is attainable by a shorter method, and without the labor of clearing away any false doctrine, or abolishing any extant creed or formula of faith. All creeds and formulas, according to him, are tentative, and never final. Yet they all serve to suggest the truth to the mind and conscience of those who adopt them, not adequately, indeed, but in the least untrue manner in which the given mind and conscience are capable of receiving it. The union already exists at bottom, and the only difficulty is, that men are not aware of it, do not know it, and suppose they differ when and where they do not. The work to be done is, not to induce men to believe otherwise than they do, but to show them what it is they really do believe, — not to persuade them to change their formulas, but to enable them to see what it is their formulas really stand for in their own minds, and to appreciate their real significance.

To understand this, we must advert to the author's theory of language, which he develops at length in his preliminary essay. This theory he promulgates as if it were original and profound, although it strikes us as an old acquaintance, and the one now very generally resorted to by unbelievers. Language, he assumes, has a divine origin only in the sense that it is the creation of man who is himself the creation of God, and is therefore strictly a human invention, — a notion which we are far from accepting ; for language presupposes society, and society is impossible without language. Man cannot create language out of society ; for whatever system of signs he should invent, being invented by and for himself alone, they would have no significance for any but himself, that is, no common significance. He cannot create it in society ; for where there is no language, that is, no common medium of intercommuni-

cation between individuals, there is no society conceivable. Doubtless, a man can think, that is, perceive intuitively, externally and internally, without words or signs ; but he cannot note his perceptions, retain them in his memory, or make them objects of reflection, without the aid of language of some sort ; — or, in other words, he cannot take a reflective cognizance of his perceptions or intuitions, mark, or distinguish them even in his own mind, without the aid of signs. Language must have been a Divine revelation, for it is not possible to conceive man, without language, setting about the invention of language. We do not, however, suppose that God gave to man in the outset, before giving him the ideas to be expressed, a complete language ; it is sufficient to suppose it infused along with the knowledge itself, or supplied as occasion demanded. But this amounts to little, because we cannot suppose a moment when man wanted the ideas. Adam was not created a baby, but a full-grown man, with a knowledge as extensive, as complete, as has ever been, or ever will be, possessed by any of his posterity. He did not grow into his knowledge, or acquire it by his own efforts, as we do ; for he possessed it at the first moment of his existence. It must, then, have been given him, or infused into him, by his Maker. It is not possible to conceive of him as a perfect man, possessing from the moment of his creation a perfection never to be surpassed by any of his posterity, and yet destitute of the faculty of speech. Even those of our philosophers who hold language to have been a human invention are obliged to suppose him originally endowed with that faculty. But the faculty of speech cannot be understood to mean a power or faculty to invent or create speech, but the power or faculty of speaking, that is, of using language. The object or material of the faculty is language ; and since no human faculty does or can either work without object or material, or create its own object or material, it follows that the faculty, where language is wanting, is as if it were not. The very assertion, which all are obliged to make, that man is endowed by his Maker with the faculty of speech, then, presupposes, prior to the faculty or independent of its exercise, the existence of signs as signs which it uses, and therefore language.

The attempt to make language a human creation or invention seems to us to proceed from a forgetfulness of the fact, that Almighty God instructed immediately the first man in what pertains to the natural order, as well as in what pertains to the supernatural, and therefore that Adam's knowledge was in-

fused, instead of being acquired ; and also from an unconscious leaning to the modern doctrine of progress, that man began, not in perfection, as reason and faith both teach, but in imperfection. Our modern philosophers have a singular tendency to remove God as far as possible from the world, and manifest great reluctance to ascribe anything to his direct agency. They will in no instance, where they can help it, allow him to have done more than create the mere germ, and seem to fancy that they have made an important advance towards the secret nature of things, when they have supposed the germ developing itself. All that comes from the Creator, they wish to suppose, comes rude and imperfect, and is subsequently perfected by its own efforts. They will not allow us to believe that God created the heavens and the earth glorious and perfect, but they would have us believe that he merely created their germs, or rather certain rude and formless bodies, which have, in the process of ages, by the operation of secondary causes, been developed or wrought into what we now find them. Some, not content with the application of this principle within the natural order, would extend it to the supernatural, and have us suppose that the Christian revelation itself was made originally only in germ, and has been since developed and matured by the agency of secondary causes. All these notions belong to one and the same general system, which develops all things from rude and feeble beginnings, and seeks perfection from imperfection, the actual from the potential, as teach the Saint-Simoni-ans and all other classes of modern Socialists, — a doctrine alike repugnant to sound philosophy and Christian theology. A religious-minded man should think twice before assigning an origin to language which demands for its basis the blasphemous doctrine of modern Socialists, or adopting notions which involve, if pushed to their logical results, the old Epicurean doctrine that the Divinity, having launched the world in space, concerns himself no more with it, but retires to doze, as the excellent Dr. Evariste Gypendole would say, in his great arm-chair, leaving the world to take care of itself, or to “go ahead on its own hook.” Perhaps, the less we are disposed to magnify the sphere of secondary causes, the more likely we are to arrive at truth.

But this by the way: Dr. Bushnell, having given language as the product of a human faculty or instinct, supposes it to consist primarily in symbols borrowed from the outward or material world, and absolutely incapable of *expressing* thought, or

of serving as the medium of communicating, from one mind to another, truths which pertain to the intellectual or spiritual order. Its signs are all signs of merely sensible objects, and never are and never can be signs of any other class of objects. When they are used as media of spiritual or intellectual truths, they do not communicate or express those truths to the one addressed; they only suggest them, or direct his attention to them, and occasion his recognizing them in the intelligible world by his own intuitive power. Thus, the word *love* does not convey an intelligible idea to the mind, but merely suggests a fact of inward experience, and will mean one thing or another, more or less, according to the particular inward experience to which it is addressed. So, the word *God* is the sign of no invariable idea, but stands in each mind for one or another idea, means this or that, more or less, according to each one's particular capacity, discipline, or internal experience. The truths suggested by language to each one, the moment it leaves the material world, are not presented by it, are not beheld in it or through it, as the medium of their revelation, but independently of it, in the intelligible world or idea, — in the Platonic sense, — in immediate relation with which, in varying subjective degrees, all men are placed by their Maker. The plain English of all this is, we take it, that the Creator has not endowed man with the faculty of speech, save for the sensible world, and that for the intelligible or spiritual world we have no language, and intercommunication of ideas or spiritual conceptions is impossible; and though we may converse with one another on sensibles, we can yet hold no *intelligible* conversation. This seems to us, nevertheless, very *intelligible* language against *intelligibility*.

That there is a partial truth in what Dr. Bushnell asserts we are not disposed to deny. Language can mean nothing to unintelligent beings, and *intelligible* conversation is possible only between intelligent persons. This, we suppose, is undeniable, and we have never heard it disputed. Intelligible conversation requires, certainly, that the one spoken to, as well as the one speaking, should be by his own constitution intelligent, that is, in relation with the intelligible. It cannot be perfect where there is a lack of unity in those who undertake to converse. There is no proper conversation possible between a man and a horse or a dog, nor between any irrational individuals. But this does not necessarily deny, as the author's doctrine implies, that man has "discourse of reason," is en-



dowed with the faculty of rational or intelligible speech. The human race began in unity, and its unity was in the unity of the intelligible, that is, the reason, — the Platonic idea or Logos, — taken objectively, not subjectively. By virtue of the unity of the intelligible, that is, of the non-sensible, or super-sensible, intelligible language was possible, and men were capable of intelligible conversation. The idea, or the intelligible, being one in itself, — for all truth is one, and therefore the same for all men in relation with it, — its language was the same to all men, having the same significance for all. Intelligible language depends on the unity of the intelligible, and the fact that men are one in that unity, or live in immediate relation with it. As the human race in the beginning were one in that unity, they could have, and in fact had, intelligible language. If they lose this unity, if they become divided, if they cease to be one in the intelligible, and able to behold it only obscurely, indistinctly, to apprehend it only partially, and to obtain only broken and detached glimpses of it, the diversity of meaning the author asserts will, no doubt, be a consequence; their language will then, certainly, be confounded, and they will no longer be able to converse intelligibly together, as happened, we know, at the building of the Tower of Babel. Thus far we do not dispute, but in some sense agree with, Dr. Bushnell.

But Dr. Bushnell pushes his theory too far, and even fails to perceive that the loss of unity in the intelligible is, *a fortiori*, a loss of unity in the sensible. The world of the sense is manifold and various, and its language has unity or common significance only in the intelligible; and consequently the denial of intelligible speech is the denial of all speech. The formative principle of language, whether it makes use solely of sensible images or not, is in the intelligible, not in the sensible, as is evident from the fact, that the advocates of sensism, or sensualism, in philosophy have never been able to conform any language to their system, and from the further fact, that every known language is more philosophical, contains a truer system of philosophy, than can be found in the speculations of any modern philosopher. Understand thoroughly any known language, ancient or modern, and you have a sound philosophy; and whoever finds it necessary to create a new language, or to distort an old one, in order to state his philosophical principles and conclusions, proves by that very fact that his philoso-

phy is false, and worthy of no consideration. Philology is the true and only safe introduction to philosophy.

Modern philosophers greatly mistake in supposing, that, either logically or chronologically, the sensible in human life precedes the intelligible. The dictum of even the ancients, that *nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu*, cannot be received without Leibnitz's famous exception, *nisi ipse intellectus*, — nor even then, unless we take note that the intellect or understanding itself is not constituted without the idea or intelligible world, which is objective, above the human intellect, and independent of it. The sensible depends on the intelligible as its condition, and always presupposes it, as sensation presupposes intellection, since not the organ perceives or senses, but the intelligent agent himself, and the perception of an external object by means of the organ of sight, smell, touch, taste, or hearing is as much an act of intellect as the perception of a non-sensible truth, and also the sensation of pain or pleasure ; for it would not be a sensation, if not intellectually apprehended. Hence the patient, whose consciousness is suspended by ether or chloroform, receives no sensation from the knife of the surgeon. A non-intelligent agent cannot be conceived as a sensitive agent, although we may conceive agents intelligent no farther than is requisite to be sentient, — that is to say, agents capable of perceiving, but not capable of noting or distinguishing beyond the sensitive perception ; that is to say, again, agents that are simply percipient, and not reflective. Nevertheless, as there can be no intelligence without the intelligible, we must suppose all percipient beings to be, in their respective degrees, in relation with it as the formative principle of all intelligence.

Language, if admitted at all, then, must be admitted as primarily adapted to the intelligible, otherwise it would not be adapted to the constitution of the human mind, and could serve no purpose even in the sphere of the sensible. It would also be a gross reflection on the Divine wisdom to maintain the contrary ; for God has evidently placed the intelligible above the sensible, and our great concernment in life is chiefly with truths which pertain to the supersensible order, that is, moral, political, and religious truths. It is these truths, that, in the commerce of life, it is chiefly necessary to communicate from one to another, and around which all serious conversation does and must turn. To suppose that God has given us a language for sensibles, and not for these, is to suppose that he has taken

care of what is comparatively trifling, and neglected to provide for matters of grave importance, which would be to suppose him to act from folly, not from wisdom.

That the difficulty Dr. Bushnell suggests does to some extent exist, though not to the extent he supposes, and is attended by grave consequences, we do not deny ; but it does not lie precisely where he supposes, nor does it depend on the causes he assigns. The difficulty does not lie in language as such, whether the signs used are primarily symbolical of sensible objects or not,—for the signs are, in fact, as adequate for signifying spiritual or intelligible truths as sensible facts, as we know from universal experience ; but it lies in the fact, that the natural human race, the race deriving from Adam, has through transgression lost its unity, and is no longer one in the idea or the intelligible, has no longer in its full strength a common reason, on which the unity of language or its common significance depends. The same signs do not signify the same truths to all minds. Men's speech is confused, and they cease to understand, clearly, distinctly, and adequately, one another, because they are themselves no longer one in the objective reason, idea, or ideal truth, in which alone the unity of the race consists. This is an evil, a great evil, we admit ; and, though incurable out of the elected human race deriving from Abraham, the father of the faithful, — the chosen people of God, — yet not an evil for which there is no remedy. Reintegrate men in the ideal truth, restore them to their pristine unity in the intelligible, as they are restored through grace in that chosen or elected society, and unity of language is recovered, and spiritual conversation is once more practicable. In that society men are of one mind and heart, and therefore of one speech, and the same words have the same meaning for all its members, as they would have had for all men in the natural human race, had they not lost primitive unity by transgression.

But Dr. Bushnell — overlooking the fact that the natural human race has lost its original unity, and making no account of the stupendous intervention of Divine Mercy for its restoration through grace, in an elected humanity, a chosen people, into which all men may enter if they will, and be reintegrated in the unity of the intelligible, as Christianity teaches us — proceeds on the assumption, whether consciously or unconsciously we pretend not to decide, that the diversity he finds in regard to the intelligible is original and fundamental in the intellectual nature or constitution of man, and therefore concludes that

unity of spiritual or intelligible language is absolutely impossible, and never to be sought.\* “Words of thought or spirit,” he says (p. 48), “are not only inexact in their significance, never measuring the truth or giving its precise equivalent, but they *always* affirm something which is false, or contrary to the truth intended. They impute form to that which is really out of form. They are related to the truth only as form to spirit,—

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\* Dr. Bushnell rarely takes the trouble to be consistent with himself, and through his whole Dissertation there runs a double train of thought, which makes an exact statement of his views exceedingly difficult. According to our view, he certainly supposes the diversity of intellect, or the want of unity in understanding, to originate in the infirmity of language, in its unsuitableness to express spiritual truth; and his general doctrine as to the union of Christian sects seems evidently to imply that the diversity is mainly in the expression, not in the thought vainly attempted to be symbolized. This supposes a real unity of the race in the intelligible, and affirms only diversity in the verbal statements. But, on the other hand, he makes language a human creation, and therefore the exponent of the interior state of the human race; consequently, he must ascribe its want of unity to the diversity of the human mind or constitution itself. Moreover, as he makes the significance of words of thought or spirit depend on the spiritual understanding and experience of those addressed, he seems to us obliged to make the diverse meaning of language the effect, and not the cause, of the diversity of the human understanding. We are inclined to believe that this is his real doctrine, and the unity which he evidently assumes as coexisting in the human race with intellectual diversity he supposes, no doubt, to consist, not in the intellect, by virtue of the unity of the intelligible, but in some deeper and more ultimate element than intellect, which he imagines there is in the human constitution.

We cannot help remarking here, that Gioberti (*Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia*, Cap. III., Brusselle, 1844) ascribes the loss of unity in the order perpetuated by natural generation from Adam to the confusion of language. That the confusion of tongues, as recorded in Genesis, operated and operates to prevent the recovery of unity in the intelligible in the order so perpetuated, we do not doubt; but we are inclined to believe the confusion of speech is the consequence rather than the cause of the loss of unity. The unity of the idea or the intelligible is lost by pride, which is, when fully developed, pure, unmitigated egotism, which asserts the sufficiency of the subjective, and denies both the need and the reality of the objective, and is the very principle of diversity and separation. Pride, undoubtedly, led to the building of the Tower of Babel, and therefore the race must have virtually lost their unity before God confounded their language, which he did in mercy, to prevent the mischief they would do, if, following their pride, they could for a while maintain commerce with one another. In order to compel them to break off from their mad and impious undertaking, God confounded their language, and dispersed them abroad over the earth, which was after all only the external accomplishment of what pride had already commenced and virtually effected in the interior of man.



earthen vessels in which the truth is borne, yet *always* offering their mere pottery as being truth itself." As falsehood is unintelligible in itself, and stands opposed to the intelligible, or, to speak more accurately, is the negation of the intelligible, it follows, since words of thought and spirit always affirm what is false, that there really is and can be no intelligible language, and no true statement, in words, of intellectual or spiritual truth can ever be made!

That the mass of men do not always clearly and distinctly apprehend the truths they seek to express, and do really express, in consequence of their confused perceptions and intuitions, more or less of error along with the truth, is no doubt the fact; and that many whose perceptions are clear and distinct express them in words which may retain traces of a meaning incompatible with the one they intend, nobody disputes; but that unintended meaning, though possibly implied by the word used, does not necessarily constitute an element of the affirmation itself, either in the mind of him who makes it, or in the mind of him to whom it is made. When we say of some one, he *attends* to what we say, we use a word which conceals the figure of a body bending to or towards some one; but not, therefore, do we affirm, or are we understood to affirm, that he stands bent forward towards us. The figure is eliminated both in our mind and in the mind we address, and the word stands in both minds as the sign of a purely intellectual or mental act of listening. The word has a spiritual as well as a material sense, and is as precise, as definite, as exact, in the former as in the latter; nay, the material sense, or the figure, serves to intensify the spiritual meaning, for *bending to* a thing indicates resolution and earnestness. It is no objection to a word, that it has many senses, or senses incompatible with the one intended, if the particular sense intended is sufficiently marked and determined, as it may be, and always is, by careful speakers and writers. Men who do not think, who pay no attention to what a speaker or writer intends, may, no doubt, mistake the "pottery" of words for the truth they are used to express; but that is not the fault of the words, but of the men themselves.

But assuming the incapacity of language, denying its adequacy to express truth in the intelligible or spiritual order, Dr. Bushnell concludes against all formal or dogmatic statements of doctrine:—"Dogmatical propositions, such as are commonly woven into creeds and catechisms of doctrine, have not the certainty they are commonly supposed to have. They

only give us the seeing of the authors at the precise stand-point occupied by them at the time, and they are true only as seen from that point,—not even there, save in a proximate sense. Passing on, descending the current of time,—we will say two centuries,—we are brought to a different point, as when we change positions in a landscape, and then we are doomed to see things in a different light, in spite of ourselves. It is not that the truth changes, but we change. Our eye changes color, and then the color of the eye affects our seeing.” (pp. 79, 80.) Evidently the author holds that all dogmatical statements of spiritual doctrine are more or less inadequate, and, indeed, at best, only proximately true. But, after all, they are so, not only because language never does, and never can, tell the truth, but because the formula of doctrine embodies only our partial views of truth, which are variable and varying, not truth itself, or views which in all times and places are true views. This last reason, which shows that the author makes the difficulty consist in the mind as well as in language, would be a good one if we had no Divine revelation,—if we were abandoned to the order of nature, compelled to draw up our own creeds and catechisms, without Divine instruction or assistance, and able to embody in them only our own variable and ever-varying views. But Dr. Bushnell’s idea of a formula of doctrine is not exactly that of the Christian. The Christian supposes the formula embodies, not our views, but, so to speak, God’s views, which do not vary with time, place, or position, and is drawn up, not by us to express our views of truth, but by God himself, as a statement for the human intellect of the views we ought always and everywhere to take, or of the truth which we must in all times and places apprehend and believe, on pain of error and the Divine displeasure. Dr. Bushnell’s idea is the reverse of this. Having assumed that “language is rather the instrument of suggestion than of absolute conveyance for thought,” he concludes that to teach, that is, to impart knowledge, or present truth to the minds of others, is impossible. We can tell no man anything whereof he is ignorant. Hence the truth, for us human beings, is never anything but the view we actually take of it ; that is, for us human beings, there is no truth but our variable and ever-varying notions of truth. The creed or catechism can express only those notions as held at the time and from the point of view it is drawn up ; and as these are constantly varying with time, and as we shift our point of sight, the creed or catechism, in order to express or embody the truth, must constantly vary

with them. The principle the "Orthodox" doctor adopts is, that the formula, to be true, must conform to human belief, not that human belief, in order to be true belief, must conform to the formula !

That men out of unity, out of the reintegrated humanity, persisting in the diversity and variety of the natural human race in its fallen state, developing pride as its principle, do shift, with regard to spiritual truth, their positions, and change their views accordingly,—that for them the creed or catechism loses, with time and change, its original significance, and fails to embody their ever-varying notions of truth,—that their eye changes color, and sheds its own hues over the objects they contemplate,—is, no doubt, very true ; but is this a proof that the formula loses its truth, becomes false, or is it a proof that they lose sight of the truth, or perceive it, if at all, only through a colored or distorting medium ? If, in process of time, there arises a discrepancy between the original formula of doctrine and men's views, is it the formula that needs changing, or men's views that need rectifying ? Is it certain that men's notions are always the standard of truth, and that every statement of doctrine not conformable to them is therefore to be rejected, either as false or as inadequate ? If the "Orthodox" doctor were pleading the cause of error instead of truth, or if he were laboring to prove that there is no real difference between truth and error, what else, or what more, could he say, than he does ?

But as language is never a medium of truth, and as its sole office is to direct the mind to the truth intuitively apprehensible, already in it or before it, every statement of doctrine it is possible to make in words, in itself considered, is erroneous. Thus, the Orthodox statements of the sacred mysteries, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, regarded as statements for the intellect, or logical understanding, are inadequate and erroneous. Indeed, the truth, in itself formless, can never be truly stated, because the statement gives it a form, and every form falsifies it. Here is the grand fact that has been overlooked. It has been supposed that Christian truth could be drawn out in formal propositions, and stated in formulas fully expressing it, and having the same meaning for all men ; but this is a mistake. Christian truth spurns all forms, defies all formal statements, and the more adequately we conceive it, the more paradoxical and contradictory shall we be in our speech, and the less shall we submit to the restraints of logic.

"There is no book in the world that contains so many repugnances, or antagonistic forms of assertion, as the Bible. Therefore, if any man choose to play off his constructive logic upon it, he can easily show it up as the absurdest book in the world." (p. 69.) "We find little, therefore, in the Scriptures, to encourage the hope of a complete and sufficient Christian dogmatism, or of a satisfactory and truly adequate system of scientific theology. Language, under the laws of logic or speculation, does not seem to be adequate to any such use or purpose." (pp. 76, 77.) "Considering the infirmities of language, all formulas of doctrine should be held in a *certain spirit of accommodation*. They cannot be pressed to the letter, for the letter is never true. They can be regarded only as proximate representations, and should, therefore, be accepted, not as *laws of our belief*, or opinion, but more as badges of consent and good understanding." (p. 81.) "Unquestionably, the view of language here presented must produce, if received, a decided mitigation of our dogmatic tendencies in religion. It throws a heavy shade of discouragement on our efforts in that direction. It shows that language is, probably, incapable of any such definite and determinate use as we have supposed it to be in our theological speculations; that, for this reason, dogma has failed hitherto, and about as certainly will [fail] hereafter." (pp. 91, 92.)

Our readers must not suppose that Dr. Bushnell means merely to reject scholastic theology, for he objects to creeds and catechisms themselves, unless taken in a loose, accommodating sense, as each one chooses to interpret them for himself, and therefore means to assert that language is inadequate to the distinct, formal, and exact statement of Christian doctrine, or the Divine *revelata*. According to him, all spiritual truth is formless, and every formula is contrary to its nature, and falsifies it. Our study should be, not to give it a form for the understanding, but to be moved and excited by it as an interior and all-pervading force or principle of life. He does not propose at once to abolish "all platforms and articles," for to that men will not as yet hear (p. 341). But it is clear that he proposes to do it ultimately, and to get rid of all *credenda*, all dogmas or articles of faith, and to have no truth for the understanding insisted upon. In other words, he holds that Christianity is a life, not a dogma; an interior principle, a living force that is felt, loved, obeyed in the conduct of life, but not a collection of articles or a system of doctrines to be intellectually apprehended and believed. Unity of language or of mind is not to be looked for or desired; the only possible unity is the unity of love, the unity of sentiment, and all who have the sentiment



have the unity of the spirit, and really and truly worship God, whether they conceive of him as "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord," or manifest it outwardly in the forms approved by the Protestant, the Catholic, the Gentoo, the Chinese, the Thibetian, or by the ancient Phœnicians, Greeks, or Romans. This is clear enough from an article of his which appeared some time since in *The New Englander*, entitled *Comprehensive Christianity*, that is, a Christianity which comprehends all forms, and is itself without form ; which accepts all the mutually contradictory and repugnant doctrines extant, with all their contradictions and repugnances, and avails itself of all their partial and one-sided views and statements as so many various and useful modes of duly infusing the spirit of love into the human heart, and effecting the concord of affection and harmony of life.

But this conception of Christianity, while it makes them of little value, allows the author to retain all creeds, formulas, and statements, not as expressive of the whole truth, truth in its purity, integrity, and completeness, nor of truth for the intellect, but of truth for the affections, sentiments, feelings, conscience. The Orthodox statements of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement are, indeed, inadequate and false for the logical intellect ; yet, in a large class of persons, they produce the true affections, quicken Christian sentiments, and aid in conforming the life to the spiritual reality. In another class they produce contrary effects, and these, therefore, should not be required to accept them, but suffered to modify them, or to substitute other statements for them, better adapted to their peculiar modes of thought and feeling. The statements preferred by Unitarians, in Unitarian minds and hearts, produce the same affections that Orthodox statements do in Orthodox minds and hearts. The truth for the affections, the only truth in the case to be considered, suggested by the two sets of statements, though one contradicts the other, is the same truth in each, and both sets should be suffered to stand ; both are as true as statements can be for those they suit, and as false as false can be for those they do not suit ; let the Orthodox have his statements, and the Unitarian have his, and both will be suited, and Christian affection promoted. Hence the "Orthodox" doctor protests against no creed. "So far," he says (p. 82), "from suffering even the least consciousness of constraint or oppression under any creed, I have been readier to accept as great a number as fell in my way ; for when they are subjected to the deepest alchemy of thought, that which descends to the relation between

the form of truth and its interior formless nature, they become, thereupon, so elastic, and run so freely into each other, that one seldom need have any difficulty in accepting as many as are offered him. He may regard them only as a kind of battle-dooring of words, blow answering to blow, while the reality of the play, namely, *exercise*, is the same, whichever side of the room is taken, and whether the stroke is given by the right hand or the left." The Doctor's notion of what accepting a creed means appears to be somewhat peculiar, but very liberal, withal.

Such, briefly, are the principal characteristics of Bushnellism. It must be apparent to the most careless student, that our "Orthodox" doctor cannot, without contradicting his whole theory, admit the possibility of a Divine revelation, made to mankind through the medium of inspired prophets and apostles, as the Christian world has hitherto held, because such revelation can be communicated by the inspired to the uninspired only through the medium of language. But language is not a medium of thought from mind to mind, and can only by its symbols suggest to the mind addressed the truth it already possesses, or that lies intuitively perceptible or apprehensible before it. Since the revealed truths, the *revelata*, at least as *revelata*, pertain to the supernatural, lie in a sphere above the naturally intelligible, are, in regard to our natural cognitive faculty, super-intelligible, they are not intuitively apprehensible or perceptible by the uninspired, and therefore cannot be communicated to them even by the inspired. Revelation, therefore, is possible only to those whom God directly and immediately inspires; and only those whom he does so inspire have, or can be believers in, a Divine revelation. To all others, in the language of Thomas Paine, "revelation is mere hearsay." This is, substantially, Quakerism, and is a conclusion the author appears not only to accept, but even to contend for. He holds to a present, immediate, personal inspiration (pp. 350, 351), — probably claims it for himself; but we shall so far adopt his doctrine as to hold ourselves excused from accepting what he says as Divine revelation, till we find it either confirmed by an authority we respect, or are ourselves personally inspired to believe it.

The doctrine of the author also denies that God himself can make a revelation to the human mind, even immediately, without supernaturally enlarging, not merely its creditive, but its cognitive power, so as to enable it by its own inherent *vis*

*intuitiva*, or intuitive energy, to behold or perceive the supernatural truth he would reveal ; for it denies that truth is communicable, or that it can be *mediately* apprehended. Consequently the doctrine denies the possibility of belief in anything which is not an object of immediate intuition ; for no one can believe what he does not apprehend. Hence faith is possible only in so far as it is intuition, sight, knowledge, or science ; that is, it is possible only in so far as it is *not* faith ; for faith is to believe what we do not see,—is, if we may believe St. Paul, “the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” *Est autem fides sperandarum substantiarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium.* Whether Dr. Bushnell is right or wrong in this, it is pretty evident that his doctrine is irreconcilable with the faith of the Christian world and the common sense of mankind.

The intelligent reader of Dr. Bushnell’s work is everywhere struck with the tendency he manifests to confound faith and science, dogma and speculation. He is offended by the theological speculations of *theologians*, as he contemptuously calls them, and therefore condemns Christian dogmata, as if Christian dogmata were mere speculations ! Does he need to be told that the dogma is the *revelatum*, the revealed truth, and essentially non-speculative, preceding theological speculation as its postulate ? The dogma is enjoined or imposed by authority, and demands simple assent ; speculation is an operation of the discursive reason, assuming the dogmas as its postulates or axioms, and its results are conclusions depending on the authority of the logical process which demonstrates them ; the dogma is accepted on the veracity of God, whose word it is, immediately or mediately spoken or transmitted to us. We do not suppose that Dr. Bushnell is ignorant of this distinction ; but does he act wisely to treat it with contempt, and to reason on and about dogma and speculation, as if both belonged to the same category ?

The same tendency, which leads the author to confound the dogmas of faith with the speculations of theologians, leads him to confound faith with science. By confounding faith with science, or resolving it into science, denying it to be faith if not science, he denies the possibility of faith in mysteries, and holds that all that is believed in the mysteries of religion is simply what the mind of the believer not only apprehends, but comprehends. This compels him either to deny, with Mr. Allen, all mysteries,—that God has revealed or reveals anything

above the natural understanding,—or else to assert a direct, immediate, and personal revelation from God to each man,—what he calls Mysticism, — which enables us to perceive intuitively their intrinsic truth. “Christian character itself,” he says (p. 351), “and all its graces, are forms of inspiration. It requires inspiration . . . . to understand or really come into the truth of Christ at all.” “No man,” he had said (p. 331), “really knows Christ, or *can know or be taught* the Christian truth, who is not in the spirit of Christ.” “Words cannot bring it—the Christian plan—into his heart; dogma cannot give it in the dry light of reason.” And again (p. 332), “We can know the things which are freely given us of God only *as Paul knew them*,—by the spirit that is of God.”

The author first asserts Rationalism as the condition of rejecting the mysteries, and then Mysticism as the condition of accepting them, not as mysteries, but as things intrinsically apprehended; that is, he is alternately a Rationalist and an enthusiast, as suits his purpose. It is very true that we cannot believe with *divine faith* the things which God has revealed, without the grace of faith; but the author abuses the word *inspiration*, if by inspiration he means this grace. The grace by which we believe the *Divine revelata* is not inspiration, is not a grace of science, but simply a grace of faith, and elevates not necessarily the *vis cognoscitiva*, but the *vis creditiva*,—gives us, not the power of seeing the intrinsic truth of the *revelata*, but of holding them in our belief with a supernatural firmness. This grace does not reveal to us the truth, as does inspiration; it simply enables us to believe it with divine faith. The truth itself, as proposed to our belief, is, when proposed, apprehensible by the natural or unelevated human intellect. The propositions of faith, as to their intrinsic truth, for the most part transcend the reach of the human intellect, and therefore must be taken, if at all, on the authority proposing them; but as propositions to be believed on authority, that is, as simple propositions of faith, they do not transcend that intellect, and can be apprehended by it without difficulty, even in the simple and unlettered, and ordinary reason can also apprehend the competency of the authority. The error of the author is in confounding inspiration with the *donum fidei* of the theologians.

The Gospel was preached by the Apostles, and is every day preached by missionaries, to men not incorporated into the mystic body of Christ, not one in him, nor living his life. But this would be absurd, if no man could learn, or be taught,



while out of Christ, Christian truth, which must be believed as the condition of becoming one with him, of being in him, or having him in them. Certainly no man can *live* Christian truth out of the mystic body of Christ ; but not therefore does it follow that no man out of that body can know intellectually what the Christian faith requires him to believe, the authority on which it is to be believed, — whether the Church or the Scriptures, — or, even with human faith, believe them. The devils certainly have not the spirit of Christ, are not in Christ, have not him in them, are not Divinely inspired, and yet St. James tells us they “believe and tremble.” If the truth cannot be taught to unbelievers, to men who are not yet Christians, how are they to be converted ? Moreover, will the author name to us a single proposition of Christian doctrine which, as a proposition of faith, not of science, is unintelligible to the natural human understanding, supposing that understanding really exerted to apprehend it ? God is one Divine Being subsisting in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; in Christ are two distinct natures subsisting in one person ; in the blessed Eucharist, when the priest pronounces the words of consecration, the elements are changed into the substance of the body of our Lord ; we cannot elect to concur with grace without the aid of grace, and yet grace does not aid us without our concurrence. We know nothing in Christian faith more difficult to understand than these propositions ; but who dares say that the assertions contained in them are not apprehensible even by a child old enough to begin his catechism ? The explanation of them, the answer to the question how they can be true, and all that, is no doubt difficult ; but nothing of all that is proposed as an object of faith, or is required to be understood by the believer in order to believe what is proposed. We know that a spire of grass grows, but how it grows we know not. By faith we know that the world was framed by the word of God, yet how God framed it is no object of our knowledge, or of our faith. Shall we therefore say that we cannot believe that he framed it by his word ? It will never do to say that we apprehend nothing because we do not comprehend all things, or that what is not comprehensible is not believable. If the good Doctor had distinguished between apprehending and comprehending, and between the simple apprehension of Christian truth as the intellectual object of faith, and the spiritual appropriation of that truth in Christian life and character, he would have escaped the blunder of asserting that “no

man can be taught Christian truth who is not in the spirit of Christ," or learn it otherwise than by immediate, personal inspiration.

That the end we are to aim at is not the intellectual apprehension of the objects or propositions of faith, the human or even the supernatural assent to them, is of course true. The end to be sought is never the intellectual apprehension of the truth, for that the devils have, but obedience to the truth, or life conformable to its teachings. There must not only be the perception of the intellect, but the consent of the will ; and without the latter, the former, instead of being meritorious, only augments our guiltiness. Faith without works, the *fides informis* of the Schoolmen, is dead ; and to be living, meritorious, it must be conjoined with love, be *fides formata*. Everybody knows, or ought to know, this. The Christian life, Christian truth as the inward principle of life, the vivifying or formative principle of character, is the main thing, without which nothing is of any value. So far as Dr. Bushnell means simply to insist on this commonplace truth,—commonplace truth with all except those sectaries who preach justification by faith alone,—we have no quarrel with him ; but when he goes farther, and tells us that Christian truth is not addressed primarily to the human intellect, and seeks to exclude the intellect from all share in the formation of the Christian character, we recognize in him neither the Christian nor the philosopher. We must apprehend the truth, or we cannot obey it, or voluntarily submit to it ; and the intellect is our only faculty for the apprehension of truth. It is our only cognitive faculty. It is the light or the sight of the will, which, considered in itself as a distinct faculty, is blind. The will acts only for an end, and cannot act for an end which is not apprehended. Suppress the intellect, and you suppress the will ; suppress the will, and you suppress all voluntary obedience, all virtue, all *human* acts. Impossible, therefore, is it to have the Christian character, to live the Christian life, without intellectual apprehension of Christian truth. The first step is always intellectual apprehension, and it is by faith that we are incorporated into the elected human race, where only we can live in unity, and complete the Christian life. Is it not a little too bad that we should be called upon to defend intellect against a modern *enlightened* reformer, and to maintain against him that intellect is not a useless appendage to the human constitution ?

But truth to the human intellect must always be presented

in some form more or less distinct, more or less definite. Doubtless, it is not necessary for every mind that it should be drawn out in detail, in all the minuteness we find in scientific theology ; yet the more clearly, distinctly, and definitely its several propositions are drawn out and stated, the more perfect will be our apprehension of it, and the less likely shall we be to mistake it, or fall into errors opposed to it. Even the Apostles' Creed, with which the author closes his volume, and which he professes to believe, is a formula of faith, a formal statement of Christian truth, to the intellect. And how will you teach Christian truth, except by means of formal statements ? What else is every sermon that is preached, every book that is written, with a view to induce men to believe and practise the Christian religion ? No teaching, no instruction, is possible, without formal statements to the understanding. Do you propose to abolish all teaching, all science, all intercommunion of thought, and leave every man to the solitary workings of his own mind ? What will you do with children ? Will you abolish all primary and secondary schools, all academies, colleges, seminaries, and universities, — all preaching, all catechizing, all talking, all reading, all literature ? If not, you must and will have teaching of some sort, and then formal statements, formulas of doctrine, addressed to the intellect. Or do you propose to follow the cant of the day, to declaim against all intellectual education, and say you will have only *moral* education, the education of the feelings, of the moral and religious affections and sentiments ? But how will you contrive, without addressing the intellect, to impart this education ? Will you do it in perfect silence, or will you now and then open your mouth ? If you open your mouth, you must say something, make some formal statement, true or false. You cannot speak to the feelings, you cannot even move them, except through the intellect. Then, in what will your moral education consist ? Is it to be conformable or not conformable to the truth ? How, without the exercise of intellect, will you know which is truth, which is falsehood, and determine what is the education conformable to the one or the other ? A *moral* act is the act of a free agent, done for the sake of the end which the law of God commands us to seek. How, without teaching your pupils this end, the means and conditions of fulfilling it, will you give them a *moral* education ? Is that a moral education that leaves the pupil ignorant of the precepts of morality ? Were you to reduce your system to practice, how long would

you be in reducing your community below the condition of the most degraded savage tribe ?

Then, again, does the Doctor act wisely in sneering at logic, and making himself merry with what he calls "logicking" ? Does it never happen that the truth is assailed, and needs to be defended ? that falsehood is promulgated, and needs to be refuted ? How is one or the other to be done without logic, — *logicking*, if the author pleases ? The author requires us to live Christian truth ; he, then, must hold that there is a difference between truth and falsehood, — that the former is good, and the latter is bad. Will he, then, deny that it is necessary to distinguish between them, to defend the truth if assailed, and repel the falsehood if it attempts to usurp the throne of truth ? Nay, is not the author himself "logicking" against logic, from the beginning of his book to the end ? Does he not bring out views of his own, and seek to give us logical reasons for accepting them ? and does he not point out what he holds to be errors, and endeavour to show us why they are errors ? Has he, then, the face to turn round and deny the very instrument he has used, the very authority to which he appeals ? Does he persuade himself that it is a sufficient answer to say, that he admits his inconsistency, but then all deep thinkers, all profound minds, are inconsistent in their statements, and cannot, owing to the imperfection of language, state the truths they behold, without violating the logical understanding ?

But we have exhausted our space, and can proceed no farther. We did intend to consider the application which Dr. Bushnell makes of his principles to the explanation of the sacred mysteries of our religion, but it is not necessary. What we have said is sufficient for the full understanding of his theory, and how he applies it is a matter of little importance. We do not suppose that Dr. Bushnell is naturally a very weak man, nor, compared with the common run of Protestant ministers, a very bad man ; but he is, undoubtedly, a very ignorant man, and unacquainted with the theology of his own denomination. He has, doubtless, read some, thought a little, felt much, and imagined more ; but he lacks mental discipline and scientific culture. He appears to have lighted, in the course of his experience, upon certain speculations, to have caught up certain half or quarter ideas, which, being novelties to him, he has presumed to be novelties to all the world. These he appears to have dwelt upon till his head has become a little turned, and he fancies that he is, as it were, a seer and a prophet. To those



who have passed through a state similar to that he is now in, and have late in life done what they could to supply the defect of early discipline, he is an object of tender interest, and they pity him at the same time that they laugh at the antics he plays, and the capers he cuts. He may, perhaps, some day, grow sober, lower his estimate of his own supereminent greatness, blush at his folly, and marvel at his delusions. He seems to us, after all, a man on whom the truth will not always fall powerless. He shows the marks of his Calvinistic breeding, it is true, but he has comparatively little of that cold, dry, hard, wiry, sly, crafty disposition, so characteristic of Calvinistic ministers; and seems to retain at bottom even something of the simplicity of the child, and the frankness of the youth. He seems really to have a little earnestness, which is not precisely fanaticism; and we shall not be surprised if we hear, one of these days, that he has abandoned system-making, has given up his trade of reformer, has bowed in sorrow and humility at the foot of the cross, and been received into the society of those whose glory it is to glory only in a crucified Redeemer. He is now mentally and morally in a chaotic state; who knows but the spirit of God may yet breathe over the chaos, and cause order to spring out of confusion, and light to arise out of darkness? Our brethren should pray for his conversion.

We have said less of Mr. Allen's book than we intended. We shall be obliged to make it the subject of some remarks hereafter. Mr. Allen is a less hopeful subject than Dr. Bushnell; but he is young, and we will not as yet despair of him.

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ART. V. — *The Law of the Press. Speech of Count de Montalembert, in the French Legislative Assembly, July 21, 1849.*

IN an article on *European Events*, in this Review for July, 1848, written before we had received the news of the memorable Socialist insurrection in June of that year, which it took four days of hard fighting to suppress, and which resulted in the victory of the party of order under General Cavaignac, we made the following remarks, which we beg leave to recall to the attention of our readers.

“What is likely to be the result of the recent events in Europe? France is now decidedly a republic. Will she be able to establish and maintain the authority of the state and the freedom of the subject? This is a matter about which we do not wish to speculate. We have found nothing in our historical reading which leads us to augur her success. The historical precedents are all against her. But we cannot pretend to fathom the designs of Almighty God, to whom belong the ordering of all events and the determination of their issues. Whether he has designed the revolution in mercy or in judgment to the nations, we can know only as he himself is pleased to make it manifest; but whichever it be, it is ours to be silent and adore, for his judgments are as adorable as his mercies. That the French people will find it an easy task to reconstitute the state, which the revolution of February dissolved, and reestablish and maintain order, the indispensable condition of liberty, we presume nobody with a grain of political philosophy or experience will pretend. The ideas and passions, the schemes and wishes, which have destroyed the old government, and reduced French society to its original elements, are opposed to all government, and if not abandoned, must be as fatal to the republic as they have been to the monarchy. The revolutionary party is in pursuit of Utopia, and has no stopping-place within the limits of practicable government. It must be arrested, or it will subvert the new institutions before they get fairly into operation. But to attempt to arrest them by physical force, by measures of repression, will only renew between them and the new government the very relations which rendered the old government impotent for good, and its longer existence impracticable. Under Providence, then, the solution of the problem must turn on the fact, whether the radicals, represented by such men as Ledru-Rollin, that second edition of Danton, Louis Blanc, Blanqui, Albert, and company, are a large, or only a small, minority of the French nation, and on the courage, firmness, and energy of the party opposed to them. If they are only a small minority, confined principally to a few localities, and the friends of order show them from the outset that their opposition is disregarded, and their advice will not be asked, they may be held in subjection till the new government is so firmly established as to render their attempts to subvert it impotent and ridiculous. But if they are a large majority, — absolutely so, by their numbers, or effectively so, by their organization and concentration, or by the uncertainty, hesitation, fears, and anxieties of their opponents, — they will have little difficulty in defeating all attempts to reconstitute the state, and in prolonging the reign of anarchy. How the case actually stands in France we have no certain means of knowing, and cannot pretend to decide.

“The majority of the National Assembly appear to be well dis-

posed, and to entertain moderate views; but they evidently lack experience, and have marked out to themselves no clear and definite line of policy. They are apparently trusting for their success to the chapter of accidents. Their determination is, indeed, to give France a republican government; but they are evidently afraid that the sincerity of their attachment to republicanism will be suspected. This renders them uneasy, deprives them of that calmness, sobriety, and independence, that naturalness and at-home feeling, so essential to their success, and gives the radical minority an immense advantage over them. The radicals have no fears of this sort. Strong in the fact that they represent the revolution, embody its spirit, and obey its tendencies, they march with a bold and confident step in the path of destruction. In settled times, when the revolutionary spirit has not penetrated the body of the people, when the subversion of an old government is looked upon as an exceptional measure, to be justified only on the ground of invincible necessity, the party adopting moderate counsels and cherishing a conciliatory spirit is sure to rally around it the great body of the nation. But when the principle of revolution aspires to obtain a legal recognition, and is held by the great body of the people to be the proper basis of the state, — when all old ideas are confounded, and the general wish is to erect the social fabric, not only after a new fashion, but on a new and untried foundation, — extreme counsels are most likely to prevail, and the party in favor of carrying out the revolution is pretty sure to succeed. We shall, therefore, by no means be disappointed, if Ledru-Rollin turns out to be a stronger man than Lamartine. The Mountain triumphed over the Girondists, the *Sans-culottes* over the Respectables, in the former revolution, and why shall they not do the same in this? They assuredly will, unless the moderate party take their ground at once, declare boldly that the revolution must be arrested, and that a contrary set of maxims from those which prepared and effected it must now be adopted and acted on. The state cannot be constituted on the revolutionary principle, nor recognize the right of the people to abolish the government; for every state must have as its basis the right of the state to command, and the duty of the citizen to obey. Whether the moderate party have the courage to face the revolution in the moment of its victory, and recognize a solid basis for authority, the event must determine. We fear, however, that, captivated by fine phrases about *fraternity*, they will attempt to conciliate the revolutionary party by compromise, and thus destroy themselves, and prepare the triumph of disorder or of despotism." — *New Series*, Vol. II. No. III. pp. 399 – 401.

At the time when this was written, Lamartine was the great man of the revolution, and Ledru-Rollin was apparently without

influence. Yet events have proved, what we then supposed to be true, that the latter was from the first the real leader of the revolutionary party. He is a bold, reckless demagogue, not without talent of a certain kind, with a determinate end in view, which he is prepared to seek at any and every hazard, — a daring and unscrupulous revolutionary chief, who cares not how much virtue he tramples upon, how many hearts he wounds, how much blood he spills, or how much misery he causes, if he can accomplish his purposes. Such a man, in times of disorder and confusion, is always sure to have a strong and determined party, and never ceases to be dangerous so long as he lives.

On the other point on which we expressed our views, our fears have not been fully justified. The party of order, the moderates, as they were then called, have proved themselves stronger and more resolute and energetic than we dared hope ; but the Red Republicans, though defeated, have not yet been vanquished, or ceased to be formidable ; and the party of order are yet far from having gained a definitive victory. One thing, however, they have gained. “ The state,” we said, “ cannot be constituted on the revolutionary principle, nor recognize the right of the people to abolish the government ; for every state must have as its basis the right of the state to command, and the duty of the citizen to obey.” “ The revolutionary party,” we said, “ must be arrested, or it will subvert the new institutions before they get fairly into operation.” Every sober Frenchman appears now to be well convinced of this. Three times, within less than eighteen months, the revolutionary party has attempted to subvert the very republican institutions it had forced upon the country, and France seems now to be thoroughly convinced that her regeneration must come from order and liberty, not from revolution and anarchy. She has taken her stand on the side of the former against the latter, — solemnly proclaimed, No more revolution, no more destruction, no more anarchy ; but whether she will be able to maintain the very just and common-sense position she has assumed remains to be seen. Thus far, she has maintained it firmly, and, under the circumstances, nobly ; and the government of Louis Napoleon, thus far, deserves the gratitude of Europe and the Christian world.

But the enemies of order, of society itself, are in France and in entire Europe neither few nor inactive, and he who to-day counts on the speedy triumph of authority in the European



nations, and the restoration of social peace, will most likely be deceived. A large portion of the people have been corrupted, and the infection spreads from the cities and towns into the villages and country. In the earlier half of the eighteenth century, it was the higher classes — kings, nobles, and even, to some extent, the clergy — who were corrupt, who had lost their faith, despised morals, and dreamed of a sensual paradise. The bulk of the people, especially the peasantry, were comparatively sound and virtuous. Now, it is or is becoming the reverse. The French revolution of 1789 chastised and corrected the upper classes, and they are now in general the most upright, moral, and religious portion of the community ; but the lower classes have taken the infection, have learned to scoff at religion, and ceased to look for a celestial recompense, or to believe in immortality. They become the ready instruments of base and unscrupulous demagogues, — combustibles, which a licentious press can at any moment kindle for a universal conflagration. In all European countries there are plenty of educated scoundrels, especially Poles and Italians, ready to inflame them with their incendiary appeals, and of able military men to conduct them in their nefarious war against society, — and plenty of decently dressed sympathizers in England and the United States to cheer them on, to pass resolutions in their favor, and even to vote to send them a flag. Under these circumstances, we cannot but apprehend a protracted struggle, although as to the ultimate issue we have no fears.

Unquestionably, for the party of order, one of the first and most important means of self-defence and of the preservation of society is to restrain, as far as possible, the radical press. In this country, we hold the freedom of the press sacred, and regard its censorship with horror ; and not without reason, for here the imbecility of the press renders it comparatively harmless, and we have few motives to rebellion. Englishmen and Americans have little confidence in ideas, — believe in few things except roast-beef and plum-pudding. They retain much of the old Anglo-Saxon character, and seldom feel, except in the pocket and the stomach. They have been bred under Protestantism, which disdains logic, and renders reason superfluous. Protestantism blunts the intellect, destroys confidence in principles, and superinduces a habit of stopping midway in a chain of reasoning. People trained under it never find any difficulty in asserting premises, and denying the conclusions which legitimately flow from them. Besides, it is an Anglo-Saxon char-

acteristic, never to put one's self in the way of learning what is repugnant to one's prejudices. The Anglo-Saxon takes a paper, not to learn what he ought to think, but to learn from it what he already thinks. If a journal advocates a view contrary to his own, or what he has a vague suspicion is his own, he eschews it, or resolutely refuses to believe one single word it says. The press has, therefore, little other influence, in England and in this country, than it exerts by expressing already existing views of the several coexisting parties, and no more influence on the ultimate action of either country than the speeches in Congress have on the final vote of the House, which, it is said, is just nothing at all. We can therefore understand no reason why, in England and the United States, the press should not be perfectly free ; for in both, though pretentious, it is, comparatively, uninfluential. It rarely strengthens or weakens a party, rarely determines any public measure, or affects the final issue of any public contest. Things would go on without, pretty much as they do with it, while it operates as a sort of safety-valve to the superfluous steam of demagogues.

But on the Continent of Europe, the case is altogether different. Mental culture there is of a superior order to what it is in Great Britain, or in our own country, and the people are more disposed to act in conformity to their principles. There is and always has been in the Continental nations more mental freedom than in Great Britain, and there is more in Great Britain than in the United States. Of all civilized countries, ours has the least freedom of thought, and is, not by the laws, but by the manners, habits, and customs of the people, subjected to an intolerable mental slavery, unequalled elsewhere. He is a brave man who, among us, dares publish his honest convictions ; and he is a still braver man who dares examine convictions contrary to his own with candor and impartiality. We are the freest people in the world — on paper, but in reality, especially in the interior world, the most enslaved. But on the Continent of Europe, even with those who have thrown off the Catholic faith, there remain some traces of Catholic culture, — a respect for intellect, for systematic thought, and a strong feeling that what a man holds to be truth he should seek to reduce to practice. Hence the press has there, and must have, an influence for good or for evil, of which we, in this country, can form no conception ; not because the European populations are more ignorant than our people, but because, in reality,

they have more mental freedom, are more logical, and have received a superior intellectual culture.

In revolutionary times, the press, with these populations, is a tremendous engine ; and a revolutionary press cannot coexist with public peace and safety. It is absolutely necessary, if order is to be preserved, if revolutions are to be arrested, and liberty consolidated, that the law should restrain the license of the journals, and suppress them, as promptly as it would arrest and imprison the conspirator. The journal is a conspirator ; its words are deeds, and must be prevented ; for it is too late to punish them after they have been spoken. As well might you consider it a sufficient precaution to lock the stable door after the colt has been stolen.

Entertaining these views, and believing no government can fulfil its mission if perpetually assailed with impunity, we were among those, though a violent Liberal at the time, who, with the late Secretary Livingston, approved the famous September laws of Louis Philippe, restraining the seditious press. We cannot but rejoice, then, that the present French government has had the courage and firmness to propose and adopt similar laws. We have thought the subject so important, and have been so desirous that our American Catholic community should understand the necessity and the motives of the recent French legislation on the press, that we have translated and publish entire the masterly speech in its defence of Count de Montalembert, made in the Legislative Assembly, July 21st. M. de Montalembert was a member of the former Chamber of Peers ; he is a man without ambition, a man of extraordinary talents, of a highly cultivated and polished mind, a genuine orator, a sincere Catholic, and the acknowledged political leader of the Catholic party in France. In times past, we feared that he had a taint of Liberalism, and that he would not bear up with sufficient firmness against the revolutionary and Socialistic ideas of the age. Nobly has he disappointed us, and earned the reputation of being, if not the first, one of the very first, Catholic laymen of Europe. The speech we lay before our readers was received by the Assembly with unbounded applause, and proved a terrible blow to the Mountain, whom it virtually silenced.

The session of the Legislative Assembly, on the 21st of July, opened by some remarks from M. Mathieu (de la Drôme), who "maintained"—we translate from the report of the *Amie de la Religion* of July 24th—"that the proposed law on the press

violated the constitution, and even the law of nature ; for only He who has endowed man with speech can take from him his right to use it. To exact the deposit of a certain sum of money as the condition of granting the right to publish a journal, is to create a privilege in favor of the rich. There is no grave reason for presenting the project, unless it is fear,—fear of Socialism. Wherefore combat Socialism with the most absurd and odious religious beliefs ? The real enemy is want ;—destroy that. A society which permits a single one of her members to die of hunger is a homicidal society. Proclaim that boldly, and you need no longer trouble yourself about the press ; for if it should then be against you, it would destroy itself.”

M. Montalembert replied :—

“ The honorable gentleman who has just spoken appears to me to have strayed far from the question before the Assembly. Though I intend to embrace it, as far as possible, in its greatest generality, I cannot follow him into the arena where he has sought to place the discussion. There is, however, one point that he has made, on which I acknowledge that I fall under his strictures. Fourteen years ago, I began my political career by speaking and voting against the laws of September ; I am here to-day to speak and vote for a law which in his opinion is even worse than the laws of September. I am not the only one here who must do the same ; others more illustrious than I are in my position ; I wish, therefore, to explain this change in our conduct, and in explaining it I believe I shall render homage to truth, warn my country of a great public danger, and discharge towards her my first duty.

“ But before proceeding to this explanation, I must reply to an objection daily urged against the laws of September, which it is pretended we wish to revive. Those laws, it is said, did not save the monarchy ; those you propose to enact will be equally impotent to save the republic. Be it so. But, Gentlemen, I hesitate not to say, that if the law we propose shall procure the republic twelve years of prosperity, security, and freedom, such as followed the laws of September, I shall, for my part, be very well satisfied, and hold myself fully justified in having voted for them. Let the republic give us by this law twelve years without the dictatorship, without a state of siege, with security and freedom, and I for one will hold her highly honored, and myself her very much obliged servant.

“ I speak not now either for or against Republicanism ; I believe society can exist under the republican form of government ; but I do not believe that it can exist with the spirit of sedition, of revolt, and of revolution, which this law is intended to repress. This is my belief, and this is wherefore I come here to defend this new law of September.



"I need not say that I am not here to combat the factious without, or even to convert adversaries within. My sole ambition is to clear up, if possible, the doubts, and remove the scruples, of some few friends, who, like myself, have always served, loved, and defended the freedom of the press, and who have some hesitation in supporting the measures which the force of the unhappy circumstances in which we are placed compels some of us to propose and others to adopt. Here is my aim.

"But how explain this change in my own conduct and in that of others? *Explain*, I say, for there is, I should hope, no need of justifying it. If a physician were consulted on the regimen of a robust man, accustomed to all the exercises and labors of ordinary life, he would very properly, in view of his constitution, prescribe a substantial, strong, and stimulating diet. This is precisely what we prescribed for France when we saw and studied her constitution fifteen years ago. We thought her constitution robust and able to bear the regimen of absolute freedom which then existed. But if the same physician, after a lapse of ten years, should be consulted again on the same subject, and should find the patient exhausted by his excesses, a prey to fever, delirium, and chills, would he prescribe the same regimen? If he should, he would be an ignorant quack, a madman, an assassin.

"The whole question is, whether French society can be justly compared to a sick man. In my opinion, it is grievously, I was about to say mortally, sick. We are called upon to save it,—to save it at any price, Gentlemen, and with it to save liberty,—yes, with it to save liberty, but not to save it without liberty.

"But how are we to save liberty? Certainly only by restricting it. All experience proves that. The experience of the last eighteen months shows to complete demonstration that unrestricted liberty is the deadly foe of liberty, that the suppression of the journals is the natural and necessary remedy, and that between the unbounded license of the press and the Dictatorship there is hardly a step. I believe, in my soul and conscience, that unlimited liberty—such liberty as we should have now if the state of siege was raised and this law not voted—would give us the Dictatorship to-morrow.

"Such being my conviction, I come here, Gentlemen, to practise a sad and difficult trade. It is not the clamors nor the sneers of certain gentlemen that make it sad and difficult, but my own heart and my love of my country. It is always a sad and difficult trade to be a pessimist, an alarmist, to paint things in black, but it is not seldom the trade of an honest man and a good citizen. We have all of us a grave fault, that of flattering ourselves. We no longer flatter kings, and for the very good reason, that kings are no more. But under the transparent veil of society, humanity,

country, nation, and the actual state of things, we flatter ourselves; we daily, in speaking of our society, of our country, and of our age, pass the bounds of adulation, and this, at bottom, is nothing but mere self-flattery. That, Gentlemen, is a trade I have never followed. I have never been a courtier, I have never flattered any one, and I will not now be either a courtier or a flatterer of my age or my country.

“Let us look beneath the surface, and see where our society and our civilization are at the present moment. To-day, after the two experiments, one of June, 1848, and the other of June, 1849, I need not fear to say that our whole society — not this or that administration, but our entire society itself — is at the mercy of sudden insurrection [*coup de main*]. If you doubt it, as does the honorable gentleman who preceded me, I beg you to consider seriously the events of this thirteenth of June, of which he spake to you in terms so singularly inexact. What is the difference which we have observed between the June of 1849 and the June of 1848? Allow me to press this question. The honorable gentleman told you truly, and no one, I think, will deny it, that the law we are about to vote originated in the events of last June. Permit me to call your attention to the real character of those events. What was it we saw in June, 1848? We saw a formidable insurrection break out in Paris, but the provinces unanimously fly to the aid of law and order, threatened in the capital. What, again, saw we in June, 1849? An insurrection, begun in Paris, forthwith suppressed; but, precisely the contrary of what happened in 1848, we saw its ramifications extended through all the provinces, the functionaries of the triumphant insurrection everywhere named in advance, and its forces everywhere pass in review. If the conspirators could have prolonged the struggle in Paris for but two days, you would have seen a thousand insurrections break out all at once in every quarter over the whole surface of France. This is what you would have seen, Gentlemen; the republic, the republic, honest, moderate, — the *constitutional* republic, if you prefer the term, — would have perished, as perished the monarchy in February, by the sudden stroke of an insurrection, and you would have seen France all terror-struck, — terror-struck, did I say? — all crushed, beneath a danger, of which, the night before, she had not the slightest suspicion. It is the truth, and it is useless to deny it. It is as clear as the sun. Well may I say, then, in view of what was the actual state of things one month ago, that our entire society itself is at the mercy of an insurrectionary surprise.

“There is nothing in this to inspire us with confidence in our civilization or in our constitution, — nothing honorable either to the one or to the other; but there is something which should make us modest when speaking of what we are, modest in view of what we have done, — modest and perspicacious at the same time.

“Be not deceived. We are in a besieged town. Society to-day is a town besieged, — and besieged, as the honorable gentleman has truly said, by Socialism. Know you not what usually happens to besieged places? Know you not that they almost always fall at last? The siege of our society has commenced; the trench is opened; several assaults have been made and repulsed; you have made successful sorties; you made a successful one last June, of which we have just spoken; but have you vanquished your enemies? Not at all. Scarcely have you disarmed them. And how have you disarmed them? You have disarmed their hands, not their hearts; you have taken away their guns, but not their ideas. The besieging army, instead of being disorganized and dispersed, increases every day in numbers and boldness. You cannot expel it as a foreign army; it remains ever there in its place to watch our blunders and divisions, and to profit by our weaknesses. It is there, as the lava of the volcano, always boiling. What sustains it? It is idle to attempt to deny it, it is the press, the seditious press; not the liberty of the press, but the excess of the press, which up to this moment has been unrestricted in its liberty. I say not that without the press the volcano would be extinguished; I know not that it would be so; perhaps it would; but this much I do know, that it is the press that now feeds it.

“But if anything more is necessary to overcome the honorable scruples of my friends, of conservatives, who all their lives have been the sincere and ardent friends of the freedom of the press, I invoke, to complete their conversion, two great forces, — and if I were addressing an assembly of ancients, of pagans, I would say two great divinities, — *PITY* and *PEACE*.

“Gentlemen, I invoke Pity; but for whom? In the first place, precisely for these poor people, this rural population, of which the honorable gentleman has spoken, I doubt not, in the tones of sincere sympathy. I ask, I implore, your pity for this rustic population. They are now the victims, the special victims, of the licentious excesses of the press. On them falls the weight, on them falls all the bitterness of the poison which the press each day distils. For a year there has been in France a press whose special vocation it is to speculate on the base passions of the peasantry, — base passions, which they have in common with us and with all men. Above all, it speculates on their ignorance and credulity, making them believe whatever is most absurd and revolting in human thought; it speculates, also, on their fears, and alarms them with a thousand chimeras about the reëstablishment of tithes and the *corvée*; in fine, it speculates on their cupidity, and tells them, daily, that the possessions of others belong of right to them, and makes them regard as their enemies all who are not dispossessed, that it may induce them to become the instruments or the accomplices

of spoliation. Here is what I assert, and what no one dares deny, and such is the actual state of things with regard to our rural districts.

“But not to rest in general statements, I will cite a particular fact, one of itself sufficient to enlighten every mind and every heart. There was among us a man, who, I do not fear to say, was the noblest and most illustrious type of that rural population, — I mean Marshal Bugeaud. No man could be better qualified to inspire the esteem and affection of that rural population from which he sprang, which he loved, and which he honored by his example and his glory. To it he had consecrated the greater part of his illustrious life, — all in that illustrious life which he did not consecrate to the defence of his country, and the defeat of the enemies of France. His last speech in this place — you, Gentlemen, remember it — was an exhortation to moderate measures; his death followed that speech, and has, if possible, enhanced his glory. But what did the press — the press with unlimited liberty — do to this man. It rendered him odious in the country, nay, rendered him ineligible in that very canton of which he was the immortal honor; it rendered this illustrious warrior in his own district ineligible, not only to this Assembly, not only to its general council, but even to the municipal council of his native village. This is what the base and licentious press did. This is what was done in the Dordogne, in the illustrious Marshal Bugeaud’s own department. Permit me now to relate what has passed in regard to him in mine, the Côte d’Or, in which I reside. I pray you to remark how an organ which is called popular expresses itself on the death of Marshal Bugeaud, — an organ entitled *The Citizen*, which circulates among the rural classes of the Côte d’Or. The article is not unknown; several of you have read it; but I must be allowed to inflict on it the stigma of publicity in the *Moniteur*. I ask pardon for reading it, but it is for your instruction. Here it is: —

“ ‘ Marshal Bugeaud is no more. The people were too slow in decreeing his accusation; God ’ — (what profanation, Gentlemen, the perpetual invocation of that holy name by such fanatics!) — ‘ God grew impatient, and summoned him to his bar. He said to the cholera, Seest thou that man down there, leaning on his huge sword? He thinks himself eternal, he believes that he is invincible. Many has he seized; go now and seize him, and cast him into that black dungeon called the grave. I have judged him.’ [Several voices. “It is shameful!” “It is horrible!”]

“But this is not all, Gentlemen; I continue: —

“ ‘ Yes, God has judged this ferocious man, as ferocious as the savage South Sea Islander who nails a death’s head to the mast of his canoe. Bugeaud was the scourge of the Democracy. In the plains of Perigord, his native district, he was *truffed* with a stupid



hatred of the people [*il s'était truffé d'une haine stupide contre le peuple*].’ [*Marks of indignation from the right, several voices exclaiming, “It is abominable !”*]

“This is what is printed in the department in which I reside, — this is what is read every day in the village from which I come. It is not merely political society that is unable to withstand such attacks, but even moral society; the human heart itself is too feeble to withstand them. No, the human heart, the heart of fallen man, cannot bear such appeals, or resist such dangers and excitations.

“I ask, therefore, your pity for these poor country people, — for the simple peasants; and after having implored it for them, I implore it in the next place for our soldiers, that is, for the sons of these peasants, who are the first victims of the insane theories daily and everywhere vented by that vile press whose licentiousness we would restrain.

“Here I will read you only a few words, — only a single phrase. It is from the close of an article in the *Emancipation* of Toulouse of June 15; — mark the date: — ‘To-day, the pen; to-morrow, the musket.’ And against whom are these pens, converted into muskets, to be directed? Against the enemies of France? Against foreign invaders of her soil? No, no; — against the children of the people, — against our soldiers. They are French soldiers who must pay with their blood the ransom of these declamations. If they betray their duty, — if they yield to the abominable appeals addressed to them, — what is done with them? It is what was done at Lyons, where they were placed in the front ranks on the barricades to fight their comrades. If, on the contrary, they remain faithful to their colors and their duty, they are slain. They fall under French balls, and, it must be said, balls cast by the journalists. Since the meeting of this Assembly, I have heard frequently that its ranks were decimated; would you know what ranks have really been decimated? They are the ranks of our regiments at Paris, in June, 1848, and at Lyons, in June, 1849.

“We are continually speaking in this place of foreigners, of Cossacks, and of the dangers incurred from them; and nobody shares more than I and my friends in that just solicitude with which we must all be animated for the greatness and independence of France; but, meanwhile, who is it that now levies this impost of blood on the children of the people? Are they foreign invaders? Are they Cossacks? No; — they are the Socialists; they are the Red Republicans; they are men inflamed by the demagogical press. Here is the simple truth; and I do not hesitate to say, that I know nothing more culpable or more cowardly than the conduct of these journalists, who, in the security of their offices, cast, as I said, the balls which are to prostrate our soldiers, and who, for

themselves, run no other risk than a few months' imprisonment, while they peril the life of those they arm, and of those against whom they arm their dupes. In all our protracted civil struggles, we have seen, indeed, stream the blood of the children of the peasantry, of workmen and soldiers; but we have never seen in them a single drop of a journalist's blood. A journalist, recently one of our colleagues, related to us that he contented himself with going one day to witness at a safe distance the sublime horrors of a cannonade! This is the heroism displayed by the revolutionary journalists in our civil struggles.

"I said, that, to overcome your scruples, I would, after Pity, also invoke Peace,—Peace, the first want of every society, and of every man as soon as he issues from the savage state. Well, have we peace? Without, we have, I grant; but within? Call you that state in which we live peace? You know it is not; yet peace is not only the first want, but the first duty, of every social man; it is the goal of all progress, the end of all laws, and of all the inventions of civilization,—nay, of war itself; for war is justifiable only when it has peace for its end.

"Nor is peace necessary merely to enable us to enjoy these material goods, whose possession and enjoyment are always legitimate when the goods themselves are; but it is, above all, necessary to enable us to enjoy domestic life, private life, the life of the heart, of family, of what is most dear and sacred to the heart of every man. Is it possible to enjoy this life amidst the convulsions, the threatenings, and the terrors which now besiege us? Where are the fathers, where the mothers, that can look upon the heads of their children without trembling for their future, without tears moistening their eyelids,—tears of a too just apprehension, of a too legitimate solicitude for the future, which the madmen who doom our country and our society to a perpetual conflagration reserve for these dear pledges which God has given them? Behold what they do, these enemies of family and the state! I speak of what I myself have felt, and therefore from the height of this tribune I hurl upon their heads, not only the reprobation of an honest man, of a good citizen, an ardent friend of liberty, but also the malediction of a *father*.

"But are these madmen alone guilty? No, Gentlemen, in my judgment they are not. And here I broach the most difficult and the most delicate part of the task which I have imposed upon myself. Has the party which is called conservative, moderate, the party of honest people, in fine, the party to which I make it my boast to belong,—the party of resistance, if you please, in all the various elements of which it is now composed,—nothing in the actual condition of the country with which to reproach itself? No; I cannot say that it has not. I believe that it is in some

measure, indirectly, unintentionally, partially, the accomplice of the evil we all deplore.

“ I refer not merely to that really supernatural blindness of many in presence of danger, nor to that foolish security in which multitudes indulge the day after a struggle, nor to the disposition so humorously described by one of our colleagues, that, with us, on the morrow of a victory over disorder, order has the air of begging pardon of disorder for having conquered it ; but more especially to that spirit of opposition, of criticism, which exists in the bosom even of those who seek now to defend and preserve society. Who is it that reads these vile and seditious journals of which I have spoken ? Who is it that purchases them, and gives them their most efficient encouragement ? Who, but conservatives like ourselves ? Moreover, where find we that depraved taste for permanent and perpetual opposition, which, if not manifested now, was, at least, manifested in the past ? Are we not all guilty of it ? Are we not habituated to the unwearied indulgence of every one who assails, blames, criticizes, the government, and at the same time to implacable severity towards its dispositions and acts, be it what it will ? Who is to be accused of this strange inconsistency ? Is it not, again, the respectable classes, conservatives, proprietors, moderates ? And yet these people require the government to protect them. To protect them, the government is obliged to struggle continually for them, — to struggle day and night, — to have for them vigilance, prudence, courage, mind, intelligence, everything ; and yet they would be held to nothing towards a government which represents and protects them.

“ Know you what is the height of the impartiality of these men ? — I exclude not myself from their number ; — know you what is the height of impartiality with them ? It is to hold themselves aloof, and to judge events as if they had no bearing upon us, either for us or against us. Now I assert, that, so long as we remain in these dispositions, we cannot, we shall not, save society.

“ I have said that we were all guilty. In fact, Gentlemen, it is easy to prove it ; for since the Empire fell, we have all more or less, when out of power ourselves, sympathized with the attacks aimed at authority, no matter what it was. Under the Restoration, the Liberals of all shades ; — under the monarchy of July, the Legitimists at first, then the Republicans, then the Dynastics, and lastly, — must I say it ? — the Catholics themselves ; less than the others, it is true, far less, yet too much, as I now perceive ; — all, in different degrees, have presumed too much on the strength of society, and the solidity of its ramparts. We have not appreciated nor sufficiently understood how extremely fragile the roof that sheltered us. We must all reproach ourselves with having sympathized with the aggression directed against authority, when we

were not in power, or when we did not thoroughly sympathize with it. I hesitate not to declare, that the country cannot be saved until men strangers to power, men who are neither its depositaries nor its confidants, shall consent to defend, love, and protect it, by all means supplied either by civilization or the constitution. This is the only condition of safety for society.

"Instead of this, what have we seen? We saw, under the late monarchy, men scarcely removed from office—who were soon, almost immediately, to resume it—employ that short space of time to weaken and discredit that very power of which they had long been, and were soon again to become, the depositaries. We have seen other men—men of undoubted talent—continue for eighteen years, with perhaps the best faith in the world, to attack under all its phases this same power. We can name them, if you desire it. M. Guizot, M. Barrot, both have been successively obliged to employ all their patriotism, all their talent, all their energy, to defend that very power they had formerly depreciated. What, then, does this prove? That these men are corrupted, apostates! No one of you has dared to say it,—no one dares to suppose it. But what, then, does this prove? That, in our manner of entering into political life, in the manner of our appreciating the functions of power and of society, there is something radically false, radically presumptuous; something incompatible, not with the interest of society alone, but also with the interest of liberty itself, and with the duty which we all are under of preserving this liberty from that certain ruin which awaits it, when for too long a time loose reins have been given to that which is hidden under its veil, and bears its name.

"But how is it with public men in our country? They commence with a want of sufficient confidence in authority, with not sufficiently respecting it, and they end, either by falling into the depth of the abyss, whither they seek to drag society with them, or by consecrating their talents and their energy to preserve society with those arms whose edge they have blunted, and whose utility they have lessened, by too frequent use.

"After having arraigned others, permit me now in a few words to arraign myself.

"I ought not to name or to speak of myself, after those illustrious men I have just mentioned; but I desire and I am bound to share in the criticisms which I have directed against them. I also have all my life opposed authority, not systematically, but too often, and in vivid and exaggerated terms. My situation was—I dare say it—favorable for such a course; for I had neither animosity towards others, nor ambition for myself. I was without animosity, for no one had injured me; without ambition, for I never recognized any more than I now do in myself the necessary capacity for the exer-



cise of power. I have, however, been an oppositionist ; and my voice—I regret it—has too often swollen that rash and senseless clamor which rose at once from all parts of Europe, and which has resulted in that explosion wherein it has been attempted to overthrow all thrones, all powers, all governments, not because they were oppressive, as some in fact were,—not because they had committed faults, which is not denied,—but because they were powers, and because they were governments possessed of authority ;—for this and no other reason. For acting thus I forgive myself, and may God forgive me ; for I acted in good faith. But I assure you that I would never forgive myself, did I believe myself of sufficient importance to have contributed in any way to the catastrophe I have designated. You see, then, how indulgent I should be towards those of whom I speak, since nothing was wanting save the abyss which yawned under my feet on the morrow of the 24th of February, to make me understand how far I also had deviated from political truth. Let us, then, Gentlemen, acknowledge that we have all been culpable towards the great law of respect, which is the basis of society, since without it you can conceive of neither of those three great things we profess to defend,—not of religion, for what is religion without respect ?—not of property, for what is property without respect ?—nor of family, for what is family without respect ? It is respect that yields what is good and social. Contempt and insult bring forth evil. And I will add, that respect renders one free, truly worthy of liberty, and capable of enjoying and understanding it. But we have forgotten, Gentlemen, the very conditions of liberty ; we have forgotten that it is a delicate as well as a hardy plant,—that it requires time to grow and become strong,—that it requires us to watch over its delicacy, I had almost said its sanctity, with the most scrupulous care. We have thought that we could expose it with impunity to all the attacks, caprices, and trials of our desires or our fantasies. We have treated it like those liberty-trees, those poor poplars, which are sometimes given as its symbols, which are torn up by their roots, and, decorated with ribbons, planted in paved places, where they soon perish,—perish to be despised or forgotten.

“Such is not liberty. Liberty, on the contrary, is an oak which strikes out deep roots and grows slowly, but which, when once its roots have taken firm hold, extends its branches far and wide, and affords shelter, consolation, and honor to many generations. Here is the symbol of true and real liberty, such as I understand it, such as I have desired and labored to serve.

“That liberty may spring from a revolution is a point I do not dispute ; but it cannot live, I fear not to say, it cannot live, save on the sole condition of killing its mother,—the revolutionary spirit. It is thus it has acted in England. There it sprang from two revo-

lutions ; but what has it constantly attempted to do ? It has constantly applied itself to put down the spirit of sedition, the spirit of revolution.

“ You may say that England is a monarchy, an aristocracy, and that of such liberty as hers you want none. I tell you that the French Republic, the Democratic Republic which we have, has existed as long as it has, only by killing, as far as in its power, or at least by combating with energy and courage, the revolutionary spirit. It was this which it did in June, 1848, which it did last June, and it is what it must continue to do. If it does not, it will perish. It will then be replaced by two dictatorships. The first will be the dictatorship of anarchy. This dictatorship we already know ; its code is already promulgated ; its laws are already written ; its satellites are enrolled, and panting for the day of rapine and plunder. And know you what dictatorship will follow this ? Not the dictatorship of Napoleon, not that of St. Louis, nor that of Charlemagne, but the dictatorship of the very first corporal who shall come bearing the matter-of-fact argument of the sword ; him you will all bless [*lively interruption from the left*] ; him you will receive, you who interrupt me. [*Continued interruption.*] Your fathers did so. [*Repeated interruptions from the left.*]

“ I repeat, that those who interrupt me, if they be not previously borne away and engulfed by the fury of the storm, will be the first to bless, and perhaps to serve, this dictatorship ; their fathers did so, those of the old Mountain, and so also will act they who have taken, I know not whence, their name.

“ I shall, therefore, vote for this bill, certainly not because it is against liberty, — the liberty of the press in particular ; but, on the contrary, because it is for the liberty of the press, because it is intended to preserve us from the dictatorship, because it is intended to save liberty from its own excesses, because it will render homage and service to that liberty which I have always loved and served, and which I will ever love and serve. It is this very devotedness to liberty that fills me with deep resentment against those who have made me doubt, not of the existence of liberty, — for of that I will not doubt, — but, perhaps, of the possibility, of the capacity, of France to understand it, to defend it, to preserve it, against those who have shown me, in the future, the terrible alternative of the two catastrophes to which I have alluded, the dictatorship of anarchy, or the dictatorship of despotism.

“ Permit me a few words more, before I close, on a point which strikes me as worthy of some consideration. Our adversaries complain of the part which our majority takes, — of the abuse, as they say, of the power of the majority. They remind us, as they have an undoubted right to do, that this majority may one day become the

minority, that the minority may become the majority. I am ready to confess that I regard such an event as very possible, and, for my part, I expect it daily. But I never cast a vote in this Assembly without first questioning myself, and demanding, if I were in the minority, whether I would vote otherwise than I am now about to do, as a member of the majority. One or two speakers of the minority, when marking the abuses of power of which, according to them, we are guilty, have taken occasion to promise, in advance, that they will not imitate us; the honorable M. Lagrange said, only day before yesterday, — ‘When we shall have become the majority, we will not treat you, the minority, as you have treated us.’ Now I place implicit confidence in the words of M. Lagrange, as far as he himself, in particular, is concerned; but I fear that what he has said is even more true of others than of himself. They will not treat us as we have treated them. O, no! I believe it. Being only a minority, they have outlawed us! Judge, then, what they would do, if they were the majority!

“I return, then, to the possibility of such an event, and I consider it under all its aspects. They speak to us of reprisals. I accept them; and though I am sure none of my friends would belie me, yet I speak here only in my own name. If they become the majority, and we act against the Constitution, against the laws, and against public order as have acted those men whom we have already struck, and whom we design to strike by the bill under consideration, I consent beforehand to all which they shall do against us. If ever our journals preach civil war, — if ever they say, ‘To-day the pen, to-morrow the musket,’ — we consent in advance that these journals be suppressed. If we come here to this tribunal to proclaim an appeal to arms, — if we then descend to the streets, and protest against the liberty, the dignity, the commission of our colleagues, — if this should happen to me, to myself personally, and if, after having committed all these crimes, I should escape with a few months of preventive detention, exacted by the lamentable slowness of the guardians of justice, — if I should escape after a few years in prison, terminated, as was always the case under the monarchy, and as I believe it will also be under the republic, by a generous amnesty, — if I should escape at so easy a price, I could be quite resigned to it; I could console myself for it, and I forgive you for it, in advance.

“But what I could never pardon myself for, what I should reproach myself and all my party for, would be, the not having profited by the time we continued to be the majority, by the leisure you so opportunely leave us, to make good laws, consolidate our authority, fortify our power, and save society, every day threatened, every day undermined, every day shaken, as if it would by some dreadful explosion engulf us all in its ruins.

What I could never pardon myself for would be, the not having profited by the liberty of this tribunal, which we, the majority, have thus far maintained, to speak the whole truth, — to speak the truth to you, minority, to you and the entire nation. Our poor country thirsts for the truth, — for truth, and, at the same time, for authority and veritable freedom. To you, Gentlemen, does it belong to guaranty these supreme goods by salutary laws, of which this we are about to vote will be the first chapter.”

Count de Montalembert is very far from asserting that the Catholic party, under Louis Philippe, were wrong in opposing the government, or implying that their motives were not justifiable, or that the ends they sought were not both legitimate and desirable ; all he means to censure is the manner in which they conducted their opposition, or the spirit and tendencies they indirectly and unintentionally encouraged. In this he is doubtless right. Our pages, and the liberal censures of some of our friends, amply prove, that, long before the explosion of February, 1848, we were convinced that the Catholic political party in France, and wherever else it was in opposition, yielded too much to the so-called Liberalists of the day, and were not sufficiently careful to mark the line which separates loyal and conservative from factious, radical, and destructive opposition. M. de Montalembert is himself now aware of this, and, with that candor which belongs to all manly natures, he frankly acknowledges it ; and we doubt not, that, if the illustrious O’Connell had lived to witness the events of the last two years, we should have had his acknowledgments to the same effect to place alongside those of his scarcely less illustrious friend.

The age in which we live is by no means one whose spirit can be safely followed. Man is a social being, and demands society ; society is impossible without even a strong and stable government ; and a strong and stable government cannot exist, where the great body of the people fail to respect it, and a large minority are actually engaged in undermining its authority, and forming conspiracies and fomenting insurrections against it. The presumption is always in favor of the government, and against all who seek its overthrow, whether, as to its form, it is monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic. It is not for it to prove itself in the right, but for those who oppose it to prove themselves free from crime. The rebel against established and legal authority is guilty of the blackest crime of which man can be guilty against society. He is even a rebel against the Church, for she enjoins obedience to such government,—a



rebel against God, for all legitimate power is from God, and whoever resists it resists God, and incurs damnation. Yet the age sympathizes with every rebel. Wherever it finds a party in revolt against authority, in arms against their legitimate sovereign, it blesses them ; and it has only curses and execrations for those who generously shed their blood in defence of society against them. It pronounces the traitor taken in arms against his government, and shot as he deserves, a glorious martyr ; and pious journalists — pious after a Satanic fashion — dip their handkerchiefs in his blood, and preserve them as sacred relics. The people rejoice over the victories of the insurrectionists, and weep over their defeats, but have not one generous tear to shed over the brave soldiers who are murdered in their heroic endeavours to preserve social order, and whatever else is dear and sacred to the unperverted human heart. Their heroes and model men are such enemies of God and man, of society and true liberty, such miscreants, as the Mazzinis, the Kossuths, the Ledru-Rollins, the Blums, the Bems, the Garibaldis, — vile criminals, deserving nothing but the extreme vengeance of the law, and the execration of every man who has a human heart. As long as such is the spirit of the age, it behooves every one to take care how he embarrasses the government, or exercises even his constitutional right of opposition. The great danger now is everywhere, not in the strength, but in the weakness, of authority ; and all good men are bound in conscience to labor to increase respect for it, to lessen its embarrassments, and to smooth the way for its free and beneficent action.

Let it not be supposed for a moment, because we thus speak, that we hold a legal, firm, and judicious opposition to such measures of government as are believed to be contrary to the common weal to be uncatholic, or that it is uncatholic to demand a redress of grievances, — if real grievances, not imaginary, — or to labor for the melioration of society and the advancement of civilization. This, certainly, may be done, but it must be done with wisdom and discretion, with loyalty of heart, with profound respect for all legal authority, and a sincere regard for the permanence and stability of the existing government. A weak government, which is constantly assailed, which finds only enemies in its subjects, and is obliged to constant vigilance and effort, not to perform the ordinary functions of government, but to preserve its own existence, is in no condition to prove a blessing to the country ; and they who

constantly assail it and compel it to bend all its energies to its own preservation have no right to complain if it prove even a curse. In times like these, all loyal subjects, all good citizens, all honest men, should rally around authority, and uphold the government, even if not so wise or so perfect as they could wish it,—even if it has committed, or commits, grievous faults, and fails to secure all the good they have a right to expect from it.

We are not disposed to censure with much severity the political conduct of the Catholic party in France, or in other countries where it has found itself in the opposition, for it is suffering severely the penalty of its mistakes, and now appears to be generally aware of them, and to be doing all that can reasonably be expected to repair them. From 1830 to 1848, it yielded too much to the radical spirit of the age, and too often made common cause with the so-called Liberals, whose principles are subversive of all order, and of society itself, and against whom it is now obliged to wage war to the knife. The heresy of La Mennais and his associates, who proposed a sort of alliance between Catholicity and radicalism, has not been unfruitful. It was promptly condemned at Rome, and disavowed by all who had shared it, except its unhappy author; but its subtle poison, nevertheless, continued to spread far and wide in the Catholic body. We detected it occasionally in some of the masterly speeches, before the Revolution of February, of De Montalembert himself, and in the writings of the Rev. Father Lacordaire; and we found it in nearly all its virulence in the famous *Funeral Oration* on O'Connell by Padre Ventura, who even attempted to make the world believe that he was merely expressing the views of Pius IX. The terrible consequences of making, or appearing to make, common cause in politics with the radical party throughout Europe, from which young enthusiasts hoped so much, both for society and the Church, have pretty well developed themselves during the last two years, and are now apparent to all who have eyes, or who are not struck with judicial blindness. The mad attempt, it is now seen and admitted, must eventuate, as far as possible, in the destruction of both Church and state.

We claim no credit for having foreseen and warned our readers of this. When a liberal, a radical, we had studied the subject, and had regarded the policy recommended by the Neo-Catholics, as they were called, as highly favorable to the views we then held, and as hostile to all in Church and state

to which we were ourselves opposed ; it was not difficult for us, when we had ceased to belong to the " movement," and had, through the mercy of God, been admitted into the Church, to see that it was directly hostile to everything we must, as a Catholic, uphold as dear and sacred. We had no new discovery to make, no new investigations to go through ; we had only to oppose as a Catholic what we had approved as hostile to Catholicity when we were ourselves hostile to it ; we had no new judgment to form, for the judgment we had from the first formed was its condemnation in the view of every intelligent Catholic. We need not say that events have justified our judgment, nor adduce the acknowledgments so frankly made by the illustrious leader of the Catholic political party in France, as our answer to those mistaken, but no doubt well-meaning, friends who have abused us for it. This is no time for boasting or for recrimination. Our duty as Catholics, here and elsewhere, is to break loose from any connection we may have had with radicals, and parties animated by a Jacobinical, insurrectionary, or Socialistic spirit, to return to the maxims of a sound political science, and to labor to reconstruct and consolidate social order. We must call things by their right names, and bestow our sympathy, not on rebel chiefs and insurrectionary bodies, but on men of loyal hearts and firm principles, who stand, in these trying times, by authority, and are ready at any sacrifice to save society from complete shipwreck. We must look upon the praise of such journals as the *New York Tribune* and the *Boston Chronotype* as a deep disgrace.

We confess that we were obliged to draw upon our Catholic faith for relief, when we heard the whole Protestant, infidel, and Socialistic world applauding Pius IX. to the echo, — when we saw a Horace Greeley reporting, and a New York sympathy meeting, approved by a William H. Seward and a Ben. Franklin Butler, adopting, an address to the "venerable Father" of Christendom, — when we found multitudes of the faithful half frantic with joy at the supposed popularity of the Head of their Church with the enemies of God and man ; and we even breathed freer when the mob took possession of the Eternal City, and the Holy Father sought an asylum at Gaëta. Those shouts of " Long live Pius the Ninth !" from infidel throats, would, if anything could, shake a Catholic's faith in the promises of our Lord to Peter. We must be traitors to God and criminals to society in order to command the sincere

applause of our age ; and whenever we find ourselves commended by any of the popular organs of the day, we should retire and make our examen of conscience, and ask, with fear and trembling, " O Lord, what iniquity hath thy servant committed, that the wicked praise him ? " Redress of grievances, the melioration of society, and the advancement of civilization, are to be effected, if at all, through government, not by overthrowing it and resolving society into chaos. The nonsense vented about " the people," " popular governments," " democracies," " the republic democratic and social," we shall do well to despise, and to remember that our first duty is " to fear God and honor the king,"—that is, the prince, the sovereign authority of the state. We shall do well to remember, that allegiance is a duty, and disobedience—except when the prince commands what is contrary to God's law—is criminal ; that loyalty is a virtue, and rebellion a crime punishable by all laws, human and Divine. Wherever you see a party at war with the government, hold them for traitors, rebels, deserving your deepest execration, till you have clear and indubitable evidence to the contrary. Give no ear to the modern blasphemous absurdities of " the sacred right of insurrection,"—an absurdity in keeping with the character of Sir Charles Grandison Cromwell Lafayette, as Carlyle not inaptly calls him, with whom, so far as we are informed, it originated, but which every loyal citizen and honest man hears with horror and disgust.

What will be the result of the present state of things in France we have no means of determining. We believe France is pretty thoroughly aroused to the dangers of Red Republicanism, or Socialism, and we do not think that her principal danger just now is to be apprehended from that quarter. Judging from such *data* as we have before us, we should say that her present danger is from the party represented by such men as De Tocqueville, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs. These men are destitute of all true statesmanship ; they are mere theorists, who have not the sense to perceive that a policy that might be admissible when the question is the gradual restriction of an authority too unlimited for liberty, must be wholly misplaced when the question is the reconstruction of power and the reëstablishment of order. They are not exactly Socialists ; they are not exactly democrats ; they reject and accept a little of all parties, and pass for moderate, judicious men ; but being men without any consistent principles of their own, men of



compromise, neither exactly one thing nor another, and appealing to no great and commanding principle in the national mind or heart, they cannot but prove themselves utterly impotent to found a strong and stable government, such as France now needs.

We know not when we have read anything which more disgusted us than the brief report which has appeared in the papers of De Tocqueville's speech in the great debate in the Assembly on the affairs of Rome. The intervention of France in those affairs, if undertaken in good faith for the purpose of rescuing the Roman people from the oppression of the foreign rabble, miscreants, and vagabonds calling themselves the Roman Republic, to put an end to the sacrilege that was daily committed, and to restore the Holy Father to the exercise of his temporal sovereignty, was noble and generous, honorable to her government, and not undeserving the gratitude of Christendom ; but if undertaken merely for the purpose of establishing French influence in Italy, and of imposing restraints on an independent sovereign, as the minister asserts, it was mean, contemptible, wholly unjustifiable, and utterly disgraceful to France and her extemporary rulers. We wish to believe the French government was governed by the more honorable motives, and we would fain hope that the explanation of the minister will turn out to be as false as the motives it implies are unjust and contemptible. But even if so, it proves the weakness, the wickedness, and the blunder of the minister. France is Catholic ; let men say what they will, the great majority of her people are Catholic ; and no government, not administered in accordance with Catholic principles, can hope to restore her internal peace, or to take a strong hold upon her affections. There are but two principles in French society, — the Catholic principle and the Socialistic, — and no government can live, and perform the proper functions of government, that does not make its election, and conform strictly to the one or the other of these. The French government must be Catholic or Socialist. Socialist it cannot be, for Socialism is incompatible even with the existence of human society. It must, then, be Catholic ; and if so frankly, if it take care to do nothing to wound the Catholic conscience, and make its appeal boldly to the Catholic principle, it will have but little difficulty, and may easily correct the defects of its present constitution, and secure the blessings of liberty and internal peace.

But men of the De Tocqueville stamp — who in politics are what Anglicans are in religion ; who have no decided religious belief or principle, but up to a certain extent pretend to patronize all religions ; who are really infidels at heart, without the energy to avow it—are wholly unequal to the courage and wisdom of adopting that which is not, in fact, more injurious and offensive to Catholics than direct and open opposition. Their wisdom consists in attempting to hold the balance even between them and Socialists,—the maddest, or rather the silliest, policy imaginable. In attempting this policy they will destroy the republic, for it will leave them without a party. It is the policy to madden the Socialists, and to disgust and alienate the Catholics, without whose cordial support no government in France can stand.

If Louis Napoleon himself approves the policy of the De Tocqueville portion of his ministry, he is far less of a statesman than we have supposed him, than we have been anxious to believe him. Fine speeches in praise of religion which mean nothing, and acts positively injurious to it, will not regenerate France. The government that admits the necessity of religion and morality, as the basis of social order, betrays its folly no less than its infidelity, if it begins by claiming authority over religion, instead of setting an example of submission to it. We can assure Prince Louis Napoleon, that the former liberal opposition will prove as impotent for good to France as the now defunct *Nationals*, who came into power with the revolution of February, have proved themselves ; and if he wishes to prove that he is not a mere name, he will, as far as depends on him, throw the government into the hands of men who do not presume to sit in judgment on Almighty God, and who have firm and fixed principles, religious as well as political. Away with your Odillon Barrots, your De Tocquevilles and Dufaures, and call to your aid, not a mongrel cabinet, but a cabinet of decided and uniform principles, composed entirely of such men as De Falloux, De Tracy, and the noble De Montalembert,—men who are not ashamed to avow themselves believers in God, and obedient and loving sons of his Church. Heed not the clamor of infidels, and men who affect a homage for religion in general and despise all religion in particular. The Catholic portion is the only sound portion of the population of France, and is, as it was in the time of the First Consul, the only portion on which any government that wishes to be strong and stable can rely for its support. If this

policy is not pursued, we think the republic will be short-lived, and what will succeed we need not undertake to conjecture.

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#### ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The Works of the Right Reverend JOHN ENGLAND, first Bishop of Charleston. Collected and arranged under the Advice and Direction of his immediate Successor, the Right Reverend IGNATIUS ALOYSIUS REYNOLDS, and printed for him. In Five Volumes. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1849. Vols. I., II., and III. 8vo.*

THE first three volumes of the promised edition of the collected works of the first Bishop of Charleston have been issued, and the two remaining volumes, we are assured, will soon follow. We received them at too late a moment to prepare a suitable review of them for our present number. We have been able, as yet, only to glance through them and read here and there an essay; but of their learning and ability there can be no doubt, and works written by Dr. England, and published under the advice and direction of the present Bishop of Charleston can need no recommendation from a journal conducted by a layman. That on a few questions, not of faith, but of great importance, these volumes express views which this journal has strenuously opposed, is very possible, but we have been instructed by the admirable essays on *The Roman Chancery*, and in refutation of *The Calumnies of Blanco White*. Dr. England was, unquestionably, unsurpassed as an eloquent preacher, and as an able, learned, and acute controversialist, by any Catholic divine in the country; and it was due to his memory to collect his various writings, and publish them in a permanent form. This has been done, under the advice and direction of Bishop Reynolds, by the Rev. Dr. Corcoran and the Rev. Mr. Hewit, who appear to have performed their task with zeal, industry, and discretion. The volumes, we doubt not, will receive a cordial welcome by the Catholic community, and find admission into many a Protestant private library. We hope to be able to speak of them soon at length, and in a manner due to their distinguished author.

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2. *A Lecture on the Nature of Law, delivered before the Chrestomathian Society of St. John's College, Fordham, N. Y. By the Rev. J. W. CUMMINGS, D. D., of St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York City. New York Freeman's Journal, July 28.*

WE refer to this Lecture as printed in the *New York Freeman's Journal*, because the pamphlet edition of it is so full of typographical errors, as not only to disfigure, but in several passages to pervert, the author's meaning. The Lecture itself is a noble production, highly creditable to its author, and even to the young men who requested a copy for publica-

tion. It is the first production of the sort that we have seen, published by a society of young men connected with one of our American Catholic colleges, of which a Catholic has no occasion to be ashamed. We have, since we became a Catholic, received several Lectures and Orations, sent us by societies connected with our colleges; but, as a general rule, we have found them deficient in literary merit, written in a loose and bombastic style, and crammed with the disgusting cant of Liberalism. A recent number of the *Catholic Observer* says wittily, as well as severely, — "We learn that there are some Catholics out West who are so very democratic, that, in repeating the Lord's Prayer, they will not say, 'Thy kingdom come,' but 'Thy democracy come.'" There was no occasion for confining these Catholics to the West, for they may be found in this diocese as well as elsewhere.

The truth is, there has been and is, among no small number of Catholics in this country, a mode of thinking, or at least of speaking, on the relations between religion and politics, which, logically considered, implies that God and the people are one and the same, — that religion is subordinate to the temporal order, and that the Church should be *national*, not *Catholic*. Most of our Catholic population have come from monarchical countries, where they have been for ages oppressed, not indeed because the government was monarchical, but because it was Protestant and opposed to their religion; but, not considering this fact, they have identified in their minds monarchy and despotism, and concluded that where the government is monarchical there can be no liberty. They find, as they suppose, that democracy is the established order here, and conclude that it is not only their right, but even their duty, to be democrats. Finally, they find their Church is opposed on the pretence that she is incompatible with popular institutions, and they very naturally seek to repel the charge by making extravagant professions of their devotion to democracy, and of their political independence. These three causes, combined and operating together, have rendered a considerable portion of nominal Catholics the most extreme democrats in the country, and the least worthy of the political confidence of those who believe that no government, not a government of law, can be a good government. Nor is this the worst of it. We cannot oppose their extravagance, and labor to correct their errors, without seeming to condemn the political order of the country, and justifying the charge brought against our religion of being hostile to republican institutions. Thus the folly and extravagance of these ultra democratic Catholics tend to confirm the very charges they are so anxious to repel.

But our religion is paramount to our politics, and whenever we see our friends making their religion subordinate to their politics, or defending it on principles that imply its falsity, we feel that we are not at liberty to be silent. We know our religion is compatible with any and every form of legitimate government, and we cannot but think that those of our friends who are so very anxious to prove that it is compatible with the political order established in this country would accomplish their object much more effectually if they showed less anxiety, and if they would make up their minds to treat the charge of our adversaries to the contrary with simple indifference. Catholics can be good republicans, can be faithful supporters of the political institutions of this country; but no Catholic who knows anything of his religion, and is able to comprehend at all its bearings on the temporal order, can be a radical, a Socialist, or a



democrat, as the term is now understood in Europe, and to some extent among our own politicians. The right, under God, to govern no doubt vests in the people, according to their particular civil constitution; the magistrate is responsible to them for the exercise of his power, and if he abuses it, they, we hold, may cashier him, and appoint a new one. Power is not, and never can be, the private property of any individual, family, or class; it is always a trust held for the public good, and is forfeited if not so exercised. All this our Catholic theologians teach, with scarcely an exception, from St. Augustine down to our own times. The Protestant doctrine of the divine right of kings is no Catholic doctrine. But, on the other hand, the right of the people to govern is not a right inherent in them, and the law does not derive its capacity to bind from the fact that it is directly or indirectly the expression of their wisdom or of their will. No act of any legislative body, popular or otherwise, as every lawyer will tell you, that contravenes the law of nature, the law of eternal justice, or the revealed law of God, is or can be binding. It is null and void from the beginning. Nor, moreover, have the people the right of insurrection, or of revolution; for this right always implies their competency, when they please, to subvert the existing political order, not because it has forfeited its trust, but because they take it into their heads that some other order would be more for their interest or their pleasure. Such a right would be incompatible with all government, with all order, and therefore cannot be supposed. The right of revolution negatives the right to govern, and cannot be asserted if the right to govern be asserted. The existing government must fail utterly to fulfil its trusts, must violate its constitution, and must become wholly illegitimate, before the right to resist commences; and even when, so far as it is concerned, the right to resist commences, that right cannot be rightfully exercised, unless its exercise is authorized by prudence, and there is a reasonable prospect, not only of successful resistance, but of establishing something far better than the government it is proposed to displace. The moral law imposes these restraints on the people, and the Catholic who makes light of them makes light of his religion.

Here is, substantially, the doctrine of the able, philosophical, and manly Lecture before us. The learned and truly Catholic lecturer raises no question as to the form or constitution of government, enters into no discussion with the advocates of monarchy or republicanism, but brings out the ethical aspect of law itself, as common to all forms of government. He shows that human law, to be obligatory, must be a transcript of the law of God, for it derives its obligation only from the will of God, as expressed in the natural or the revealed law. Consequently, he concludes that law is *ethical*, and cannot be resisted without sin, and therefore that the mobocratic spirit, the spirit of revolution, which denies the sacredness of law, cannot be encouraged by a Catholic, nor, indeed, by one who would possess even natural morality. But at the same time that his doctrine binds us in conscience to obey the law, it binds the law-makers to enact nothing not in strict conformity to the law of God. It then protects liberty on the one hand and authority on the other. It is the true Catholic doctrine on the subject, and, we need not add, the precise doctrine which is here and now especially necessary to be insisted on: Dr. Cummings deserves the thanks of every friend of religion and good government for having freely, boldly, and energetically proclaimed it; and for ourselves personally, we are not a little grateful to find set forth so

eloquently, from so high an authority, the doctrine which we have, in our humble way, been for years laboring to impress upon the minds of our countrymen, and for which we have had the honor of being very well abused, even by some who call themselves Catholics. The man who is afraid of being called hard names must not in these times venture to regard politics as a branch of ethics, or assert that the politician is as much bound by the moral law in his public as in his private acts. The assertion of so unpopular a truth is sure to meet the decided disapprobation of the whole band of *Tribunes*, *Chronotypes*, and *Nations*, — the especial organs of that democracy which teaches that power comes not from above, but ascends from below.

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3. — *Meditations for every Day in the Year, on the Principal Duties of Christianity*. Translated from the French of PÈRE GRIFFET, S. J. By the RT. REV. WILLIAM WALSH, D. D., Bishop of Halifax. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1849. 2 vols. 24mo.

THE name of the author and that of the right reverend translator are a sufficient warranty of the excellence of these two beautiful little volumes. We have found them admirable, and they are, what we can so seldom say, admirably translated.

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4. — *Solution de Grands Problèmes Mise à la portée de tous les Esprits*. Par l'Auteur de Platon-Polichinelle. Lyon. 1847. 4 tomes. 24mo.

THESE volumes are admirably adapted to the wants of our times, and address themselves especially to the infidel, skeptical, and Socialistic state of mind now so lamentably prevalent. They are written with great freedom, in a lively and popular style, and are marked by sprightliness, wit, and humor, and at the same time by profound thought, real science, and true learning. We notice them now, because a highly esteemed friend of ours, eminently qualified for the task, has nearly completed a translation of them, which will soon be published. We can promise, in advance, that the translation will be faithful, tasteful, and classical, — a model of what translations should be, and we can assure the American public that they will find in the work when it appears a rich fund of pleasure and instruction.

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5. — 1. *Little Frank, or the Painter's Progress; and, What a Mother can endure*. From the Flemish of HENRY CONSCIENCE. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1849. 24mo. pp. 152 and 72. — 2. *Fashion, or Siska Van Roosemael*. By the same. New York: By the same. 1849. 24mo. pp. 170.

THESE two handsomely printed and illustrated little volumes, from the Flemish of Henry Conscience, the popular Belgian author, make Nos. X. and XI. of Dunigan's Home Library, and are a very acceptable present to our young folk. Their author is hardly inferior in his genius to Canon von Schmid, and they will prove hardly less favorites with the public than the Canon's exquisite Tales. Indeed, it has been objected to Canon



von Schmid that he too studiously conceals the necessity of the Sacraments to the practice of heroic virtue, and too uniformly rewards his good little boys and girls with temporal prosperity. The objection is not without foundation. Virtue does not always insure a temporal reward, and perhaps it is not well to accustom our youth to expect it; perhaps it is better that they should see it not unfrequently go unrewarded here, in the goods of this world, that they may early look to its spiritual reward, both here and hereafter. Yet we find, in Holy Scripture, the heroic patience of Job rewarded with a double measure of temporal prosperity. The other objection is no doubt a grave one, and would condemn the whole series, if our children are to be presumed to read nothing else, and to be uninstructed in their catechism; for every Catholic knows that the heroic virtue the author represents his little folk as practising is impossible without the aid of the Sacraments. That Protestants may draw a wrong and dangerous inference from these little Tales, namely, that the virtue described is practicable out of the Catholic Church, is possible; but no Catholic, properly instructed in his catechism, seems to us likely to draw any such inference, and we are by no means disposed to retract anything from the high commendation we have given them. But however this may be, the little volumes before us are not open to this objection, and the author does not reward all his heroes and heroines with temporal prosperity. As substitutes for devotional books and spiritual reading, we have never recommended the Tales of Canon von Schmid, nor as such do we recommend the little volumes before us; but as a secular literature attractive and not unprofitable to the young we recommend both, and feel that our Catholic community owe a debt of gratitude to the Messrs. Dunigan for placing them within their reach. In an age like ours, popular reading is a necessity of life, and must and will be had, — if not such as we could desire, such as we cannot approve. We know nothing of the sort to be preferred to the moral Tales of Canon von Schmid and Henry Conscience.

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6. — *The Analogy of Ancient Craft Masonry to Natural and Revealed Religion.* By CHARLES SCOTT, A. M. Philadelphia: Grigg, Elliot, & Co. 1849. 8vo. pp. 396.

THIS volume has been sent us with a request that we would review it; — a request with which, having on becoming a Catholic renounced our former slight connection with the Masonic fraternity, we are unwilling to comply. Personally, on our own knowledge, we know nothing bad of Masonry, excepting that it is a secret society, and no one can be initiated into its mysteries without taking a rash oath. But it is enough for us that the Church condemns it, and forbids us to belong to the craft. We have looked over the work before us, and learn from it that the author labors to establish the coincidence of "Ancient Craft Masonry to Natural and Revealed Religion." If he could prove this, we see not wherefore we want Masonry. If we find in Masonry only what we find in the Christian Church, it is unnecessary; for the Christian Church is sufficient of itself. If we find something else, we do not want it; for that something else must be false and hurtful. But the author counts too much on our credulity, if he expects us to believe what he asserts. That in Christian countries Freemasonry recognizes some Christian doctrines, and travesties some Christian forms, nobody denies; but everybody who

knows anything of the subject knows very well that a Jew, a Mahometan, a deist, a pagan, can be a Freemason. How, then, can ancient craft Masonry be coincident with *revealed*, that is, the Christian, religion? That the Masonic institution was used during the last century in Europe for the spread of infidel and revolutionary principles seems to be as certain as anything of the sort can be, and we think it idle to attempt to prove it coincident with revealed religion, especially since it is the boast of its members that it embraces individuals of all religions, false as well as true. If, however, we find ourselves at leisure, we will comply with the request sent us, although we have no disposition to engage in a war against Masonry, against which we can effect nothing, and which has, if it chooses to exert it, sufficient power in this country to crush any man who declares himself its enemy.

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7. — *Memoirs of* REV. JOSEPH BUCKMINSTER, D. D., *and of his Son,* REV. JOSEPH STEVENS BUCKMINSTER. By ELIZA BUCKMINSTER LEE. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1849. 12mo. pp. 486.

THIS volume opens a subject of great importance in the religious history of New England, and we must reserve our notice of it to a future occasion, when we shall have room to speak at length of the decline of New England Calvinism, and the rise and fall of New England Unitarianism.

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8. — *A Trap to Catch a Sunbeam.* By the Author of "Old Joliffe," &c. Boston and Cambridge: James Munroe & Co. 1849. 24mo. pp. 60.

A VERY pleasant little story with a quaint title, and one which would teach a good moral, if there were no difference between the sentiment of philanthropy and the Christian virtue of charity, and if there were no revealed religion, and we were to aspire only to mere natural morality.

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9. — *The Stars and the Earth; or Thoughts upon Space, Time, and Eternity.* From the Third English Edition. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1849. 24mo. pp. 88.

THIS work is not much to our taste, but it is crammed full of thought, and in some instances with very profound and not untrue thought.

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10. — *Remains of* WILLIAM S. GRAHAM, *with a Memoir.* Edited by GEORGE ALLEN. Philadelphia: Moore. 1849. 12mo. pp. 278.

THE Memoir is an affectionate tribute of the widow to her deceased husband, an enthusiastic young Presbyterian, and the *Remains* will no doubt be held in high esteem by the personal friends and acquaintances of the author. They indicate an active mind, a youth full of promise, but have in themselves no great intrinsic value. The volume, however, ought to be interesting, and might be instructive, to members of the Presbyterian sect. Catholics will find nothing in it to interest them, except the sympathy they must always feel with our common humanity.